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fighting against voluntary temptations through self-control and enduring involuntary temptations through patience, and he is complete (14Γ_146> who accomplishes both practice with knowledge and contemplation that is not inactive.

For since both pain and pleasure are divided into what belongs to the soul and what belongs to sensation, he who preserves the pleasure of the soul, while accepting the pain of sensation with patience, becomes approved and perfect and complete; approved, because of the experience of sensory opposites, perfect, as one who fights unyieldingly against sensory pleasure and pain through self-control and patience, and complete, as one who preserves unharmed, in the stability of sameness according to reason, the habits that are opposed to the contrary dispositions of sensation, I mean practice and contemplation being connected to each other and neither separated from the other, but practice revealing the knowledge of contemplation through one's ways of life, and contemplation, armored with the virtue of practice no less than by reason.

Therefore, since the argument has shown that both pain and pleasure are twofold, the one consisting in what belongs to the soul, the other in what belongs to sensation, come, let us also contemplate, as best we can, their more synoptic causes. Now, of pain according to the soul there are two modes, the one consisting in one's own transgressions, the other in those of others, and the cause of such pain is clearly the sensory pleasure of the one who is pained or of those for whom he is pained; for according to the precise account, there is almost no sin at all among men that does not have as the beginning of its own generation the irrational relation of the soul to sensation for the sake of pleasure. And of the pleasure according to the soul the cause is clearly the sensory pain of the one who takes pleasure and rejoices in his own virtues or in those of others; for according to the precise account, there is almost no virtue at all among men that does not have as the beginning of its own generation the rational disinclination of the soul towards sensation.

(14Γ_148> And when the soul has acquired a disinclination towards sensation for the sake of virtue, sensation will necessarily be in labors, since it does not have the inventive power of the soul for pleasant things, which is joined to it according to the disposition of the will, but, on the contrary, manfully beating back through self-control the insurrection of its own natural pleasures, and remaining completely unyielding through patience toward the infliction of unnatural and involuntary pains, and not departing from the God-befitting worth and glory of virtue for the sake of insubstantial pleasure, and not falling away from the height of the virtues toward the reception of pains out of pity for the flesh because of the painful sensation. And the cause of sensory pain is the complete lack of occupation of the soul with things according to its nature; and the unnatural activity of the soul clearly brings into existence sensory pleasure, which can have no other beginning of its constitution than the soul's abandonment of things according to nature.

For mind and sensation have their natural activity opposed to one another because of the extreme difference and otherness of their underlying objects. For the one has as its underlying objects the intelligible and incorporeal substances, which it is its nature to grasp essentially, while the other has the sensible and corporeal natures, which it too grasps naturally.

Since, therefore, it is not possible for the mind to pass over to its kindred intelligibles without the contemplation of the sensibles that are set before it as intermediaries, and since it is altogether impossible for this to happen without sensation, which is composite with the mind but naturally akin to the sensibles, it is reasonable that, if it attacks and becomes entangled in the surfaces of visible things, thinking that composite sensation is a natural activity, it has fallen away from the intelligibles that are according to its nature, and has grasped with both hands, as the saying goes, bodies that are contrary to nature—by which, being activated contrary to reason because of the one that has conquered it

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ἑκουσίοις δι᾽ ἐγκρατείας μαχόμενος καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις δι᾽ ὑπομονῆς ἐγκαρτερῶν πειρασμοῖς, καὶ ὁλόκληρός (14Γ_146> ἐστιν ὁ καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν μετὰ γνώσεως καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ἄπρακτον διανύων.

∆ιῃρημένης γὰρ εἰς ψυχήν τε καὶ αἴσθησιν τῆς τε λύπης καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὁ τὴν ψυχῆς περιποιούμενος ἡδονήν, τὴν δὲ τῆς αἰσθήσεως μεθ᾽ ὑπομονῆς καταδεχόμενος λύπην, δόκιμος γίνεται καὶ τέλειος καὶ ὁλόκληρος· δόκιμος μὲν διὰ τὴν πεῖραν τῶν κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἐναντίων, τέλειος δὲ ὡς τῇ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἡδονῇ τε καὶ λύπῃ δι᾽ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ὑπομονῆς ἀνενδότως μαχόμενος, ὁλόκληρος δὲ ὡς τὰς μαχομένας ταῖς κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἀλλήλαις ἀντικειμέναις διαθέσεσιν ἕξεις ἐν τῇ σταθερότητι τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ταυτότητος ἀλωβήτους διαφυλάττων, φημὶ δὲ τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ἀλλήλαις συνεχομένας καὶ μηδεμίαν τῆς ἑτέρας διεζευγμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πρᾶξιν τῆς θεωρίας τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τῶν τρόπων προφαίνουσαν, τὴν δὲ θεωρίαν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀρετὴν τεθωρακισμένην τῆς πράξεως.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τήν τε λύπην καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν διττὴν οὖσαν ἀπέδειξεν ὁ λόγος καὶ τὴν μὲν κατὰ ψυχήν, τὴν δὲ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν συνισταμένην, φέρε καὶ τὰς τούτων συνοπτικωτέρας κατὰ δύναμιν θεωρήσωμεν αἰτίας. Τῆς μὲν οὖν κατὰ ψυχὴν λύπης διττὸς ὁ τρόπος, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις πλημμελήμασι συνιστάμενος, αἰτία δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης λύπης ἡ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν τοῦ λυπουμένου σαφῶς ἢ τῶν δι᾽ οὓς λυπεῖται καθέστηκεν ἡδονή· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἁμαρτία σχεδὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μὴ τὴν ψυχῆς πρὸς αἴσθησιν, ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν, ἀλόγιστον σχέσιν ἀρχὴν τῆς οἰκείας γενέσεως ἔχουσα. Τῆς δὲ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡδονῆς αἰτία πρόδηλός ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν τοῦ ἐπὶ ταῖς οἰκείαις ἢ ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις ἀρεταῖς ἡδομένου τε καὶ χαίροντος λύπη· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἀρετὴ σχεδὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μὴ τὴν ψυχῆς πρὸς αἴσθησιν λελογισμένην ἀποδιάθεσιν ἀρχὴν τῆς οἰκείας γενέσεως ἔχουσα.

(14Γ_148> Τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποδιάθεσιν κτησαμένης, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν πόνοις ἔσται, τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπινοητικήν, συνημμένην αὐτῇ κατὰ τὴν γνωμικὴν σχέσιν, τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχουσα δύναμιν, τοὐναντίον δὲ τῶν μὲν αὐτῆς φυσικῶν ἡδονῶν τὴν ἐπανάστασιν δι᾽ ἐγκρατείας ἀνδρικῶς ἀπορραπίζουσαν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀκουσίων πόνων ἐπαγωγὴν διὰ τῆς ὑπομονῆς ἀμείλικτον παντελῶς διαμένουσαν καὶ τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν θεοπρεποῦς ἀξίας τε καὶ δόξης διὰ τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐξισταμένην καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πόνων ἀντίληψιν φειδοῖ τῆς σαρκὸς διὰ τὴν ὀδύνουσαν αἴσθησιν τοῦ ὕψους τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀποπίπτουσαν. Τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν λύπης αἰτία καθέστηκεν ἡ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς παντελὴς ἀσχολία· τὴν δὲ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν ἡ παρὰ φύσιν ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς προδήλως ὑφίστησιν, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἔχειν οὐ δυναμένην συστάσεως ἢ τὴν ψυχῆς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπόθεσιν.

Νοῦς γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις ἀντικειμένην ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν διὰ τὴν τῶν αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένων ἀκροτάτην διαφορὰν καὶ ἑτερότητα. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκειμένας ἔχει τὰς νοητὰς καὶ ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ὧν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἡ δὲ τὰς αἰσθητὰς καὶ σωματικὰς φύσεις, ὧν καὶ αὐτὴ φυσικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν πρὸς τὰ συγγενῆ νοητὰ τὸν νοῦν διαβῆναι δίχα τῆς τῶν διὰ μέσου προβεβλημένων αἰσθητῶν θεωρίας, ταύτην δὲ γενέσθαι παντελῶς ἀμήχανον χωρὶς τῆς, αὐτῷ μὲν συγκειμένης τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενοῦς, αἰσθήσεως, εἰκότως, εἰ μὲν προσβαλὼν ἐνσχεθῇ ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις τῶν ὁρατῶν, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φυσικὴν τὴν συγκειμένην οἰόμενος αἴσθησιν, τῶν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκπέπτωκε νοητῶν, τῶν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἀμφοῖν ταῖν χεροῖν, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, ἐπελάβετο σωμάτωνοἷς παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργούμενος διὰ τὴν αὐτὸν ἐκνικήσασαν