Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate)

 QUESTION ONE

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 QUESTION TWO

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 QUESTION THREE

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 QUESTION FOUR

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 QUESTION FIVE

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 QUESTION SIX

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 QUESTION SEVEN

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 QUESTION EIGHT

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 QUESTION NINE

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 REFERENCES

 QUESTION TEN

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 QUESTION ELEVEN

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 QUESTION TWELVE

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 QUESTION THIRTEEN

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 QUESTION FOURTEEN

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 QUESTION FIFTEEN

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 QUESTION SIXTEEN

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 QUESTION SEVENTEEN

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 QUESTION EIGHTEEN

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 QUESTION NINETEEN

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 QUESTION TWENTY

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 REFERENCES

 QUESTION TEN

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 QUESTION ELEVEN

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 QUESTION TWELVE

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 QUESTION THIRTEEN

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 QUESTION FOURTEEN

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 QUESTION FIFTEEN

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 QUESTION SIXTEEN

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 QUESTION SEVENTEEN

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 QUESTION EIGHTEEN

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 QUESTION NINETEEN

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 QUESTION TWENTY

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 QUESTION TWENTY-ONE

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 QUESTION TWENTY-TWO

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 QUESTION TWENTY-THREE

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 QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR

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 QUESTION TWENTY-FIVE

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 QUESTION TWENTY-SIX

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 QUESTION TWENTY-SEVEN

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 QUESTION TWENTY-EIGHT

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 QUESTION TWENTY-NINE

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ARTICLE I

This Question Concerns Prophecy, and in the First Article We Ask: IS PROPHECY A HABIT OR AN ACT?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not a habit, for

1. As the Commentator says, a habit is that by which one performs an activity when he wants to. But the prophet cannot make use of prophecy when he wants to, as is clear of Eliseus in the fourth Book of Kings (3:14, 15), who, on being questioned by the king, could not give him an answer without calling the minstrel, so that the hand of the Lord might come upon him. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.

2. Whoever has a cognitive habit can consider the subject matter of that habit without receiving anything from another. For one who needs an instructor for this does not yet have the habit. But a prophet cannot examine the subject matter of prophecy unless each event is revealed to him. Hence, in the fourth Book of Kings (4:27) Eliseus said of the woman whose son was dead: "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me." Therefore, prophecy is not a cognitive habit. Nor can it be a different habit, for prophecy belongs to cognition.

3. It was said that the prophet needs a habit to be able to know those things which are divinely shown him.--On the contrary, divine speech is more efficacious than human speech. But no habit is needed for one to understand from human speech that something will take place. Therefore, there seems much less need of a habit to perceive the revelation by which God speaks to the prophet.

4. A habit suffices for the knowledge of the whole subject matter of that habit. But by the gift of prophecy one is not taught everything that can be prophesied. For, as Gregory says and proves by examples: "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy inspires the mind of the one prophesying for present events and not at all for the future, and sometimes touches it for the future and not for the present." Therefore, the gift of prophecy is not a habit.

5. It was said that the subject matter of the gift of prophecy is not everything which can be prophesied but only that for the revelation of which the gift is given.--On the contrary, an inpouring can be limited only by that which gives it or by that which receives it. But the one receiving the inpouring of the gift of prophecy imposes no limitation to prevent it from extending to everything which can be prophesied, for the human intellect is capable of knowing all that can be prophesied. Nor is it limited by the one who gives it, for His liberality is infinite. Therefore, the gift of prophecy extends to everything which can be prophesied.

6. The affective part of the soul is so constituted that the one influx of grace frees the soul from all guilt. Therefore, the intellective part, also, is such that the influx of the one light of prophecy will cleanse the soul from all ignorance of things that can be prophesied.

7. A freely given habit is more perfect than an acquired habit. But an acquired habit extends to many acts. Therefore, if prophecy is a freely given habit, it, too, will extend not to only one of the things which can be prophesied, but to all of them.

8. If we had one habit for each conclusion, those habits would not be joined together in the habit of one complete science, unless the conclusions had some connection in so far as they are deduced from the same principles. But future contingents of this sort and other things which prophecy concerns, do not have any interconnection, as the conclusions of a single science have. Therefore, it follows that, if prophecy is a habit, and if the gift of prophecy extends to only one of the things prophesied, there will be in one prophet as many habits of prophecy as there are things which he knows can be prophesied.

9. It was said that the habit of prophecy, once infused, extends to all that can be prophesied, but still a new revelation is needed to disclose certain species.--On the contrary, the infused habit of prophecy ought to be more perfect than the habit of an acquired science, and the prophetic light ought to be more perfect than the natural light of the agent intellect. But with the power of the light of the agent intellect and with the habit of a science, plus the added assistance of the power of imagination, we can form as many species as we need for the actual consideration of those things to which the habit extends. Therefore, if a prophet has a habit, he can do this much more readily without a new disclosure of any species.

10. As the Gloss reads: "Prophecy is a divine inspiration, which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth." But inspiration does not signify a habit, but an act. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.

11. According to the Philosopher, seeing is a kind of passivity. Therefore, sight is a passive operation. But prophecy is a kind of sight, for, according to the first Book of Kings (9:9): "He that is now called a prophet, in times past was called a seer." Therefore, prophecy is not a habit, but rather a passive operation.

12. According to the Philosopher, a habit is "a quality which is hard to change." But prophecy is easily changed, since it does not remain in the prophet at all times but only now and then. As the Gloss on Amos (7:14), "I am not a prophet," says: "The spirit does not give prophecy to the prophets at all times, but only now and then. And when they are enlightened, they are rightly called prophets." Gregory also says: "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy fails prophets and it is not always at the service of their minds, for, when they do not have it, they know that it is a gift when they do have it." Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.

To the Contrary:

1'. According to the Philosopher, there are three things in the soul: powers, habits, and passive operations. But prophecy is not a power, for, then, everyone would be a prophet, since the powers of the soul are common to all. Similarly, it is not a passive operation, for they exist only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is said in the Physics. Therefore, it is a habit.

2'. Everything which is known is known through some habit. But the prophet knows the things which he declares; he does not know them, however, by reason of a natural or an acquired habit. Therefore, he knows them by some infused habit, which we call prophecy.

3'. If prophecy is not a habit, this is so only because the prophet cannot see everything else which can be prophesied, unless he receives a new inspiration. But this does not prevent it from being a habit, for one who has a habit of common principles cannot consider the particular conclusions of some particular science unless he receives in addition some habit of the particular science. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent prophecy from being a common habit, which still demands a new revelation for the knowledge of the individual things to be prophesied.

4'. Faith is the habit of everything which must be believed, yet one who has the habit of faith does not immediately have distinct knowledge of each matter of belief, but needs instruction to know the articles of faith distinctly. Therefore, although prophecy is a habit, there still is need of divine revelation, as a kind of speech, for the prophet to know distinctly what is to be prophesied.

REPLY:

As is said in the Gloss: Prophecy is called sight, and the prophet is called seer." This is clear from the first Book of Kings (9:9), as was mentioned earlier. Still, not every sight can be called prophecy, but only the sight of those things which are far beyond our ordinary knowledge. As a result, the prophet is said to be not only one who speaks from afar (procul fans), that is, one who announces, but also one who sees from afar (procul videns), from the Greek phanos, which is an appearing.

However, since everything which is revealed is revealed under some light, as can be seen in Ephesians (5:13), those things which are revealed to man beyond the ordinary course of knowledge must be made manifest by a higher light. This is called the prophetic light and by receiving it one is made a prophet.

However, we must bear in mind that a thing can be received in someone in two ways. In one, it is received as a form which remains in the subject; in the other, it is received after the manner of a transient impression. Thus, pallor exists as a quality in one who has this color naturally or from some serious accident, but exists as a transient impression in one who suddenly turns white from some fear. Similarly, physical light is in the stars as a quality of the stars, since it is a form remaining in them. But it is in air as a transient impression, since air does not retain light, but only receives it by being placed in the path of a shining body.

Accordingly, in human understanding there is a light which is a quality or permanent form, namely, the essential light of the agent intellect, by reason of which our soul is called intellectual. But the prophetic light in the prophet cannot be this. For whoever knows certain objects by means of intellectual light, which has become a property in him, existing there as a form, must have stable knowledge of those things. And this cannot be unless he sees them in a principle in which they can be known. For, as long as the things known are not reduced to their principles, the knowledge is not established as certain, but is apprehended by him as having some probability, inasmuch as it has been spoken by others. Hence, for each thing he must receive word from others. Thus, if someone did not know how to deduce the conclusions of geometry from the principles, he would not have the habit of geometry, but would apprehend whatever he knew of the conclusions of geometry as one who believes his teacher. Hence, he would have to be instructed on each point, for he would not be able securely to proceed from some points to others without making a resolution to first principles.

Now, God Himself is the principle in which we can know future contingents and other things which exceed natural knowledge and with which prophecy deals. Hence, since the prophets do not see God's essence, they cannot know the things which they see prophetically by a light which is a kind of habitual form inhering in them, but they have to be taught each thing individually. Thus it is that the prophetic light must not be a habit, but must exist in the soul of the prophet in the manner of a transient impression, as the light of the sun exists in the air. And, as the light remains in the air only when the sun is shining, so the previously mentioned light remains in the mind of the prophet only when it is actually being divinely inspired.

And thus it is that the saints, when they talk about prophecy, speak of it as a transient impression and call it an inspiration or a kind of touch by which the Holy Spirit is said to touch the heart of the prophet. They also speak of prophecy with other words of this kind. And thus it is clear that, as far as the prophetic light is concerned, prophecy cannot be a habit.

But we must remember that in bodily things, after something has undergone a transient impression, even after the impression has left, it is rendered more apt to undergo the impression, as water, once warmed, is warmed more easily afterwards when it has become cold, and a man, after he has been sad many times, is saddened more easily. Hence, the mind, when it has been under the influence of a divine inspiration, even after that inspiration has gone, remains more fit to receive it again, just as the mind remains more devout after devout prayer. It is for this reason that Augustine says: "Lest the mind which begins to grow lukewarm from cares and occupations become altogether cold and its fire die out completely, unless it is frequently enkindled, at set hours we call our mind back to the business of prayer."

Hence, the mind of the prophet, after it has received a divine inspiration one or more times, remains more apt to receive the inspiration again, even after the actual inspiration has ceased. And this aptitude can be called the habit of prophecy, just as Avicenna says that in us habits of science are nothing but certain aptitudes of our soul ordained for the reception of the illumination of the agent intelligence and the intelligible species flowing forth from it into our soul. However, it cannot properly be called habit, but an aptitude or disposition by reason of which one is called a prophet even when he is not actually being inspired. Nevertheless, lest an argument be built on the strength of the word, habit, we will uphold both sides and answer both sets of reasons.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The definition given fits habit in the strict sense, and in this sense the previously mentioned aptitude of prophesying cannot be called a habit. Nevertheless, taken in this way, the aptitude of our soul to receive something from the agent intelligence can also be called a habit, according to Avicenna, for in his opinion that reception is natural. Thus, according to him, one who has an aptitude has the power to receive when he so wishes, for a natural influx does not fail when the matter is disposed. But the influx of prophecy depends on the divine will alone; hence, it is not in the power of a prophet to use prophecy, no matter how great an aptitude he has for it in his mind.

2. If prophetic light existed in the mind as a habit of knowledge about things to be prophesied, a prophet would not need new revelation to know anything that can be prophesied. But he does need new revelation, because that light is not a habit. The aptitude itself to perceive the light is like a habit, and without this light things to be prophesied cannot be known.

3. Beyond the perception of the divine speech by which God talks interiorly to the prophet, and which is nothing but the enlightening of his mind, no habit is needed to perceive interiorly what has been said. But an aptitude seems to have a greater effect toward the perception of this speech, the more noble the speech is and the more its perception surpasses the natural powers.

4. The solution to the fourth difficulty is clear from what has been said.

5. The prophetic light, once infused, does not give knowledge of all that can be prophesied, but only of those things for the knowledge of which it is given. This limitation does not come from lack of power in the giver, but from the ordination of His wisdom, which distributes to each as He wishes.

6. All mortal sins have this in common, that through any one of them man is separated from God. Hence, grace, which joins man to God, frees him from every mortal sin, but not from every venial sin, for venial sins do not separate him from God. But things which can be prophesied have a connection among themselves only in the order of God's wisdom. Hence, one can be seen without another by those who do not see divine wisdom completely.

7. An infused habit is more perfect than an acquired habit according to its genus, namely, by reason of its origin and by reason of the object which it is given to attain, which is higher than that to which an acquired habit is ordained. But nothing prevents an acquired habit from being more perfect in the manner in which it is possessed or perfected. Thus, it is clear that through the infused habit of faith we do not see the matters to be believed as perfectly as we see the conclusions of the sciences through the acquired habit of a science. Similarly, although the prophetic light is infused, still it does not exist as perfectly in us as the acquired habits. This also attests to the dignity of infused habits, for, since they are so excellent, human weakness cannot fully possess them.

8. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the light with which the mind of the prophet is flooded were a habit, but not if we hold that this habit or quasi habit is an aptitude for perceiving the aforesaid light, since this one thing could render a man apt to be enlightened about anything.

9. We will treat later of the way in which the species have to be formed anew for prophetic revelation.

10. Although inspiration does not signify a habit, it cannot be proved from this that prophecy is not a habit. For it is customary to define habits through their acts.

11. According to the Philosopher, to see can be taken in two ways: actually and habitually. Hence, sight can mean the act or the habit.

12. Prophetic light is not a quality which is hard to change, but something transient. It is in this sense that the authoritative citations mentioned speak. But that aptitude which remains for perceiving the illumination again is not easily changed; in fact, it remains a long time unless there is a great change in the prophet, through which such an aptitude is taken away.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

13. Since acts arise completely from habits, they are therefore reduced to habit in that division of the Philosopher. Or they are also reduced to passive operations, since passive operations are acts of the soul, as to be angry or to desire.

But prophecy, in so far as it refers to the sight of the prophet, is an act of the mind; in so far as it refers to the light, which is received suddenly and in a passing manner, it is like a passive operation, inasmuch as a reception in the intellective part is called a passive operation, for to understand is a kind of passivity, as is said in The Soul.

Or it can be said that, if the members of the division are taken strictly, that division of the Philosopher does not adequately comprehend everything which is in the soul, but only that which relates to moral matters, about which the Philosopher is thinking, as is clear from the examples with which he there explains himself.

2'. Not everything which is known is known by some habit, but only that of which we have perfect knowledge. For there are in us imperfect acts, which do not come from habits.

3'. In the demonstrative sciences there are certain general things in which particular conclusions are contained virtually, as it were in embryo. Hence, one who has the habit of those general things is only in remote potency to the particular conclusions, and this potency needs a mover to reduce it to act. But in things to be prophesied there is no such connection requiring that some knowledge be deduced from other prior knowledge in such a way that one possessing the knowledge involved in the prior habits would possess in a confused way the knowledge involved in the subsequent habits. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4'. Our understanding is perfected in different ways by prophecy and by faith. For prophecy perfects understanding in itself, and thus it is necessary that the prophet be able to see distinctly those things for which he has the gift of prophecy. But faith perfects our understanding in the affective order, for the act of faith is an act of the understanding commanded by the will. Hence, through faith the understanding is only prepared to assent to those things which God orders to be believed. It is for this reason that faith is likened to hearing, but prophecy to sight. And thus it is not necessary for one who has the habit of faith to know all the matters of belief distinctly, as one who has the habit of prophecy must know distinctly all that is to be prophesied.