Chap. XV.—Of Folly, Wisdom, Piety, Equity, and Justice.

But the reason on account of which they imagine those who are wise to be foolish has strong grounds of support (for they are not deceived without reason). And this must be diligently explained by us, that they may at length (if it is possible) recognise their errors. Justice by its own nature has a certain appearance of folly, and I am able to confirm this both by divine and human testimonies. But perhaps we should not succeed with them, unless we should teach them from their own authorities that no one can be just, a matter which is united with true wisdom, unless he also appears to be foolish. Carneades was a philosopher of the Academic sect; and one who knows not what power he had in discussion, what eloquence, what sagacity, will nevertheless understand the character of the man himself from the praises of Cicero or of Lucilius, in whose writings Neptune, discoursing on a subject of the greatest difficulty, shows that it cannot be explained, even if Orcus should restore Carneades himself to life. This Carneades, when he had been sent by the Athenians as ambassador to Rome, disputed copiously on the subject of justice, in the hearing of Galba and Cato, who had been censor, who were at that time the greatest of orators. But on the next day the same man overthrew his own argument by a disputation to the contrary effect, and took away the justice which he had praised on the preceding day, not indeed with the gravity of a philosopher, whose prudence ought to be firm and his opinion settled, but as it were by an oratorical kind of exercise of disputing on both sides. And he was accustomed to do this, that he might be able to refute others who asserted anything. L. Furius, in Cicero, makes mention of that discussion in which justice is overthrown.1005    [See Rep., iii. cap. 6, part iv. vol. 2, p. 300, ed. Klotz.]   I believe, inasmuch as he was discussing the subject of the state, he did it that he might introduce the defence and praise of that without which he thought that a state could not be governed. But Carneades, that he might refute Aristotle and Plato, the advocates of justice, in that first disputation collected all the arguments which were alleged in behalf of justice, that he might be able to overthrow them, as he did. For it was very easy to shake justice, having no roots, inasmuch as there was then none on the earth, that its nature or qualities might be perceived by philosophers. And I could wish that men, so many and of such a character, had possessed knowledge also, in proportion to their eloquence and spirit, for completing the defence of this greatest virtue, which has its origin in religion, its principle in equity! But those who were ignorant of that first part could not possess the second. But I wish first to show, summarily and concisely, what it is, that it may be understood that the philosophers were ignorant of justice, and were unable to defend that with which they were unacquainted. Although justice embraces all the virtues together, yet there are two, the chief of all, which cannot be torn asunder and separated from it—piety and equity. For fidelity, temperance, uprightness, innocence, integrity, and the other things of this kind, either naturally or through the training of parents, may exist in those men who are ignorant of justice, as they have always existed; for the ancient Romans, who were accustomed to glory in justice, used evidently to glory in those virtues which (as I have said) may proceed from justice, and be separated from the very fountain itself. But piety and equity are, as it were, its veins: for in these two fountains the whole of justice is contained; but its source and origin is in the first, all its force and method in the second. But piety is nothing else but the conception1006    Notio.   of God, as Trismegistus most truly defined it, as we have said in another place. If, therefore, it is piety to know God, and the sum of this knowledge is that you worship Him, it is plain that he is ignorant of justice who does not possess the knowledge of God. For how can he know justice itself, who is ignorant of the source from which it arises? Plato, indeed, spoke many things respecting the one God, by whom he said that the world was framed; but he spoke nothing respecting religion: for he had dreamed of God, but had not known Him. But if either he himself or any other person had wished to complete the defence of justice, he ought first of all to have overthrown the religions of the gods, because they are opposed to piety. And because Socrates indeed tried to do this, he was thrown into prison; that even then it might be seen what was about to happen to those men who had begun to defend true justice, and to serve the only God.  

The other part of justice, therefore, is equity; and it is plain that I am not speaking of the equity of judging well, though this also is praiseworthy in a just man, but of making himself equal to others, which Cicero calls equability.1007    [De Officiis, i. 26; and see vol. ii. p. 421, this series.]   For God, who produces and gives breath to men, willed that all should be equal, that is, equally matched.1008    [A striking parallel to Cyprian’s saying, vol. v. note 2, p. 460, this series.]   He has imposed on all the same condition of living; He has produced all to wisdom; He has promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits. For as He distributes to all alike His one light, sends forth His fountains to all, supplies food, and gives the most pleasant rest of sleep; so He bestows on all equity and virtue. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if all have the same Father, by an equal right we are all children. No one is poor in the sight of God, but he who is without justice; no one is rich, but he who is full of virtues; no one, in short, is excellent, but he who has been good and innocent; no one is most renowned, but he who has abundantly performed works of mercy; no one is most perfect, but he who has filled all the steps of virtue. Therefore neither the Romans nor the Greeks could possess justice, because they had men differing from one another by many degrees, from the poor to the rich, from the humble to the powerful; in short, from private persons to the highest authorities of kings. For where all are not equally matched, there is not equity; and inequality of itself excludes justice, the whole force of which consists in this, that it makes those equal who have by an equal lot arrived at the condition of this life.  

0595A CAPUT XV. De stultitia, sapientia, pietate, aequitate et justitia.

Quae vero causa sit, 0595A ut eos qui sapientes sunt, stultos putent, magna ratio est (nec enim frustra falluntur). Quae nobis diligenter est explicanda, ut errores suos tandem (si fieri possit) agnoscant. Justitia suapte natura speciem quamdam stultitiae habet, quod ego et divinis, et humanis testimoniis confirmare possum. Sed nihil fortasse apud istos agamus, nisi eos de suis doceamus auctoribus, non posse quemquam justum esse, quod est conjunctum cum vera sapientia, nisi idem stultus esse videatur. Carneades, Academicae sectae philosophus, cujus in disserendo quae vis fuerit, quae eloquentia, quod acumen, qui nescit, ipsum 0595B ex praedicatione Ciceronis intelliget, aut Lucilii, apud quem disserens Neptunus de re difficillima, ostendit non posse id explicari, nec si Carneadem ipsum Orcus remittat. Is, cum legatus ab Atheniensibus Romam missus esset, disputavit de justitia copiose, audiente Galba, et Catone censorio, maximis tunc oratoribus. Sed idem disputationem suam postridie contraria disputatione subvertit; et justitiam, quam pridie laudaverat, sustulit, non quidem philosophi 0596A gravitate, cujus firma et stabilis debet esse sententia, sed quasi oratorio exercitii genere in utramque partem disserendi. Quod ille facere solebat, ut alios quidlibet afferentes posset refutare. Eam disputationem, qua justitia evertitur, apud Ciceronem L. Furius recordatur: credo, quoniam de republica disserebat, ut defensionem laudationemque ejus induceret, sine qua putabat regi non posse rempublicam. Carneades autem, ut Aristotelem refelleret ac Platonem justitiae patronos, prima illa disputatione collegit ea omnia, quae pro justitia dicebantur, ut posset illa, sicut fecit, evertere. Erat enim facillimum justitiam radices non habentem labefactare, quia tum nulla in terra fuit, ut quid esset, aut qualis, a philosophis cerneretur.

Atque utinam tot ac tales viri, quantum eloquentiae 0596B quantumque animi, tantum etiam scientiae ad implendam defensionem summae virtutis habuissent, cujus origo in religione, ratio in aequitate est! Sed ii, qui primam illam partem nescierunt, ne secundam quidem tenere potuerunt. Volo autem prius circumscripte, ac breviter, quid sit ostendere, ut intelligatur philosophos ignorasse justitiam, nec id, quod minime noverant, potuisse defendere. Justitia quamvis omnes simul virtutes amplectatur, tamen duae sunt 0597A omnium principales, quae ab illa divelli separarique non possunt, pietas et aequitas. Nam fides, temperantia, probitas, innocentia, integritas, et caetera hujusmodi, vel natura, 0597A vel institutis parentum, possunt esse in iis hominibus qui justitiam nesciunt, sicuti semper fuerunt. Nam Romani veteres, qui justitia gloriari solebant, iis utique virtutibus gloriabantur, quae (ut dixi) proficisci a justitia possunt, et ab ipso fonte secerni. Pietas vero et aequitas, quasi venae sunt ejus; his enim duobus fontibus constat tota justitia. Sed caput ejus et origo in illo primo est, in secundo vis omnis ac ratio. Pietas autem nihil aliud est quam Dei notio; sicut Trismegistus verissime definivit, ut alio loco diximus. Si ergo pietas est cognoscere Deum, cujus cognitionis haec summa est, ut eum colas, 0597B ignorat utique justitiam, qui religionem Dei non tenet. Quomodo enim potest eam ipsam nosse, qui unde oriatur ignorat? Plato quidem multa de uno Deo locutus est, a quo ait constitutum esse mundum: sed nihil de religione; somniaverat enim Deum, non cognoverat. Quod si justitiae defensionem vel ipse, vel quilibet alius implere voluisset, in primis religiones deorum evertere debuit, quia contrariae sunt pietati. Quod quidem Socrates quia facere tentavit, in carcerem conjectus est; ut jam tunc appareret quid esset futurum iis hominibus, qui justitiam veram defendere, Deoque singulari servire coepissent.

0598A Altera est justitiae pars aequitas: aequitatem dico non utique bene judicandi, quod et ipsum laudabile est in homine justo; sed se cum caeteris coaequandi, quam Cicero aequabilitatem vocat. Deus enim, qui homines generat, et inspirat, omnes aequos, id est pares esse voluit. Eamdem conditionem vivendi omnibus posuit, omnes ad sapientiam genuit, omnibus immortalitatem spopondit: nemo a beneficiis ejus coelestibus segregatur. Nam sicut omnibus unicum suum lumen aequaliter dividit, emittit omnibus fontes, victum subministrat, quietem somni dulcissimam tribuit: sic omnibus aequitatem virtutemque largitur. Nemo apud eum servus est, nemo dominus. Si enim cunctis idem pater est, aequo jure omnes liberi sumus. Nemo Deo pauper est, nisi qui justitia indiget; nemo dives, nisi 0598B qui virtutibus plenus est; nemo denique egregius, nisi qui bonus et innocens fuerit; nemo clarissimus, nisi qui opera misericordiae largiter fecerit; nemo perfectissimus, nisi qui omnes gradus virtutis impleverit. Quare neque Romani, neque Graeci justitiam tenere potuerunt, quia dispares multis gradibus homines habuerunt, a pauperibus ad divites, ab humilibus ad potentes, a privatis denique usque ad regum sublimissimas potestates. Ubi enim non sunt universi pares, aequitas non est; et excludit inaequalitas ipsa justitiam, cujus vis omnis in eo est, ut pares faciat eos, qui ad hujus vitae conditionem pari sorte venerunt.