Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (Article 3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.

Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.

Objection 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.

Objection 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God."

Objection 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God."

On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."

I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).

Reply to Objection 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies.

Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the word "God" does not naturally stand for person.

Reply to Objection 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the divine essence---is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (Article 3).

Reply to Objection 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self ," forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (Question 31, Article 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.

Reply to Objection 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina essentialia concretiva non possunt supponere pro persona, ita quod haec sit vera, deus genuit deum. Quia, ut sophistae dicunt, terminus singularis idem significat et supponit. Sed hoc nomen deus videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter praedicari non possit, ut dictum est.

Ergo, cum significet essentiam, videtur quod supponat pro essentia, et non pro persona.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, terminus in subiecto positus non restringitur per terminum positum in praedicato, ratione significationis; sed solum ratione temporis consignificati. Sed cum dico, deus creat, hoc nomen deus supponit pro essentia. Ergo cum dicitur, deus genuit, non potest iste terminus deus, ratione praedicati notionalis, supponere pro persona.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, si haec est vera, deus genuit, quia pater generat; pari ratione haec erit vera, deus non generat, quia filius non generat.

Ergo est deus generans, et deus non generans.

Et ita videtur sequi quod sint duo dii.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, si deus genuit deum, aut se deum, aut alium deum. Sed non se deum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., nulla res generat seipsam.

Neque alium deum, quia non est nisi unus deus.

Ergo haec est falsa, deus genuit deum.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, si deus genuit deum, aut deum qui est deus pater, aut deum qui non est deus pater. Si deum qui est deus pater, ergo deus pater est genitus. Si deum qui non est deus pater, ergo deus est qui non est deus pater, quod est falsum.

Non ergo potest dici quod deus genuit deum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod in symbolo dicitur deum de deo.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod hoc nomen deus, et similia, proprie secundum suam naturam supponunt pro essentia, sed ex adiuncto notionali trahuntur ad supponendum pro persona.

Et haec opinio processisse videtur ex consideratione divinae simplicitatis, quae requirit quod in deo idem sit habens et quod habetur, et sic habens deitatem, quod significat hoc nomen deus, est idem quod deitas.

Sed in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res significata; sed etiam modus significandi. Et ideo, quia hoc nomen deus significat divinam essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen homo humanitatem significat in supposito; alii melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen deus ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona, sicut et hoc nomen homo. Quandoque ergo hoc nomen deus supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur, deus creat, quia hoc praedicatum competit subiecto ratione formae significatae, quae est deitas.

Quandoque vero supponit personam, vel unam tantum, ut cum dicitur, deus generat; vel duas, ut cum dicitur deus spirat; vel tres, ut cum dicitur, regi saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli deo etc., I Tim. I.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen deus, licet conveniat cum terminis singularibus in hoc, quod forma significata non multiplicatur; convenit tamen cum terminis communibus in hoc, quod forma significata invenitur in pluribus suppositis. Unde non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentia quam significat.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit contra illos qui dicebant quod hoc nomen deus non habet naturalem suppositionem pro persona.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter se habet hoc nomen deus ad supponendum pro persona, et hoc nomen homo. Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus homo non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, homo est species. Sed forma significata per hoc nomen deus, scilicet essentia divina, est una et communis secundum rem. Unde per se supponit pro natura communi, sed ex adiuncto determinatur eius suppositio ad personam. Unde cum dicitur, deus generat, ratione actus notionalis supponit hoc nomen deus pro persona patris.

Sed cum dicitur, deus non generat, nihil additur quod determinet hoc nomen ad personam filii, unde datur intelligi quod generatio repugnet divinae naturae. Sed si addatur aliquid pertinens ad personam filii, vera erit locutio; ut si dicatur, deus genitus non generat. Unde etiam non sequitur, est deus generans et est deus non generans, nisi ponatur aliquid pertinens ad personas; ut puta si dicamus, pater est deus generans, et filius est deus non generans. Et ita non sequitur quod sint plures dii, quia pater et filius sunt unus deus, ut dictum est.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod haec est falsa, pater genuit se deum, quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum.

Neque est contrarium quod Augustinus dicit, ad maximum, quod deus pater genuit alterum se. Quia ly se vel est casus ablativi; ut sit sensus, genuit alterum a se. Vel facit relationem simplicem, et sic refert identitatem naturae, sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus, genuit alterum simillimum sibi.

Similiter et haec est falsa, genuit alium deum. Quia licet filius sit alius a patre, ut supra dictum est, non tamen est dicendum quod sit alius deus, quia intelligeretur quod hoc adiectivum alius poneret rem suam circa substantivum quod est deus; et sic significaretur distinctio deitatis.

Quidam tamen concedunt istam, genuit alium deum, ita quod ly alius sit substantivum, et ly deus appositive construatur cum eo.

Sed hic est improprius modus loquendi, et evitandus, ne detur occasio erroris.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est falsa, deus genuit deum qui est deus pater, quia, cum ly pater appositive construatur cum ly deus, restringit ipsum ad standum pro persona patris; ut sit sensus, genuit deum qui est ipse pater, et sic pater esset genitus, quod est falsum. Unde negativa est vera, genuit deum qui non est deus pater. Si tamen intelligeretur constructio non esse appositiva, sed aliquid esse interponendum; tunc e converso affirmativa esset vera, et negativa falsa; ut sit sensus, genuit deum qui est deus qui est pater. Sed haec est extorta expositio. Unde melius est quod simpliciter affirmativa negetur, et negativa concedatur.

Praepositivus tamen dixit quod tam negativa quam affirmativa est falsa. Quia hoc relativum qui in affirmativa potest referre suppositum, sed in negativa refert et significatum et suppositum.

Unde sensus affirmativae est, quod esse deum patrem conveniat personae filii. Negativae vero sensus est, quod esse deum patrem non tantum removeatur a persona filii, sed etiam a divinitate eius sed hoc irrationabile videtur, cum, secundum philosophum, de eodem de quo est affirmatio, possit etiam esse negatio.