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it happened by a necessary external cause. But in this way the power of choice in us is completely destroyed and the garment would no longer be saved or destroyed because of my causality; wherefore I would be logically blameless even when it is being destroyed, for some other cause was destroying it, and again, when it is saved, in no way praised, because I was not the one doing this. But you, as if able to save all things, thus insisted in your argument.” 6.8.39 Thus spoke the aforementioned man. Let there be joined to these things also the words from Alexander of Aphrodisias, a man very distinguished in philosophical treatises, who himself also, in his work *On Fate*, used such expressions for the refutation of the dogma: 6.9.1 9.

FURTHER ON THE SAME SUBJECT; FROM ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

“The causes of things that come to be are divided into four kinds of causes, as the divine Aristotle has shown. For of causes, some are efficient, others have the character of matter; and among them there is also the cause according to form; and besides these three causes, there is among them also a cause that is the end, for the sake of which the thing that comes to 6.9.2 be comes to be. And so many are the differences of the causes; for whatever is a cause of something, will be found to be one of these causes. For even if not all things that come to be require so many causes, at least those requiring the most do not exceed 6.9.3 the stated number. But the difference between them would become more familiar if it were observed in some example of things that come to be. Let the division of causes now be demonstrated by us with a statue. Of the statue, then, the efficient cause is the craftsman who made it, whom we call a sculptor, and as matter, the underlying bronze or stone or whatever it may be that is shaped by the craftsman according to his art; for this too is a cause of the statue's having come to be and existing. 6.9.4 And the form that has come to be in this underlying matter through the craftsman is itself also a cause of the statue, by which form it is a discus-thrower or a javelin-thrower or in some 6.9.5 other definite shape. Not only are these causes of the statue’s coming-to-be, but the end for which it has come to be, that is, either the honoring of someone or some piety toward a god, is second to none of the causes of its coming-to-be. For without 6.9.6 such a cause the statue would not have come to be in the first place. Since, therefore, there are so many causes, and they have a recognizable difference from one another, we might rightly number fate among the efficient causes, preserving an analogy to the creative art of the statue with respect to the things that come to be according to it. 6.9.7 This being so, it would be logical to make our argument concerning the efficient causes; for in this way it will be known whether we must hold fate responsible for all things that come to be or whether we must concede to some other things besides this, as being 6.9.8 efficient causes of some things. Making a division of all things that come to be, Aristotle says that some of them come to be for the sake of something, the one making them having some aim and end set forth for the things that come to be, but others for the sake of nothing, as many as do not come to be according to some purpose of the one making them nor have their reference to a definite end, such as are certain grasps and twirlings of twigs and touchings and extensions of hairs and as many things as happen similarly to these 6.9.9. For that they too happen is recognizable; however, they do not have the cause according to the end and for the sake of which. Those things, then, that come to be in this way without a purpose and simply 6.9.10 coming to be have no reasonable division; but of those having a reference to something and coming to be for the sake of something, some come to be according to nature, others according to reason. For things having nature as the cause of their coming-to-be proceed according to certain numbers and a definite order to some end, at which, having come to be, they cease from coming to be, unless something standing in their way should become an impediment to their natural path toward the proposed 6.9.11 end. but

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κατὰ αἰτίαν ἔξωθεν ἀναγκαίαν ἐγίνετο. ἀλλ' οὕτως τέλεον ἡ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἐξουσιαστικὴ δύναμις ἀναιρεῖται καὶ οὐκέτι σῴζοιτο ἂν θοἰμάτιον παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ἐμὴν ἢ ἀπολλύοιτο· διὸ καὶ εἴην ἂν ἐγὼ καὶ ἀπολλυμένου τούτου κατὰ λόγον ἀνεπιτίμητος ἄλλη γὰρ αὐτό τις ἀπώλλυεν αἰτία καὶ σῳζομένου πάλιν οὐδαμῶς ἐπαινούμενος, ὅτι μηδὲ τοῦτο εἰργαζόμην ἐγώ. σὺ δὲ ὡς σῶσαι πάντα δυνάμενος οὕτως ἀνετείνου τῷ λόγῳ.» 6.8.39 Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ προδηλωθεὶς ἀνήρ. συνήφθω δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Ἀφροδισιέως, ἀνδρὸς εὖ μάλα διαφανοῦς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ εἱμαρμένης τοιαῖσδ' ἐχρήσατο φωναῖς εἰς ἀνασκευὴν τοῦ δόγματος· 6.9.1 θʹ.

ΕΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ· ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΕΞΑΝ∆ΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΑΦΡΟ∆ΙΣΙΕΩΣ

«∆ιαιρεῖται δὴ τὰ τῶν γινομένων αἴτια εἰς τρόπους αἰτιῶν τέσσαρας, καθὼς ὁ θεῖος Ἀριστοτέλης δέδειχε. τῶν γὰρ αἰτίων τὰ μέν ἐστι ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ὕλης ἐπέχει λόγον· ἔστι δέ τις ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτία· παρὰ δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς αἴτιον καὶ τέλος, οὗ χάριν τὸ γινό6.9.2 μενον γίνεται. καὶ τοσαῦται μὲν αἱ τῶν αἰτίων διαφοραί· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν αἴτιον ᾖ τινος, ὑπό τι τούτων τῶν αἰτίων ὂν εὑρεθήσεται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα τοσούτων αἰτίων δεῖται, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλείστων δεόμενα οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει 6.9.3 τὸν εἰρημένον ἀριθμόν. γνωριμωτέρα δ' ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορὰ γένοιτο, εἰ ἐπὶ παραδείγματός τινος τῶν γινομένων ὁραθείη. ἔστω δὴ ἐπ' ἀνδριάντος ἡμῖν ἡ τῶν αἰτίων δεικνυμένη διαίρεσις. τοῦ δὴ ἀνδριάντος ὡς μὲν ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὁ ποιήσας τεχνίτης, ὃν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν καλοῦμεν, ὡς δὲ ὕλη ὁ ὑποκείμενος χαλκὸς ἢ λίθος ἢ ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ τεχνίτου σχηματιζόμενον κατὰ τὴν τέχνην· αἴτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ γεγονέναι τε καὶ εἶναι τὸν ἀνδριάντα. 6.9.4 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τούτῳ γενόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος αἴτιον, δι' ὃ εἶδός ἐστι δισκεύων ἢ ἀκοντίζων ἢ ἐπ' ἄλ6.9.5 λου τινὸς ὡρισμένου σχήματος. οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῦτα τῆς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος γενέσεως αἴτια, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν αἰτίων τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ δεύτερον τὸ τέλος, οὗ χάριν γέγονε, τουτέστιν ἢ τιμή τινος ἢ εἰς θεὸν εὐσέβειά τις. ἄνευ γὰρ τῆς 6.9.6 τοιαύτης αἰτίας οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐγένετο. ὄντων τοίνυν τοσούτων τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορὰν ἐχόντων γνώριμον, τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐν τοῖς ποιητικοῖς αἰτίοις δικαίως ἂν καταριθμοῖμεν, ἀναλογίαν σῴζουσαν πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα κατ' αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος δημιουργῷ τέχνῃ. 6.9.7 Τούτου δ' οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη περὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν αἰτίων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον· οὕτως γὰρ ἔσται γνώριμον εἴτε πάντων τῶν γινομένων χρὴ τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἰτιᾶσθαι εἴτε δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ παρὰ τήνδε συγχω6.9.8 ρεῖν, ὡς οὖσι ποιητικοῖς τινων αἰτίοις. ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν γινομένων Ἀριστοτέλης ποιούμενος τὴν διαίρεσιν τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν τινὸς χάριν γίνεσθαι λέγει, σκοπόν τινα καὶ τέλος τῶν γινομένων προκείμενον ἔχοντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτά, τὰ δὲ οὐδενός, ὅσα οὐ κατὰ πρόθεσίν τινα τοῦ ποιοῦντος γίνεται οὐδ' ἐπὶ τέλος ὡρισμένον ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν, τοιαῦτα οἷόν ἐστι καρφῶν τέ τινων διακρατήσεις καὶ περιστροφαὶ καὶ τριχῶν ἐπαφαί τε καὶ ἐκτάσεις καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὁμοίως 6.9.9 γίνεται. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ γίνεται καὶ αὐτὰ γνώριμον· οὐ μὴν ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν οὗ χάριν αἰτίαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως γινόμενα ἀσκόπως καὶ ἁπλῶς 6.9.10 γινόμενα οὐδεμίαν εὔλογον ἔχει διαίρεσιν· τῶν δὲ ἐπί τι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐχόντων καί τινος γινομένων χάριν τὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ λόγον γίνεται. τά τε γὰρ φύσιν αἰτίαν ἔχοντα τῆς γενέσεως κατά τινας ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τάξιν ὡρισμένην πρόεισιν ἐπί τι τέλος, ἐν ᾧ γινόμενα τοῦ γίνεσθαι παύεται, εἰ μή τι αὐτοῖς ἐνστὰν ἐμποδὼν γένοιτο τῇ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον 6.9.11 ὁδῷ. ἀλλὰ