Chap. XVIII.—Of Justice, Wisdom, and Folly.

With reference to our present discussion, I have shown how justice bears the resemblance of folly, that it may appear that those are not deceived without reason who think that men of our religion are foolish in appearing to do such things as he proposed. Now I perceive that a greater undertaking is required from me, to show why God wished to enclose justice under the appearance of folly, and to remove it from the eyes of men, when I shall have first replied to Furius, since Lælius has not sufficiently replied to him; who, although he was a wise man, as he was called, yet could not be the advocate of true justice, because he did not possess the source and fountain of justice. But this defence is easier for us, to whom by the bounty of Heaven this justice is familiar and well known, and who know it not in name, but in reality. For Plato and Aristotle desired with an honest will to defend justice, and would have effected something, if their good endeavours, their eloquence, and vigour of intellect had been aided also by a knowledge of divine things. Thus their work, being vain and useless, was neglected: nor were they able to persuade any of men to live according to their precept, because that system had no foundation from heaven. But our work must be more certain, since we are taught of God. For they represented justice in words, and pictured it when it was not in sight; nor were they able to confirm their assertions by present examples. For the hearers might have answered that it was impossible to live as they prescribed in their disputation; so that none have as yet existed who followed that course of life. But we show the truth of our statements not only by words, but also by examples derived from the truth. Therefore Carneades understood what is the nature of justice, except that he did not sufficiently perceive that it was not folly; although I seem to myself to understand with what intention he did this. For he did not really think that he who is just is foolish; but when he knew that he was not so, but did not comprehend the cause why he appeared so, he wished to show that the truth lay hidden, that he might maintain the dogma of his own sect,1017    i.e., The Academic School.   the chief opinion of which is, “that nothing can be fully comprehended.”  

Let us see, therefore, whether justice has any agreement with folly. The just man, he says, if he does not take away from the wounded man his horse, and from the shipwrecked man his plank, in order that he may preserve his own life, is foolish. First of all, I deny that it can in any way happen that a man who is truly just should be in circumstances of this kind; for the just man is neither at enmity with any human being, nor desires anything at all which is the property of another. For why should he take a voyage, or what should he seek from another land, when his own is sufficient for him? Or why should he carry on war, and mix himself with the passions of others, when his mind is engaged in perpetual peace with men? Doubtless he will be delighted with foreign merchandise or with human blood, who does not know how to seek gain, who is satisfied with his mode of living, and considers it unlawful not only himself to commit slaughter, but to be present with those who do it, and to behold it! But I omit these things, since it is possible that a man may be compelled even against his will to undergo these things. Do you then, O Furius—or rather O Carneades, for all this speech is his—think that justice is so useless, so superfluous, and so despised by God, that it has no power and no influence in itself which may avail for its own preservation? But it is evident that they who are ignorant of the mystery1018    Sacramentum, “the true theory of human life.”   of man, and who therefore refer all things to this present life, cannot know how great is the force of justice. For when they discuss the subject of virtue, although they understand that it is very full of labours and miseries, nevertheless they say that it is to be sought for its own sake; for they by no means see its rewards, which are eternal and immortal. Thus, by referring all things to the present life, they altogether reduce virtue to folly, since it undergoes such great labours of this life in vain and to no purpose. But more on this subject at another opportunity.  

In the meanwhile let us speak of justice, as we began, the power of which is so great, that when it has raised its eyes to heaven, it deserves all things from God. Flaccus therefore rightly said, that the power of innocence is so great, that wherever it journeys, it needs neither arms nor strength for its protection:—  

It is impossible, therefore, that amidst the dangers of tempests and of wars the just man should be unprotected by the guardianship of Heaven; and that even if he should be at sea in company with parricides and guilty men, the wicked also should not be spared, that this one just and innocent soul may be freed from danger, or at any rate may be alone preserved while the rest perish. But let us grant that the case which the philosopher proposes is possible: what, then, will the just man do, if he shall have met with a wounded man on a horse, or a shipwrecked man on a plank? I am not unwilling to confess he will rather die than put another to death. Nor will justice, which is the chief good of man, on this account receive the name of folly. For what ought to be better and dearer to man than innocence? And this must be the more perfect, the more you bring it to extremity, and choose to die rather than to detract from the character of innocence. It is folly, he says, to spare the life of another in a case which involves the destruction of one’s own life. Then do you think it foolish to perish even for friendship?  

Why, then, are those Pythagorean friends praised by you, of whom the one gave himself to the tyrant as a surety for the life of the other, and the other at the appointed time, when his surety was now being led to execution, presented himself, and rescued him by his own interposition? Whose virtue would not be held in such glory, when one of them was willing to die for his friend, the other even for his word1021    Pro fide.   which had been pledged, if they were regarded as fools. In fine, on account of this very virtue the tyrant rewarded them by preserving both, and thus the disposition of a most cruel man was changed. Moreover, it is even said that he entreated1022    Deprecatus esse dicitur.   them to admit him as a third party to their friendship, from which it is plain that he regarded them not as fools, but as good and wise men. Therefore I do not see why, since it is reckoned the highest glory to die for friendship and for one’s word, it is not glorious to a man to die even for his innocence. They are therefore most foolish who impute it as a crime to us that we are willing to die for God, when they themselves extol to the heavens with the highest praises him who was willing to die for a man. In short, to conclude this disputation, reason itself teaches that it is impossible for a man to be at once just and foolish, wise and unjust. For he who is foolish is unacquainted with that which is just and good, and therefore always errs. For he is, as it were, led captive by his vices; nor can he in any way resist them, because he is destitute of the virtue of which he is ignorant. But the just man abstains from all fault, because he cannot do otherwise, although he has the knowledge of right and wrong.  

But who is able to distinguish right from wrong except the wise man? Thus it comes to pass, that he can never be just who is foolish, nor wise who is unjust. And if this is most true, it is plain that he who has not taken away a plank from a shipwrecked man, or a horse from one who is wounded, is not foolish; because it is a sin to do these things, and the wise man abstains from sin. Nevertheless I myself also confess that it has this appearance, through the error of men, who are ignorant of the peculiar character1023    Proprietatem.   of everything. And thus the whole of this inquiry is refuted not so much by arguments as by definition. Therefore folly is the erring in deeds and words, through ignorance of what is right and good. Therefore he is not a fool who does not even spare himself to prevent injury to another, which is an evil. And this, indeed, reason and the truth itself dictate.1024    Conciliatricem sui.   For we see that in all animals, because they are destitute of wisdom, nature is the provider of supplies for itself. Therefore they injure others that they may profit themselves, for they do not understand that the1025    Nesciunt, quia malum est nocere.   committing an injury is evil. But man, who has the knowledge of good and evil, abstains from committing an injury even to his own damage, which an animal without reason is unable to do; and on this account innocence is reckoned among the chief virtues of man. Now by these things it appears that he is the wisest man who prefers to perish rather than to commit an injury, that he may preserve that sense of duty1026    Officium.   by which he is distinguished from the dumb creation. For he who does not point out the error of one who is offering the gold for sale, in order that he may buy it for a small sum, or he who does not avow that he is offering for sale a runaway slave or an infected house, having an eye to his own gain or advantage, is not a wise man, as Carneades wished it to appear, but crafty and cunning. Now craftiness and cunning exist in the dumb animals also: either when they lie in wait for others, and take them by deceit, that they may devour them; or when they avoid the snares of others in various ways. But wisdom falls to man alone. For wisdom is understanding either with the purpose of doing that which is good and right, or for the abstaining from improper words and deeds. Now a wise man never gives himself to the pursuit of gain, because he despises these earthly advantages: nor does he allow any one to be deceived, because it is the duty of a good man to correct the errors of men, and to bring them back to the right way; since the nature of man is social and beneficent, in which respect alone he bears a relation to God.  

CAPUT XVIII. De justitia, sapientia et stultitia.

Quod ad praesentem disputationem pertinebat, ostendi quomodo justitia similitudinem stultitiae gerat; ut appareat non sine causa decipi eos, qui putant, nostrae religionis homines stultos esse, qui talia facere 0604B videantur, qualia ille proposuit. Nunc majus a me exigi sentio; ut ostendam, quare justitiam Deus stultitiae specie convolutam, ex oculis hominum voluerit auferre, si prius Furio respondero, quia parum plene respondit Laelius: qui profecto licet sapiens fuerit, ut vocabatur, patrocinari tamen verae justitiae nullo modo poterat, qui caput ipsum fontemque justitiae non tenebat. Nobis autem facilior est ista defensio, quibus coelesti beneficio familiaris est ac penitus nota justitia, quique illam non nomine, sed re, novimus. Nam Plato et Aristoteles honesta quidem voluntate justitiam defendere cupierunt, effecissentque aliquid, si conatus eorum bonos, si eloquentiam, si virtutem ingenii, divinarum quoque rerum doctrina juvisset. Itaque opus illorum inane atque 0604C inutile jacuit; nec cuiquam hominum persuadere potuerunt, ut eorum praescripto viveret, quia fundamentum a coelo disciplina illa non habuit. Nostrum 0605A opus certius sit necesse est, quos 0605A Deus docuit. Illi enim depingebant verbis, et imaginabantur justitiam, quae in conspectu non erat; nec praesentibus exemplis confirmare poterant, quae afferebant. Responderi enim posset ab audientibus, non posse ita vivi, sicut illi sua disputatione praescriberent; adeo ut nulli adhuc extiterint, qui id genus vitae sequerentur. Nos autem non verbis modo, sed etiam exemplis ex vero petitis, vera esse quae a nobis dicuntur ostendimus. Sensit igitur Carneades, quae sit natura justitiae, nisi quod parum alte perspexit, stultitiam non esse: quanquam intelligere mihi videor, qua mente id fecerit. Non enim vere existimavit eum stultum esse, qui justus est: sed cum sciret non esse, et rationem tamen cur ita videretur, non comprehenderet, voluit 0605B ostendere latere in abdito veritatem, ut decretum disciplinae suae tueretur: cujus summa sententia est, Nihil percipi posse.

Videamus ergo, utrumne justitia foedus aliquod habere cum stultitia possit. Justus, inquit, si aut equum saucio, aut tabulam naufrago non ademerit, ut ipse animam suam liberet, stultus est. Primum omnium, nego ullo modo fieri posse, ut homini, qui quidem vere justus sit, ejusmodi casus eveniat; quia justus neque cuiquam nato inimicus est, neque quidquam omnino appetit alienum. Cur enim naviget, aut quid petat ex aliena terra, cui sufficit sua? Cur autem belligeret, ac se alienis furoribus misceat, in cujus animo pax cum hominibus perpetua versetur? Scilicet peregrinis mercibus, aut humano sanguine delectabitur, 0605C qui nec lucrum sciat appetere, cui sufficit victus; et 0606A non modo ipse caedem facere, sed interesse facientibus, ac spectare ducat nefas. Sed omitto ista; quoniam fieri potest, ut vel invitus ad haec subeunda cogatur. Adeone ergo justitiam, o Furi, vel potius, o Carneade, cujus est illa omnis oratio, tam inanem, tam supervacuam, tamque contemptam Deo putas, ut nihil possit, nihilque habeat in sese, quod ad custodiam sui valeat? Sed videlicet qui sacramentum hominis ignorant, ideoque ad hanc vitam temporalem referunt omnia, quanta sit vis justitiae, scire non possunt. Nam et cum de virtute disputant, quamvis intelligant aerumnis ac miseriis esse plenissimam, tamen expetendam esse aiunt sua causa; ejus enim praemia, quae sunt aeterna et immortalia, nullo modo vident. Sic rebus omnibus ad hanc praesentem vitam 0606B relatis, virtutem plane ad stultitiam redigunt; siquidem tantos hujus vitae labores frustra et inaniter suscipit. Sed haec alio loco plenius.

Interim de justitia, ut coepimus, cujus tanta vis est, ut cum oculos in coelum sustulerit, a Deo mereatur omnia. Recte igitur Flaccus tantam esse dixit innocentiae vim, ut ad tutelam sui non egeat nec armis, nec viribus, quacumque iter fecerit; Integer vitae sceleris atque purus, Non eget Mauri jaculis, nec arcu, Nec venenatis gravida sagittis, Fusce, pharetra: Sive per Syrtes iter aestuosas, Sive facturus per inhospitalem Caucasum, vel quae loca fabulosus Lambit Hydaspes.Non potest ergo fieri, quin hominem justum inter 0606C discrimina tempestatum atque bellorum coelestis tutela 0607A custodiat; ac non, etiamsi cum parricidis et nocentibus naviget, aut malis quoque parcatur, ut una justa et innocens anima liberetur aut certe pereuntibus caeteris sola servetur. Sed concedamus posse fieri, quod proponit philosophus; quid ergo justus faciet, si nactus fuerit aut in equo saucium, aut in tabula naufragum? 0607A Non invitus confiteor, morietur potius, quam occidet. Nec ideo tamen justitia, quod est singulare hominis bonum, stultitiae nomen accipiet. Quid enim melius, quid carius esse homini debet, quam innocentia? quae utique tanto perfectior sit necesse est, quanto illam perduxeris ad extremum, morique malueris, ne quid de innocentiae ratione minuatur. Stultitia est, inquit, alienae animae parcere cum pernicie suae. Num etiam 0607B pro amicitia perire, stultum judicabis?

Quid ergo illi familiares Pythagoraei laudantur a vobis, quorum alter se tyranno vadem mortis pro altero dedit, alter ad praestitutum tempus, cum jam sponsor ejus duceretur, praesentiam sui fecit, eumque interventu suo liberavit? quorum virtus in tanta gloria non haberetur, quod alter pro amico, alter etiam pro fide mori voluit, si stulti putarentur. Denique ob hanc ipsam virtutem tyrannus his gratiam retulit, utrumque servando, et hominis crudelissimi natura mutata est. Quin etiam deprecatus esse dicitur, ut se tertium in amicitiam reciperent, non utique tanquam stultos, sed tanquam bonos et sapientes viros. Itaque non video, quare cum pro amicitia et fide mori, summa gloria computetur, non etiam 0607C pro innocentia perire, sit homini gloriosum. Ergo stultissimi sunt, qui nobis crimini dant, mori velle pro Deo, cum ipsi eum, qui pro homine mori voluit, in coelum summis laudibus tollant. Denique ut concludam disputationem, non posse eumdem justum esse, ac stultum, eumdem sapientem, et injustum, docet ipsa ratio. Qui enim stultus est, quid sit justum 0608A ac bonum nescit; et ideo semper peccat. Ducitur enim quasi captivus a vitiis; nec resistere ullo modo potest, quia caret virtute, quam nescit. Justus autem ab omni peccato se abstinet, quod aliter facere non potest, quam si habeat recti pravique notitiam.

Rectum autem discernere a pravo quis potest, nisi sapiens? Ita fit, ut numquam possit esse justus, qui stultus est, neque sapiens, qui fuerit injustus. Quod si est verissimum, manifestum est eum, qui aut naufrago tabulam, aut equum saucio non ademerit, stultum non esse; quia haec facere peccatum est, a quo se sapiens abstinet. Videri tamen et ipse confiteor, per hominum errorem ignorantium cujusque rei proprietatem. Itaque omnis haec quaestio non tam argumentis, 0608B quam definitione dissolvitur. Stultitia igitur est in factis dictisque, per ignorantiam recti ac boni, erratio. Ergo stultus non est, qui ne sibi quidem parcit, dum ne noceat alteri, quod est malum. Quod quidem nobis et ratio, et veritas ipsa praescribit. In omnibus enim videmus animalibus, quia sapientia carent, conciliatricem sui esse naturam. Nocent igitur aliis, ut sibi prosint; nesciunt enim quia malum est, nocere. Homo vero, qui scientiam boni ac mali habet, abstinet se a nocendo, etiam cum incommodo suo, quod animal irrationale facere non potest; et ideo inter summas hominis virtutes innocentia numeratur. Quibus rebus apparet sapientissimum esse, qui mavult perire ne noceat; ut id officium, quo a mutis discernitur, servet. Nam qui vendentis errorem 0608C non redarguit, ut aurum parvo emat, aut qui non profitetur fugitivum servum, vel pestilentem se domum vendere, lucro et commodo suo consulens, non est ille sapiens, ut Carneades videri volebat, sed callidus et astutus. Calliditas autem et astutia in mutis quoque animalibus sunt, vel cum insidiantur aliis et dolo capiunt ut devorent, vel cum insidias aliorum 0609A vario genere deludunt. Sapientia vero in hominem solum cadit. Sapientia est enim intelligentia vel ad bonum rectumque faciendum, vel ad abstinentiam 0609A dictorum factorumque improborum. Lucro autem nunquam sapiens studet, quia bona haec terrena contemnit; nec quemquam falli patitur, quia boni viri officium est, errores hominum corrigere, eosque in viam reducere. Siquidem socialis est hominis ac benefica natura, quo solo cognationem cum Deo habet.