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to meet the Romans. But to flee, when there is no necessity, is not profitable even for a short time. But to place whatever is superfluous and the rest of the soldiers' baggage in safety wherever it seems best, and he himself, having his army lightly-equipped and agile, to remain in the same places. However, to by no means make the army visible, but to conceal it in glens and valleys, as the place was naturally well-suited for this. And selecting about one hundred soldiers as scouts, to order them to stand in the same places where he himself had been drawn up on the previous day, and if the emperor were to remain quiet in the camp, they too were to hide there until it became clear to us what course he would take. But if he should come against us, first it is not possible for them to come head-on, avoiding the difficult terrain and the strongholds of the region. For it is characteristic of strategic experience not only to arrange the army in an orderly fashion, but also to aim for opportunities 1.358 and places, from which they will be able to harm the enemy most and help their friends. But if indeed they shall be so far removed from right reasoning as to thrust themselves so rashly and recklessly into the precipices of the mountains and the ravines, this is what we would most wish, and it would be a prayer answered to see it happen. For they will hand the victory to us, being destroyed without a struggle. Therefore, this being so, we do not think that they themselves are unaware of it, since we see they have experience of the deeds of enemies. It remains then for them, going around the summit of the mountains, to attack us from the other side, since it is level and offers them an easy assault. But anyone who wishes can guess that, until their path is completed, it is possible for us to place ourselves outside of all danger and fear by withdrawing to the most defensible positions, and in addition there will be the advantage of not seeming to flee because of fear of them, in which lies the greatest shame, but, using the experience of generals, to provide safety for our own men. But those one hundred whom we said were to stand as scouts, after waiting for the emperor until he gets near them, then they too are to withdraw safely, since no one would attack them because they are lightly-equipped and swift and use good horses. When the barbarians had deliberated on such things, Orchanes was persuaded, and the others too, and it was decided to remain, so as to carry out their plans on the next day. And into the Roman camp 1.359 a rumor spread that the emperor was in a bad way from his wound, having been struck a critical blow. And as many as were still inclined in their opinions to the elder emperor spread the report that the emperor was on the verge of death; and whether they thought this was truly the case, or whether they circulated such rumors out of enmity, was left uncertain, since the emperor later left the matter unexamined so as not to seem to be taking vengeance on them on account of their loyalty to his grandfather. For the time being, then, it was rumored by them, and they advised the soldiers from Byzantium to withdraw from the camp to the neighboring cities of Bithynia, since if anything should happen to the emperor they would all be destroyed by the Persians. And some of them, going to the grand domestic, as if they were well-disposed, advised him to lead the army away to the nearby cities, as it was already disturbed by the rumor and on the verge of falling into disorder. But he refused the suggestion and said that what they were planning was not expedient; and when they could not persuade him though they pleaded much, they suggested that the opinion be shared with the emperor, so that whatever seemed best to him might be done. To this indeed they persuaded him, as he himself thought it necessary to make known to the emperor what was happening. And so going to the emperor, he reported all that the officers had said concerning what seemed expedient. But the emperor considered it most disadvantageous and was displeased not moderately, and ordered him to go as quickly as possible to the entrance of the camp, to hold back the army and by no means allow it to fall into disorder, as they would be destroyed by their own hands without any enemy 1.360. This therefore, as

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προσυπαντᾷν Ῥωμαίοις. τὸ δὲ φεύγειν, ἀνάγκης μὴ παρούσης, μηδ' ἐπὶ μικρὸν λυσιτελεῖν. ἀλλ' ὅσα μὲν περιττὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποσκευὴν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ καθιστᾷν ὅποι ἂν δοκῇ, αὐτὸν δὲ εὐσταλῆ καὶ κούφην ἔχοντα τὴν στρατιὰν, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων μένειν. ἐμφανῆ μέντοι μηδαμῶς ποιεῖν τὴν στρατιὰν, ἀλλ' ἐν νάπαις καὶ ταῖς κοιλάσι κατακρύπτειν, ἐπιεικῶς πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχοντος τοῦ τόπου εὐφυῶς. ὥσπερ δέ τινας σκοποὺς ἑκατὸν ἀπολεξάμενον στρατιώτας, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑστάναι τόπων κελεύειν, οὗ αὐτὸς παρετάττετο τῇ προτεραίᾳ, καὶ εἰ μὲν βασιλεὺς ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἡσυχάζοι, καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐνταῦθα κρύπτεσθαι ἄχρις ἂν ἡμῖν ἐμφανὲς καταστῇ πρὸς ὅ, τι τράπηται κἀκεῖνος. ἐὰν δὲ ἡμῖν ἐπίῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ δυνατὸν αὐτοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐλθεῖν, τὰς δυσχωρίας παραιτουμένους καὶ τὰς ὀχυρότητας τὰς ἐκ τῶν τόπων. ἐμπειρίας γὰρ ἴδιον στρατηγικῆς οὐ μόνον τὴν στρατιὰν διατάττειν κοσμίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καιρῶν στο 1.358 χάζεσθαι καὶ τόπων, ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστα τούς τε πολεμίους δυνήσονται βλάψαι καὶ τοὺς φίλους ὠφελῆσαι. εἰ δ' ἄρα τοσοῦτον ἐκστήσονται τῶν ὀρθῶς ἐχόντων λογισμῶν, ὥσθ' ἑαυτοὺς θρασέως οὑτωσὶ καὶ παραβόλως ἐπὶ τὰ κρημνὰ τῶν ὀρῶν καὶ τὰς χαράδρας εἰσωθεῖν, τοῦτ' ἂν μάλιστα βουλοίμεθα ἡμεῖς καὶ εὐχῆς ἂν ἔργον ἰδεῖν γεγενημένον εἴη. τὴν νίκην γὰρ ἡμῖν παραδώσουσιν ἀπονητὶ διαφθαρέντες. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτον ὂν οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς οἰόμεθα ἀγνοῆσαι, πεῖραν ὡς ὁρῶμεν πολεμίων ἔργων ἔχοντας. λείπεται δὴ περιελθόντας τὴν ἄκραν τῶν ὀρῶν, ἐκ θατέρου μέρους προσβαλεῖν ἡμῖν, πεδινοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ ῥᾳδίαν παρέχοντος τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν αὐτοῖς. στοχάζεσθαι δὲ ἔξεστι παντὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, ὡς ἄχρις ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ ὁδὸς διανυσθῇ, δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἔξω τε κινδύνων καὶ φόβου παντὸς ἑαυτοὺς καθιστᾷν πρὸς τὰ καρτερώτατα ἀναχωρήσαντας, καὶ προσέτι προσέσται τὸ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ὀῤῥωδίαν φεύγειν δοκεῖν, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστά ἐστι τὸ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίᾳ στρατηγῶν χρωμένους, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐκπορίζειν. οὓς μέντοι ἔφημεν ὥσπερ σκοποὺς ἑστάναι ἑκατὸν, τὸν βασιλέα περιμείναντας ἄχρις ἂν ἐγγὺς γένηται αὐτῶν, τότ' ἤδη καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀσφαλῶς ἀποχωρεῖν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἐπιθησομένου διὰ τὸ εὐσταλεῖς εἶναι καὶ κούφους καὶ ἵπποις χρῆσθαι ἀγαθοῖς. Τοιαῦτα τῶν βαρβάρων βουλευσαμένων, Ὀρχάνης τε ἐπείθετο καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐδέδοκτο μένειν ὡς ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίαν τὰ βεβουλευμένα ἐκτελέσοντας. εἰς δὲ τὸ Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον 1.359 διῄει φήμη, ὡς βασιλεὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ τραύματος πονήρως ἔχει, καιρίως πληγείς. ὅσοι δὲ ἦσαν ἔτι καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ βασιλεῖ προσκείμενοι τὰς γνώμας, διεφήμισαν ὡς τεθνηξόμενον ὅσον οὐδέπω βασιλέα· εἴτε δὲ καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως ἔχειν οἰηθέντες, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἔχθραν τὰ τοιαῦτα διεθρύλλησαν, ἐν ἀδήλῳ κατελείφθη, τοῦ βασιλέως ὕστερον διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν τῆς εἰς τὸν πάππον ἕνεκα εὐνοίας ἀμύνεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἀβασάνιστον καταλιπόντος τὸ τοιοῦτον. τέως οὖν διεθρυλλήθη παρ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Βυζαντίου στρατιώταις συνεβούλευον, τοῦ στρατοπέδου πρὸς τὰς παρακειμένας τῆς Βιθυνίας ἀναχωρεῖν πόλεις, ὡς εἴ τι συμβαίη περὶ βασιλέα πάντων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ Περσῶν διαφθαρησομένων. ἔνιοι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν δομέστικον ἐλθόντες, οἷα δὴ εὖνοι, συνεβούλευον ἀπαγαγεῖν τὴν στρατιὰν πρὸς τὰς πλησίον πόλεις ὡς ἤδη τεταραγμένην ὑπὸ τῆς φήμης καὶ ὅσον οὔπω καὶ ἀταξίᾳ χρησομένην. ὁ δὲ ἀνένευέ τε πρὸς τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ λυσιτελοῦντα ἔφασκε βουλεύεσθαι αὐτούς· ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθον πολλὰ δεόμενοι, καὶ βασιλεῖ κοινοῦσθαι τὴν γνώμην ὑπετίθεντο, ὡς ὅ, τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκοίη πραχθησομένου. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἔπειθον οἰόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ γινόμενα γνωρίσαι βασιλεῖ. καὶ δὴ πρὸς βασιλέα ἀπελθὼν, ἀπήγγειλεν ὅσα οἱ ἐν τέλει εἶπον περὶ τοῦ λυσιτελεῖν δοκοῦντος. βασιλεὺς δὲ ἀσυμφορώτατόν τε ἡγεῖτο καὶ ἐδυσχέραινεν οὐ μετρίως, ἐκέλευέ τε ὅτι τάχιστα πρὸς τοῦ στρατοπέδου τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἐλθόντα, κατέχειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ μηδαμῶς ἀτακτεῖν ἐᾷν, ὡς ἄνευ πολεμίων αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς διαφθαρη 1.360 σομένους. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ᾗ