Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Question 25, Article 1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.

Objection 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God.

Objection 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above (Question 25, Article 1). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.

I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

Reply to Objection 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.

Reply to Objection 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.

Reply to Objection 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis non sit potentia respectu actuum notionalium. Omnis enim potentia est vel activa, vel passiva. Sed neutra hic competere potest, potentia enim passiva in deo non est, ut supra ostensum est; potentia vero activa non competit uni personae respectu alterius, cum personae divinae non sint factae, ut ostensum est.

Ergo in divinis non est potentia ad actus notionales.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, potentia dicitur ad possibile. Sed divinae personae non sunt de numero possibilium, sed de numero necessariorum.

Ergo respectu actuum notionalium, quibus divinae personae procedunt, non debet poni potentia in divinis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, filius procedit ut verbum, quod est conceptio intellectus, spiritus autem sanctus procedit ut amor, qui pertinet ad voluntatem. Sed potentia in deo dicitur per comparationem ad effectus, non autem per comparationem ad intelligere et velle, ut supra habitum est.

Ergo in divinis non debet dici potentia per comparationem ad actus notionales.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, contra maximinum haereticum, si deus pater non potuit generare filium sibi aequalem, ubi est omnipotentia dei patris? est ergo in divinis potentia respectu actuum notionalium.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ponuntur actus notionales in divinis, ita necesse est ibi ponere potentiam respectu huiusmodi actuum, cum potentia nihil aliud significet quam principium alicuius actus. Unde, cum patrem intelligamus ut principium generationis, et patrem et filium ut principium spirationis, necesse est quod patri attribuamus potentiam generandi, et patri et filio potentiam spirandi. Quia potentia generandi significat id quo generans generat, omne autem generans generat aliquo, unde in omni generante oportet ponere potentiam generandi, et in spirante potentiam spirandi.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut secundum actus notionales non procedit aliqua persona ut facta, ita neque potentia ad actus notionales dicitur in divinis per respectum ad aliquam personam factam, sed solum per respectum ad personam procedentem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod possibile, secundum quod necessario opponitur, sequitur potentiam passivam, quae non est in divinis.

Unde neque in divinis est aliquid possibile per modum istum, sed solum secundum quod possibile continetur sub necessario.

Sic autem dici potest quod, sicut deum esse est possibile, sic filium generari est possibile.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia significat principium.

Principium autem distinctionem importat ab eo cuius est principium. Consideratur autem duplex distinctio in his quae dicuntur de deo, una secundum rem, alia secundum rationem tantum.

Secundum rem quidem, deus distinguitur per essentiam a rebus quarum est per creationem principium, sicut una persona distinguitur ab alia, cuius est principium, secundum actum notionalem. Sed actio ab agente non distinguitur in deo nisi secundum rationem tantum, alioquin actio esset accidens in deo. Et ideo respectu illarum actionum secundum quas aliquae res procedunt distinctae a deo, vel essentialiter vel personaliter, potest deo attribui potentia, secundum propriam rationem principii. Et ideo, sicut potentiam ponimus creandi in deo, ita possumus ponere potentiam generandi vel spirandi.

Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicuius rei a deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter. Unde respectu horum actuum, non potest salvari ratio potentiae in deo, nisi secundum modum intelligendi et significandi tantum; prout diversimode significatur in deo intellectus et intelligere, cum tamen ipsum intelligere dei sit eius essentia, non habens principium.