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Although the teachers of the Church, through the grace within them, were able to say many things about the question at hand, they honored the passage rather with silence, deeming it better, because the mind of the many is unable to reach the depth of what is written, not venturing to say anything deeper; and if any did speak, having first discerned the capacity of their listeners, they spoke only a part for the benefit of their students, leaving the greater part unexamined. Therefore I too was minded to pass over the passage in silence, had I not suspected that your God-loving soul would be grieved. Nevertheless, for your sake I will say what can be suitable for all, and fitting for both the small and the great in understanding.

The tree of life, and that which is not so, from the very fact alone that the one was named a tree, while the other not of life, but only knowledgeable of good and evil, have a great and ineffable difference. For the tree of life is in every way productive of life; but the tree not of life is, clearly, productive of death. For that which is not productive of life, from the fact that it was not called the tree of life, would clearly be productive of death; for nothing else is divided in opposition to life.

And in another way as well, as wisdom, the tree of life has the greatest difference from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which is neither wisdom, nor named such. For the property of wisdom is intellect and reason; but the property of the disposition opposed to wisdom is irrationality and sense-perception. Therefore, since man came into being composed of a rational soul and a perceptible body, let the intellect of the soul, in which wisdom resides, be, in one view, the tree of life; and the sense-perception of the body, in which the movement of irrationality clearly resides, be the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which man, having received the divine commandment not to touch it experientially through activity, did not keep.

Both trees, according to the Scripture, are discriminative of certain things; that is, the intellect and sense-perception. For example, the intellect has a power discriminative of intelligible and sensible things, of temporary and eternal things; or rather, being a discriminative power of the soul, it persuades it to hold to some things, and to rise above others; while sense-perception has a power discriminative of bodily pleasure and pain; or rather, being a power of ensouled and sensible bodies, it persuades one to be drawn to the one, and to repel the other.If, then, man partakes only of the sensible discrimination of bodies according to pleasure and pain, transgressing the divine (413) commandment, he eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, that is, the irrationality according to sense-perception, having only the discrimination that constitutes bodies, according to which he holds to pleasure as a good, and abstains from pain as an evil. But if he partakes only of the intellectual discrimination which distinguishes eternal things from temporary ones completely, keeping the divine commandment, he eats of the tree of life; I mean the wisdom constituted according to the intellect, having only the discrimination that constitutes the soul, according to which he abstains from the corruption of temporary things as from an evil.

Great, therefore, is the difference between the two trees, both of their natural discrimination and of the fitting significance in each; the name of good and evil being pronounced homonymously without distinction, which can cause great error for those who do not encounter the words of the Spirit wisely and with examination; but you, being wise through grace, know that what is simply called evil is not in every way evil, but is evil in relation to something, and not evil in relation to something else. Likewise, what is simply called good is not in every way good, but is good in relation to something, and not good in relation to something else; and guard against the harm from this homonymy.

SCHOLION.

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Πολλά μέν εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι περί τοῦ προκειμένου ζητήματος διά τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς χάριτος οἱ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας διδάσκαλοι, σιωπῇ μᾶλλον τιμήσαντες τόν τόπον, ἡγήσαντο κρεῖττον, διά τήν τῶν πολλῶν διάνοιαν μή δυναμένην ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ βάθους τῶν γεγραμμένων, μηδέν βαθύτερον εἰπεῖν ἀνασχόμενοι· εἰ δέ καί εἶπόν τινες, πρότερον διακρίναντες τῶν ἀκουόντων τήν δύναμιν, οὕτω μέρος πρός λυσιτελές τῶν διδασκομένων εἰρηκότες, τό πλεῖστον κατέλιπον ἀνεξέταστον. ∆ιό κἀγώ μᾶλλον σιωπῇ τόν τόπον παρελθεῖν διενοούμην, εἰ μή λυπεῖσθαι τήν ὑμετέραν φιλόθεον ψυχήν ὑπενόησα. Πλήν ἀλλ᾿ ὑμῶν χάριν ἐρῶ, τό πᾶσιν δυνάμενον εἶναι κατάλληλον, καί μικροῖς καί μεγάλοις τήν διάνοιαν πρόσφορον.

Τό ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς, καί τό μή τοιοῦτον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου τοῦ, τό μέν ξύλον ὀνομασθῆναι, τό δέ οὐ ζωῆς, ἀλλά μόνον γνωστόν καλοῦ καί πονηροῦ, πολλήν καί ἄφατον ἔχουσι τήν διαφοράν. Τό γάρ τῆς ζωῆς ξύλον, πάντως καί ζωῆς ἐστι ποιητικόν· τό δέ ζωῆς ξύλον, δηλονότι θανάτου ποιητικόν. Τό γάρ μή, ποιητικόν ζωῆς, ἐκ τοῦ μή προσαγορευθῆναι ζωῆς ξύλον, θανάτου σαφῶς ἄν εἴη ποιητικόν· ἄλλο γάρ οὐδέν τῇ ζωῇ κατ᾿ ἐναντίωσιν ἀντιδιαιρεῖται.

Ἄλλως τε δέ καί ὡς σοφία, τό ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς πλείστην ἔχει διαφοράν πρός τό ξύλον τό γνωστόν καλοῦ καί πονηροῦ, τό μήτε ὄν σοφία, μήτε ὠνομασμένον. Τῆς μέν γάρ σοφίας ἴδιον, νοῦς καί λόγος· τῆς δέ τῇ σοφίᾳ κατά τό ἐναντίον ἀντικειμένης ἕξεως ἴδιον, ἀλογία καί αἴσθησις. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καί σώματος αἰσθητικοῦ συνεστώς πρός γένεσιν ἦλθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔστω κατά μίαν ἐπιβολήν ξύλον ζωῆς, ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἐν ᾧ τῆς σοφίας ὑπάρχει τό χρῆμα· ξύλον δέ γνωστόν καλοῦ καί πονηροῦ, ἡ τοῦ σώματος αἴσθησις, ἐν ᾗ τῆς ἀλογίας ὑπάρχει σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις· ᾗς κατά τήν πεῖραν μή ἅψασθαι δι᾿ ἐνεργείας ὁ ἄνθρωπος τήν θείαν λαβών ἐντολήν, οὐκ ἐφύλαξεν.

Ἀμφότερα δέ τά ξύλα, κατά τήν Γραφήν, τινῶν εἰσι διακριτικά· ἤγουν, ὁ νοῦς καί ἡ αἴσθησις· οἷον, ὁ μέν νοῦς δύναμιν ἔχει διακριτικήν νοητῶν καί αἰσθητῶν, προσκαίρων καί αἰωνίων· μᾶλλον δέ ψυχῆς ὑπάρχων δύναμις διακριτική, τῶν μέν αὐτήν ἀντέχεσθαι πείθει· τῶν δέ, ὑπεραίρεσθαι· ἡ δέ αἴσθησις ἔχει δύναμιν διακριτικήν ἡδονῆς σώματος καί ὀδύνης· μᾶλλον δέ δύναμις ὑπάρχουσα ἐμψύχων καί αἰσθητικῶν σωμάτων, τήν μέν, ἐπισπᾶσθαι πείθει· τήν δέ, ἀποπέμπεσθαι.Ἐάν μέν οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνης τῆς καθ᾿ ἡδονήν καί ὀδύνην αἰσθητικῆς τῶν σωμάτων γένηται διακρίσεως, τήν θείαν παραβάς(413) ἐντολήν, ἐσθίει τό ξύλον τό γνωστόν καλοῦ τε καί πονηροῦ, τουτέστι τήν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἀλογίαν, μόνην ἔχων τήν συστατικήν τῶν σωμάτων διάκρισιν, καθ᾿ ἥν, ὡς μέν καλοῦ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀντέχεται, ὡς δέ κακοῦ, τῆς ὀδύνης ἀπέχεται. Ἐάν δέ μόνης τῆς τῶν αἰνωίων διακρινούσης τά πρόσκαιρα διόλου νοερᾶς γένηται διακρίσεως, τήν θείαν φυλάξας ἐντολήν, ἐσθίει τό ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς· τήν κατά νοῦν λέγω συνισταμένην σοφίαν, μόνην ἔχων τήν συστατικήν τῆς ψυχῆς διάκρισιν· καθ᾿ ἥν ὡς μέν κακοῦ, τῆς τῶν προσκαίρων ἀπέχεται φθορᾶς.

Πολλή τοιγαροῦν ἐστιν ἡ διαφορά τῶν δύο ξύλων, καί τῆς αὐτῶν φυσικῆς διακρίσεως, καί τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ προσφυοῦς ἐμφάσεως· ὁμωνύμως ἐκφωνηθείσης ἄνευ διαστολῆς προσηγορίας τοῦ καλοῦ τε καί τοῦ κακοῦ· καί πολλήν δύναται ποιῆσαι τοῖς μή σοφῶς τε καί ἐπισκεμμένως ἐντυγχάνουσι τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ Πνεύματος τήν πλάνην· ἀλλ᾿ ὑμεῖς σοφοί διά τῆς χάριτος ὄντες, γνῶτε ὅτι τό ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον κακόν, οὐ πάντως κακόν· ἀλλά πρός τι μέν κακόν, πρός τι δέ οὐ κακόν. Ὡσαύτως καί τό ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον καλόν, οὐ πάντως καλόν, ἀλλά πρός τι μέν καλόν, πρός τι δέ οὐ καλόν· καί τήν ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας βλάβην φυλάξασθε.

ΣΧΟΛΙΟΝ.