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is accomplished. and that Lachesis is so called from allotting to each his destiny, and Atropos from the unalterable and unchangeable nature of the apportionment, and Clotho from the spinning together and connecting of all things and their having some one ordered outcome. For by babbling these things and others like them he thinks he is demonstrating the necessity in all things. 6.8.11 But it occurs to me to wonder if in saying such things he was not aware of his own idle talk. For let it be granted that men, using these concepts, just as he himself etymologizes, have assigned the names set forth, holding the opinion that fate has comprehended all things and that the causes pre-established from eternity in all things that exist and come to be are unchangeable. 6.8.12 Why then, O Chrysippus, do you follow all the opinions of men and does not one of them seem to you to be mistaken about anything, but are they all beholders of the 6.8.13 truth? How then do you say that there is no man, who does not seem to you to be as mad as Orestes and Alcmaeon, except for the wise man? And you say that only one or two have become wise, and that the rest, out of folly, have been just as 6.8.14 mad as the aforementioned? And how do you refute those opinions of theirs as being erroneous, for instance, those concerning wealth and reputation and tyranny and pleasure in general, which most people have considered to be goods? And how do you say that all established laws and constitutions are in error? Or why did you write such a multitude of books, if men held erroneous opinions about nothing? 6.8.15 For surely we shall not say that they think correctly when they hold the same opinions as you, 6.8.16 but that they are mad when they hold different ones. For in the first place, not even you say that you yourself are wise, much less do we, so that we might make agreement with your opinion the criterion for their ever thinking correctly; then, even if this were true, why was it necessary to say that all are equally mad and not rather to praise them insofar as they seemed to hold the same opinions as you, as having grasped something correct, and to suppose they are in error insofar as they disagreed? 6.8.17 Nevertheless, not even so was it necessary to consider what seemed right to them a sufficient testimony of the truth, whom, even if they are not mad as you think, yet anyone would agree are far removed from wisdom. 6.8.18 Ludicrously, therefore, you too will use these as witnesses through the positing of names, whom you would say differ in no way from yourself in understanding, unless, perhaps, it happens that those who originally posited these names were wise, which you will in no way be able to show. 6.8.19 But let it be granted to you that this is so and that those names were established as having the meanings you wish, and that this did not happen according to false opinions; where then is it indicated by them that all things absolutely are according to fate, and not, if at all, only those things of which fate consists? 6.8.20 For both the number of the Fates and their names and the spindle of Clotho and the thread wound upon it and the spinning of this and all such other things that are said in those accounts, indicate the unalterable and eternal succession of causes, as many as have been necessitated to come to be in this way and as many as have been prevented from being otherwise. 6.8.21 And many such things there might be. But as for things that do not happen in this way, for some of them men have named gods as governors and creators, for some they supposed ourselves to be the causes, for others again, nature, for others, 6.8.22 Fortune; wishing to show her changeability and instability and her being now in this state, now in that, having personified this quality of the coincidence of events, 6.8.23 they depicted Fortune as standing on a sphere. Or have not these things also been opined by men? For even if they sometimes confuse the causes and think that whatever happens by fate or by chance happens by divine power, and that whatever is up to us happens by fate, yet it is surely clear to everyone that they hold that all these causes exist among things that are. 6.8.24 So it has turned out that neither the assumptions of men nor the positing of such names bears witness with the opinion of Chrysippus.” 6.8.25 Next to these he adds: “In the first book On Fate, then,

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ἐπιτελεῖται. καὶ Λάχεσιν μὲν κεκλῆσθαι παρὰ τὸ λαγχάνειν ἑκάστῳ τὸ πεπρωμένον, Ἄτροπον δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀμετάθετον τοῦ μερισμοῦ, Κλωθὼ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συγκεκλῶσθαι καὶ συνείρεσθαι τὰ πάντα καὶ μίαν αὐτῶν τεταγμένην τινὰ εἶναι διέξοδον. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια φλυαρῶν ἀποδεικνύναι τὴν ἐν ἅπασιν 6.8.11 ἀνάγκην νομίζει. ἐμοὶ δὲ θαυμάζειν ἔπεισιν εἰ τοιαῦτα λέγων οὐκ ᾐσθά νετο τῆς ματαιολογίας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστω γὰρ ταύταις ταῖς ἐννοίαις κεχρημένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καθὼς αὐτὸς ἐτυμολογεῖ, τὰ ὀνόματα τεθεῖσθαι τὰ ἐκκείμενα, δοξάζοντας τὰ πάντα κατειληφέναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἀμεταθέτους εἶναι τὰς ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατειλημμένας ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ γινομένοις 6.8.12 αἰτίας. τί οὖν ἀκολουθεῖς, ὦ Χρύσιππε, πάσαις ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαις καὶ οὐδεμία σοι περὶ οὐδενὸς φαίνεται διεψευσμένη, ἀλλὰ πάντες τῆς 6.8.13 ἀληθείας εἰσὶ θεωρητικοί; πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι δοκεῖ κατ' ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ τε καὶ Ἀλκμέωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο μόνους φῂς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐξ ἀφροσύνης ἐπ' ἴσης 6.8.14 μεμηνέναι τοῖς προειρημένοις; πῶς δὲ ἀνασκευάζεις αὐτῶν τὰς δόξας ἐκείνας ὡς διημαρτημένας, οἷον τὰς περὶ πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ τυραννίδος καθόλου τε ἡδονῆς, ἅπερ ἀγαθὰ νενομίκασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι; πῶς δὲ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους ἡμαρτῆσθαι φῂς ἅπαντας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας; ἢ διὰ τί πλῆθος τοσούτων βιβλίων συνέγραψας, εἰ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶχον οἱ ἄνθρωποι δόξας διημαρτημέ6.8.15 νας; οὐ γὰρ ὅταν μὲν ταὐτὰ σοὶ δοξάζωσιν, ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς φή6.8.16 σομεν, ὅταν δὲ διάφορα, μαίνεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ σὺ φῂς σοφὸν εἶναι σεαυτόν, μή τι γε ἡμεῖς, ἵνα κριτήριον ποιώμεθα τοῦ καλῶς ποτε ἐκείνους φρονεῖν τὸ τῇ σῇ δόξῃ συνδραμεῖν· ἔπειτ', εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν ἀληθές, τί λέγειν ἐχρῆν μαίνεσθαι πάντας ἐπ' ἴσης καὶ οὐχὶ καθὸ μὲν ἐφαίνοντο ταὐτὰ σοὶ δοξάζοντες κατὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὺς ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς ὀρθοῦ τινος ἐπειλημμένους, καθὸ δὲ 6.8.17 διεφώνουν ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν; μαρτύριον μέντοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἱκανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐχρῆν, οὓς εἰ καὶ μὴ μαίνεσθαι καθάπερ σὺ οἴει, ἀλλὰ πολύ γε ἀφεστηκέναι σοφίας πᾶς ἄν τις ὁμολογήσειε. 6.8.18 γελοίως οὖν καὶ σὺ χρήσῃ μάρτυσι τούτοις διὰ τῆς θέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὓς οὐδὲν ἂν κατά γε σύνεσιν σεαυτοῦ φήσαις διαφέρειν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θεμένους ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα σοφοὺς εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, ὅπερ οὐδαμῶς δεῖξαι 6.8.19 δυνήσῃ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεδόσθω σοι τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐκεῖνα τίθεσθαι ὡς σὺ βούλει τὰς σημασίας ἔχοντα, καὶ μὴ κατὰ δόξας ψευδεῖς τὸ τοιοῦτον γεγονέναι· ποῦ τοίνυν δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνεται τὰ πάντα ἁπαξαπλῶς καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι, καὶ μή, εἰ ἄρα, ταῦτα μόνα ὧν ἐστιν εἱμαρμένη; 6.8.20 ὅ τε γὰρ τῶν Μοιρῶν ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ τῆς Κλωθοῦς ἄτρακτος καὶ τὸ ἐπειλημένον αὐτῷ νῆμα καὶ τὸ ἐπίκλωσμα τούτου καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἄλλα λέγεται ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἐνδείκνυται τὸ ἀπαράβατον καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος καθῆκον τῶν αἰτιῶν, ὅσα οὑτωσὶ κατηνάγκασται γενέσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλως 6.8.21 ἔχειν κεκώλυται. πολλὰ δ' ἂν εἴη τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὅσα δὲ οὐχ οὕτω γίνεται, τούτων τισὶ μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι θεοὺς διοικητὰς καὶ δημιουργοὺς ἐπεφήμισαν, τινῶν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς αἰτίους ὑπέλαβον, ἄλλων δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλων 6.8.22 τὴν Τύχην· ἧς τὸ εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον καὶ νῦν μὲν οὕτω, νῦν δὲ οὕτως ἔχον ἐνδείξασθαι βουλόμενοι, εἰδωλοποιήσαντες τὸ ποιὸν τοῦτο σύμ6.8.23 πτωμα τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ σφαίρας βεβηκυῖαν τὴν Τύχην ἔδειξαν. ἢ οὐχὶ δεδόξασται παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ταῦτα; καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε συνταράττουσι τὰ αἴτια καὶ ὅσα μὲν καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἢ κατὰ τύχην γίνεται, ταῦτα ἐκ θείας δυνάμεως γίνεσθαι νομίζουσιν, ὅσα δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλ' ὅτι γε πάντα τὰ αἴτια ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι δοξάζουσι παντί που δῆλον. 6.8.24 ὥστε οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολήψεις οὐδὲ τὰς θέσεις τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων συμμαρτυρεῖν τῇ Χρυσίππου δόξῃ συμβέβηκεν.» 6.8.25 Τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης βιβλίῳ