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where there is neither any man nor any other animal nor a body great or small, but a certain ineffable and indescribable, simply a divine solitude, where there are the characters, pursuits, and splendors of the good, but it is in peace, in benevolence, the tranquil, the ruling principle borne propitiously 11.22.2 upon its essence. But if anyone, clinging to sensible things, imagines the good flying towards them and then, taking delight, should think he has encountered the good, he errs completely. For in reality, not an easy, but a divine method is needed to approach it; and it is best for one who has disregarded sensible things, having vigorously applied himself to studies, having contemplated numbers, thus to practice a lesson: what is being.» 11.22.3 These things, then, in the first book; but in the fifth he says these things: «If, then, essence and idea are intelligible, and mind has been acknowledged to be older than and the cause of this, this very mind alone is found to be the good. For even if the demiurge is the god of generation, it is enough for the good to be the principle of essence. And analogous to this is the demiurge god, being its imitator, and to 11.22.4 essence is generation, which is its image and imitation. But if the demiurge of generation is good, then surely the demiurge of essence will also be the good-in-itself, co-natural with essence. For the second, being twofold, makes both the idea 11.22.5 of itself and the cosmos, being a demiurge, and then is wholly contemplative. And since we have reasoned thus, let there be these four names for four things: the first god is the good-in-itself; his imitator, the demiurge, is good; and essence is one, that of the first, and another, that of the second; of which the beautiful cosmos is an imitation, beautified by participation in the beautiful.» 11.22.6 And in the sixth book he adds: «Those that participate in it do so in nothing else, but only in thinking; in this way, therefore, one might also profit from the good’s property, but in no other way. And indeed, thinking, this has befallen the first alone. If, then, that by which other things are perfected and made good belongs to that one alone, 11.22.7 it would be the mark of a duller soul still to dispute it. For if the second is good not from himself, but from the first, how is it possible that the one by participation in which this one is good, is not itself good, especially if the second happens to have partaken of it 11.22.8 as good? In this way, indeed, Plato by reasoning has demonstrated to the sharp-sighted that the good is one.» And again he says next: 11.22.9 «These things being so, Plato has set them down, separating them in different places; for in one place he wrote about the circular nature of the demiurge in the Timaeus, saying, 'he was good'; and in the Republic he said the good is the idea of the good, as though the idea of the demiurge is the good, who has been shown to us to be good by participation 11.22.10 in the first and only. For just as men are said to be formed by the idea of man, and oxen by that of the ox, and horses by the idea of the horse, so also, reasonably, the demiurge, if he is good by participation in the first good, the first mind would be the idea of the good, being the good-in-itself.»

11.23.1 24. CONCERNING THE IDEAS IN PLATO «Having been so generated»—it is clear he means the cosmos—«it has been crafted with a view to that which is comprehensible by reason and wisdom and is unchanging. These things being so, it is altogether necessary that this cosmos be an image of something. For that one contains within itself all the intelligible living things, just as this cosmos contains us.» 11.23.2 These things Plato says in the Timaeus. But I will set forth the meaning of what has been said from the things compiled by Didymus On the Doctrines of Plato. And he writes thus: 11.23.3 «Saying that the ideas are certain defined paradigms of natural sensible things according to genus, of which the knowledges and the definitions come to be; for alongside all men a certain man is conceived, and alongside all

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ἔνθα μήτε τις ἄνθρωπος μήτε τι ζῷον ἕτερον μηδὲ σῶμα μέγα μηδὲ σμικρόν, ἀλλά τις ἄφατος καὶ ἀδιήγητος ἀτεχνῶς ἐρημία θεσπέσιος, ἔνθα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤθη διατριβαί τε καὶ ἀγλαΐαι, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν εἰρήνῃ, ἐν εὐμενείᾳ, τὸ ἤρεμον, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἵλεω ἐποχούμενον 11.22.2 ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ. εἰ δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λιπαρῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐφιπτάμενον φαντάζεται κἄπειτα τρυφῶν οἴοιτο τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐντετυχηκέναι, τοῦ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνει. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι οὐ ῥᾳδίας, θείας δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ δεῖ μεθόδου· καὶ ἔστι κράτιστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀμελήσαντι, νεανιευσαμένῳ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς θεασαμένῳ, οὕτως ἐκμελετῆσαι μάθημα, τί ἐστι τὸ ὄν.» 11.22.3 Ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ· ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ ταῦτά φησιν· «Εἰ δ' ἔστι μὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, ταύτης δ' ὡμολογήθη πρεοβύτερον καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι ὁ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος μόνος εὕρηται ὢν τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς θεός ἐστι γενέσεως, ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας εἶναι ἀρχή. ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ὁ δημιουργὸς θεός, ὢν αὐτοῦ μιμητής, τῇ δὲ 11.22.4 οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, ἣ εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ μίμημα. εἴπερ δὲ ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ἦ που ἔσται καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας δημιουργὸς αὐτοάγαθον, σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ. ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος διττὸς ὢν αὐτοποιεῖ τήν τε ἰδέαν 11.22.5 ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιουργὸς ὤν, ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως. συλλελογισμένων δ' ἡμῶν ὀνόματα τεσσάρων πραγμάτων τέσσαρα ἔστω ταῦτα· ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου μιμητὴς δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός· ἡ δ' οὐσία μία μὲν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου· ἧς μίμημα ὁ καλὸς κόσμος, κεκαλλωπισμένος μετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ.» 11.22.6 Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ δὲ ἐπιλέγει· «Μετέχει δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰ μετίσχοντα ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδενί, ἐν δὲ μόνῳ τῷ φρονεῖν· ταύτη ἄρα καὶ τῆς ἀγαθοῦ συμβάσεως ὀνίναιτ' ἄν, ἄλλως δ' οὔ. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὸ φρονεῖν, τοῦτο δὴ συντετύχηκε μόνῳ τῷ πρώτῳ. ὑφ' οὗ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἀποχραίνεται καὶ ἀγαθοῦται, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ μόνον μόνῳ προσῇ, 11.22.7 ἀβελτέρας ἂν εἴη ψυχῆς ἔτι ἀμφιλογεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου, πῶς οἷόν τε ὑφ' οὗ μετουσίας ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀγαθός, μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχῃ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ 11.22.8 μεταλαχὼν ὁ δεύτερος; οὕτως τοι ὁ Πλάτων ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ τῷ ὀξὺ βλέποντι ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν.» Καὶ πάλιν ἑξῆς φησι· 11.22.9 «Ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἔθηκεν ὁ Πλάτων ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ χωρίσας· ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸν κυκλικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐγράψατο ἐν Τιμαίῳ εἰπὼν «ἀγαθὸς ἦν»· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, ὡς δὴ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἰδέαν οὖσαν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅστις πέφανται ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸς μετουσίᾳ 11.22.10 τοῦ πρώτου τε καὶ μόνου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι μὲν λέγονται τυπωθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἰδέας, βόες δ' ὑπὸ τῆς βοός, ἵπποι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππου ἰδέας, οὕτως καὶ εἰκότως ὁ δημιουργός, εἴπερ ἐστὶ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὢν αὐτοάγαθον.»

11.23.1 κδʹ. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΙ Ι∆ΕΩΝ «Οὕτω δὲ γεγενημένος» δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὁ κόσμος «πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται. τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὖ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι. τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς.» 11.23.2 Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Τιμαίῳ. τὴν δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων διάνοιαν ἐκ τῶν ∆ιδύμῳ Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων Πλάτωνι συντεταγμένων ἐκθήσομαι. γράφει δὲ οὕτως· 11.23.3 «Τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητῶν κατὰ γένος ὡρισμένα τινὰ παραδείγματα φάμενος εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας, ὧν τὰς ἐπιστήμας γίνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὅρους· παρὰ πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἄνθρωπόν τινα νοεῖσθαι καὶ παρὰ πάντας