,

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4. Successive definitions of sorrow, referring to the cause according to which it is natural for it to occur.

5. He says sorrow is twofold: the one concerning sense-perception, consisting in the privation of bodily pleasures; and the other concerning the mind, occurring through the privation of the goods of the soul. And he says temptations are also twofold, the voluntary and the involuntary; and the voluntary ones are fathers of bodily pleasure according to sense-perception, and begetters of sorrow according to the soul. For sin alone, when committed, grieves the soul. But the involuntary ones, which are manifested in afflictions against one's will, are fathers of pleasure according to the soul, and begetters of bodily pain according to sense-perception.

6. The temptation according to one's will, he says, constitutes sorrow according to the soul, but clearly creates pleasure according to sense-perception; whereas the one against one's will establishes the pleasure of the soul, and the sorrow of the flesh.

7. The Lord, he says, teaches us to pray to be delivered from voluntary temptations, as being productive of pleasure of the flesh but of pain of the soul; but the great James exhorts us to rejoice in involuntary temptations, as they take away the pleasure of the flesh and the pain of the soul.

8. Whom he calls perfect. 9. Whom he calls complete. 10. He who has had experience of sorrow and pleasure of the flesh might be called approved, as

having experienced the ease and hardship of things concerning the flesh (14Γ_156> But perfect is he who has wrestled down the pleasure of the flesh and the pain by the power of the Logos. And complete is he who has kept the dispositions related to practice and contemplation unchanging through intense application to the divine.

11. Of all sorrow constituted according to the soul, pleasure of the flesh, he says, precedes. 12. That without the passionate relation of the soul to sense-perception, among

men there is no sin at all. 13. That he spiritually gladdens the soul, he says, who with voluntary the flesh

subdues with labors. 14. That the genesis of virtue, he says, is the voluntary of the soul in relation to the flesh

alienation.

15. He calls the intellective power of the soul inventive; which, being separated from the relation according to sense-perception, leaves the flesh destitute of providence for pleasure according to the disposition in the will. With it not even enduring to console the pain of the flesh, on account of the complete absorption in divine things in the disposition of the will.

16. The soul's laying aside of the things according to nature, he says, is naturally the beginning of pain according to sense-perception. For with the soul laboring over the goods according to nature, there is no power for inventing ways of pleasure according to sense-perception.

17. To sense-perception are subject the sensible things; and to the mind, the intelligible things. There is, therefore, a great difference between intelligible and sensible things.

18. The mind, he says, so long as it considers sense-perception a power naturally its own, being entangled in the appearances of sensible things, invents the pleasures of the flesh, unable to pass beyond the nature of visible things, being constrained by its passionate relation to sense-perception.

(14Γ_158> 19. He who transfers the laws of beings to his own law by way of imitation is virtuous, reflecting on the movement of those deprived of reason. But he who changes his own [law] to the laws of others by way of imitation is passionate, carrying forth the power of reason towards irrationality.

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4. Ὁρισμοί λύπης ἐπάλληλοι πρός τήν αἰτίαν, καθ᾿ ἥν γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἀναφέροντες.

5. ∆ιττήν τήν λύπην λέγει· τήν μέν περί τήν αἴσθησιν, κατά στέρησιν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν συνισταμένην· τήν δέ περί νοῦν, κατά στέρησιν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθῶν γινομένην. ∆ιττούς δέ λέγει καί τούς πειρασμούς, τούς μέν ἑκουσίους, τούς δέ ἀκουσίους· καί τούς μέν ἑκουσίους, τῆς μέν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν σωματικῆς ἡδονῆς εἶναι πατέρας· τῆς δέ κατά ψυχήν λύπης εἶναι γεννήτορας. Μόνη γάρ πραχθεῖσα λυπεῖ τήν ψυχήν ἁμαρτία. Τούς δέ ἀκουσίους, οἵτινες ἐν τοῖς παρά γνώμην δείκνυνται πόνοις, τῆς μέν κατά ψυχἠν ἡδονῆς εἶναι πατέρας, τῆς δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν σωματικῆς ὀδύνης εἶναι γεννήτορας.

6. Ὁ μέν κατά γνώμην πειρασμός, φησι, τήν μέν κατά ψυχήν λύπην συνίστησι· τήν δέ κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν δημιουργεῖ σαφῶς ἡδονήν· ὁ δέ παρά γνώμην, τήν μέν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονήν· τήν δέ τῆς σαρκός λύπην ὑφίστησι.

7. Ὁ μέν Κύριος, φησί, τούς ἑκουσίους ἀπεύχεσθαι ἡμᾶς διδάσκει πειρασμούς· ὡς σαρκός μέν ἡδονῆς, ψυχῆς δέ ποιητικούς ὀδύνης· ὁ δέ μέγας Ἰάκωβος, ἐπί τοῖς ἀκουσίοις ἡμῖν παραινεῖ χαίρειν πειρασμοῖς· ὡς σαρκός μέν ἡδονήν, ψυχῆς δέ ὀδύνην ἀφαιρουμένους.

8. Τίνα λέγει τέλειον. 9. Τίνα λέγει ὁλόκληρον. 10. Ὁ λύπης καί ἡδονῆς σαρκός πεῖραν λαβών, λέγοιτ᾿ ἄν δόκιμος, ὡς

εὐχερείας καί δυσχερείας τῶν περί σάρκα πραγμάτων (14Γ_156> πεπειραμένος. Τέλειος δέ, ὁ τήν ἡδονήν τῆς σαρκός, καί τήν ὀδύνην τῇ τοῦ Λόγου δυνάμει καταπαλαίσας. Ὁλόκληρος δέ, ὁ τάς κατά τήν πρᾶξιν καί τήν θεωρίαν ἕξεις ἀτρέπτους τῇ περί τόν θεῖον συντονίᾳ διατηρήσας.

11. Πάσης λύπης συνισταμένης κατά ψυχήν, ἡδονή σαρκός φησι προηγεῖται. 12. Ὅτι χωρίς τῆς κατά ψυχήν ἐμπαθοῦς πρός αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, ἐν

ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἁμαρτία. 13. Ὅτι ψυχήν πνευματικῶς εὐφραίνει, φησίν, ὁ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις τήν σάρκα

πόνοις δομάζων. 14. Ὅτι γένεσίς ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, φησίν, ἡ πρός τήν σάρκα τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκούσιος

ἀλλοτρίωσις. 15. Ἐπινοητικήν λέγει τήν νοεράν τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν· ἥτις χωριζομένη τῆς

κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν σχέσεως, ἔρημον τῆς πρός ἡδονήν τήν σάρκα καταλιμπάνει προνοίας κατά τήν ἐν γνώμῃ σχέσιν. Οὐδέ τήν ὀδύνην τῆς σαρκός ἀνεχομένης παραμυθεῖσθαι διά τήν ἐν σχέσει τῆς γνώμης ὁλικήν περί τά θεῖα σχολήν.

16. Ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν κατά φύσιν ἀπόθεσίς φησι τῆς κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ὀδύνης ἀρχή γίνεσθαι πέφυκε. Τῆς γάρ ψυχῆς περί τά κατά φύσιν ἀγαθά πονουμένης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν τῆς ἡδονῆς τρόπων ἐφευρίσκουσα δύναμις.

17. Ὑπόκειται τῇ μέν αἰσθήσει, τά αἰσθητά· τῷ δέ νῷ, τά νοητά. Πολλή γοῦν διαφορά νοητῶν ἐστι καί αἰσθητῶν.

18. Ὁ νοῦς, φησίν, ἅμα τήν αἴσθησιν οἰκείαν κατά φύσιν ἡγήσεται δύναμιν, ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιπλεκόμενος ἐπιφανίαις, ἐπινοεῖ τάς τῆς σαρκός ἡδονάς, οὐ δυνάμενος τῶν ὁρατῶν διαβῆναι τήν φύσιν, τῇ πρός τήν αἴσθησιν ἐμπαθεῖ σχέσει περισχεθείς.

(14Γ_158> 19. Ὁ πρός τόν ἑαυτοῦ νόμον, τούς τῶν ὄντων κατά μίμησιν μεταφέρων νόμους, ἐνάρετος λογίζων τῶν ἐστερημένων λόγου τήν κίνησιν. Ὁ δέ τόν ἑαυτοῦ πρός τούς νόμους τῶν ἄλλων κατά μίμησιν μεταβάλλων, ἐμπαθής· πρός ἀλογίαν ἐκφέρων τοῦ λόγου τήν δύναμιν.