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He has used certain such demonstrations, but in the second he tries to resolve the absurdities that seem to follow the argument which says all things are compelled by necessity, which we also set forth at the beginning; for instance, the elimination through it of our own zeal concerning blame and praise and exhortations and all those things that appear to happen 6.8.26 on account of our agency. For in the second book he says that while it is clear that many things happen from us, these things are nonetheless co-fated with the 6.8.27 governance of the whole. And he has used certain such examples: for the garment not being destroyed, he says, was not simply fated, but fated along with its being protected, and this certain man's being saved from the enemy was fated along with his fleeing the enemy, and the begetting of children was fated along with the willingness to have intercourse 6.8.28 with a woman. For just as, he says, if someone said that Hegesarchus the boxer would come out of the contest entirely un-struck, someone would absurdly demand that Hegesarchus fight with his hands down, since it was fated for him to leave un-struck, when the one making the pronouncement said this on account of the man's extraordinary defense against being 6.8.29 struck, so it is also in other matters. For many things cannot happen without us both willing them and contributing the most earnest zeal and effort to them, since along with this, 6.8.30 he says, they were fated to happen. So again, here too one might marvel at the man's lack of insight and reasoning and his inconsistency with clear facts and his own arguments. For I think that just as what is called sweet happens to be most opposite to what is called bitter, and black to white, and hot to cold, so too is what is up to us opposite to what is according to fate, if indeed he has assumed to call "according to fate" those things that happen in any case, whether we are willing or unwilling, and "up to us" those things that are brought to completion by our exerting ourselves and acting, or are not accomplished through our negligence and sloth. 6.8.31 If, therefore, from my striving to protect the garment it is saved, and from my wishing to approach my wife children are begotten, and from my wishing to flee the enemy I do not die at their hands, and from fighting bravely against my opponent and guarding against the attacks of his hands I depart from the contest un-struck, how will what is "according to fate" be preserved here? 6.8.32 For if these things happen according to fate, they could not be said to happen through us; but if through us, then clearly not according to fate, because these things 6.8.33 cannot concur with one another. But it will be up to us, he says, with that which is up to us, however, being encompassed by fate. And how, I would say, is it encompassed? If indeed both protecting the garment and not protecting it were in 6.8.34 my power. For thus it is clear that I would be the master of its being saved. And from the very distinction that Chrysippus makes, it becomes clear that our agency is released from fate. For it is fated, he says, for the garment to be saved, if you protect it, and for children to be begotten, if you too should wish it, but otherwise none of these things would be. But concerning things pre-determined by fate, we would never use such conditions. 6.8.35 We do not say, therefore, that every man will die if this or that happens, and will not die if it does not happen, but simply that he will die, whatever might be done at all to avoid dying; or that a certain man will not be susceptible to pain, even if he does these things, but simply that every man is susceptible to pain, whether he 6.8.36 wishes it or not; and whatever other things are fated to be so and not otherwise. So that if it is necessary for a certain thing to happen, if we wish it, but not otherwise, it is clear that our wishing and not wishing was not pre-determined by any 6.8.37 other cause, but was by our own free will; and if this was unconstrained by necessity, it is also clear that the happening of a certain thing was not pre-determined from eternity, unless perhaps the very act of wishing to protect the garment or not wishing it is according to 6.8.38 some fate and

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τοιαύταις τισὶν ἀποδείξεσι κέχρηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ λύειν πειρᾶται τὰ ἀκολουθεῖν δοκοῦντα ἄτοπα τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πάντα κατηναγκάσθαι λέγοντι, ἅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐτί θεμεν· οἷον τὸ ἀναιρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπὰς καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν 6.8.26 γιγνόμενα φαίνεται. φησὶν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον συγκαθειμάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ 6.8.27 τῶν ὅλων διοικήσει. κέχρηταί τε παραδείγμασι τοιούτοις τισί· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι, φησί, θοἰμάτιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς καθείμαρτο, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων σωθήσεσθαι τόνδε τινὰ μετὰ τοῦ φεύγειν αὐτὸν τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι παῖδας μετὰ τοῦ βούλεσθαι κοινωνεῖν 6.8.28 γυναικί. ὥσπερ γάρ, φησίν, εἰ λέγοντός τινος Ἡγήσαρχον τὸν πύκτην ἐξελεύσεσθαι τοῦ ἀγῶνος πάντως ἄπληκτον ἀτόπως ἄν τις ἠξίου καθιέντα τὰς χεῖρας τὸν Ἡγήσαρχον μάχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἄπληκτον αὐτὸν καθείμαρτο ἀπελθεῖν, τοῦ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιησαμένου διὰ τὴν περιττοτέραν τἀνθρώπου πρὸς τὸ μὴ 6.8.29 πλήττεσθαι φυλακὴν τοῦτο εἰπόντος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. πολλὰ γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι χωρὶς τοῦ καὶ ἡμᾶς βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐκτενεστάτην γε περὶ αὐτὰ προθυμίαν τε καὶ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τούτου, 6.8.30 φησίν, αὐτὰ γενέσθαι καθείμαρτο. πάλιν οὖν κἀνταῦθα θαυμάσειέ τις ἂν τἀνθρώπου τὸ ἀθεώρητον καὶ ἀνεπιλόγιστον καὶ τῶν ἐναργειῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων λόγων ἀνακολουθίας. οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι καθάπερ τὸ καλούμενον γλυκὺ τῷ καλουμένῳ πικρῷ συμβέβηκεν ἐναντιώτατον εἶναι, τῷ τε λευκῷ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ θερμόν, οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς τῷ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, εἴ γε καθ' εἱμαρμένην μὲν ἐκεῖνα καλεῖν προείληφεν ὅσα καὶ ἑκόντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκόντων πάντως γίνεται, παρ' ἡμᾶς δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔρχεται ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀμελεῖν καὶ ῥᾳθυμεῖν οὐκ ἐπιτελεῖται. 6.8.31 ἐὰν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἐμὲ θοἰμάτιον φυλάττειν ἐκεῖνο σῴζηται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι τῇ γυναικὶ πλησιάζειν τὰ τέκνα γίνηται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι φεύγειν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀνδρείως φυλάττεσθαί τε αὐτοῦ τὰς τῶν χειρῶν ἐπιβολὰς τὸ ἄπληκτον ἐκ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, πῶς τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἐνταῦθα 6.8.32 σωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνην ταῦτα συμβαίνει, παρ' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο συμβαίνειν, εἰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, οὐκ ἂν κατ' ἐκείνην δηλαδή, διὰ τὸ μὴ 6.8.33 δύνασθαι συνδραμεῖν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμᾶς μὲν ἔσται, φησί, περιειλημμένου μέντοι τοῦ παρ' ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης. καὶ πῶς, εἴποιμ' ἄν, περιειλημμένου; εἴ γε καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν θοἰμάτιον καὶ τὸ μὴ φυλάττειν ἀπὸ τῆς 6.8.34 ἐξουσίας ἐγίνετο τῆς ἐμῆς. οὕτως γὰρ καὶ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι τοῦτο δηλονότι κύριος ἂν εἴην ἐγώ. καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς διαστολῆς, ἣν ποιεῖται Χρύσιππος, δῆλον γίνεται τὸ ἀπολελύσθαι τῆς εἱμαρμένης τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. καθείμαρται γάρ, φησί, σωθῆναι θοἰμάτιον, εἰ φυλάττοις αὐτό, καὶ παῖδας ἔσεσθαι, εἰ καὶ σὺ βουληθείης, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἂν ἔσεσθαί τι τούτων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης προκατειλημμένων οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὑποτιμήσεσι τοιαύταις χρησαίμεθα. 6.8.35 οὔκουν φαμὲν τεθνήξεσθαι πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἰ τόδε τι γένοιτο, μὴ τεθνήξεσθαι δὲ εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς τεθνήξεσθαι, κἂν ὁτιοῦν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καθόλου γίγνοιτο· ἢ μὴ ἀλγηδόνος ἔσεσθαι δεκτικὸν ἄνθρωπόν τινα, κἂν ταδὶ πράττοι, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς πάντ' ἄνθρωπον ἀλγηδόνος εἶναι δεκτικόν, ἐάν τε βού6.8.36 ληται ἐάν τε μή· καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα οὑτωσὶ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἔχειν καθείμαρται. ὥστ' ε<ἰ> καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τόδε τι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, εἰ βουληθείημεν ἡμεῖς, ἄλλως δὲ οὐχί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἡμᾶς βουληθῆναί τε καὶ μὴ βουληθῆναι ὑπ' οὐδεμιᾶς 6.8.37 ἑτέρας αἰτίας προκατείχετο, ἀλλ' ἦν αὐτεξούσιον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκατανάγκαστον ἦν, καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τόδε τι δῆλον ὡς ἀπ' αἰῶνος οὐ προκατείχετο, εἰ μή τι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ βούλεσθαι φυλάττειν θοἰμάτιον ἢ μὴ βούλεσθαι παρά 6.8.38 τινα εἱμαρμένην καὶ