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And things that come to be according to reason have some end; for nothing of the things that come to be according to reason comes to be by chance, but for all of them 6.9.12 the reference is to some purpose. Things that come to be according to reason are those that are made by those who make them by reasoning about them and putting them together in whatever manner they might come to be. Thus come to be both all things that are made according to the arts and things according to choice; 6.9.13 which differ from things that come to be by nature in that things that come to be by nature have within themselves both the beginning and the causes of such a generation—for such is nature—and while they come to be according to a certain order, the nature that makes them does not, however, use reasoning about them in the same way as 6.9.14 the arts do. But things that come to be according to art and choice have the principle of their motion and the efficient cause externally, but not in themselves, and the reasoning about them of the one who makes them guides their 6.9.15 generation. And third among the things that come to be for the sake of something are also those believed to come to be from chance and from the spontaneous, differing in this way from things that come to be primarily for the sake of something, in that in the former case the things before the end come to be for the sake of the end, but in the latter case the things that come to be before the end come to be for the sake of something else, but what is called the spontaneous and chance outcome meets them as an end, though they were coming to be for the sake of something else. 6.9.16 Since these things are so, and all things that come to be are divided into these categories, it is logical after this to see in which of the efficient 6.9.17 causes one must place fate. Is it in those things that come to be for the sake of nothing? Or is this completely unreasonable? For we always use the name of fate with reference to some end, saying that it has happened according to fate; wherefore it is necessary to place fate among the things that happen for the sake of something.” 6.9.18 These things in these very words the aforementioned man, after distinguishing them, establishes consecutively through several points that fate is nothing other than things that happen according to nature; for the necessity of fate is not to be observed in things accomplished by our reasoning and by 6.9.19 art. And he says that it happens that most things according to nature are impeded, which are also called contrary to nature, just as in things according to art, things contrary to art are spoken of. But if some things happen entirely contrary to what is according to nature, they would also happen contrary to fate, if indeed things according to nature are the same as things according to fate. 6.9.20 “We see, at any rate,” he says, “that the body also, by having a nature of such a kind or such a kind, is involved in diseases and destructions in accordance with its natural constitution, but not, however, in the same way for all nor by necessity. For often cares and changes of life and prescriptions of doctors and counsels of 6.9.21 gods are sufficient to avert such a condition. And in the same way also in the case of the soul, one might find different choices and actions and lives in each person contrary to their natural constitution, being improved by training and from learning and from better reasonings.” 6.9.22 “When, at any rate, the physiognomist once said some strange things about Socrates the philosopher, and things very far removed from his choice of life, and was for this laughed at by those around Socrates, Socrates said that Zopyrus had made no mistake; for he would have been such a person, as far as his nature was concerned, if he had not become better than his nature through the training of philosophy.” 6.9.23 And such are the things according to nature, which he also says differ in no way from things according to fate; but things from chance are of this sort: “When for someone doing something for the sake of something else, that for the sake of which he did it does not turn out, but something else which was not even expected at the beginning. For they say that someone found a treasure by chance, when, digging for the sake of something else, and not to find a treasure, he came upon a treasure; and they say that someone recovered his money by chance, when, having gone to the marketplace for the sake of something else, he met the debtor who had the money and received what was owed to him; and the horse, too, is said by some to have been saved spontaneously, when, in the hope of food or for the sake of something else, it escapes those who hold it, and its flight and running result in it coming upon its masters.” 6.9.24 Since these things are so, not even these would

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καὶ τὰ κατὰ λόγον γινόμενα ἔχει τι τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε τῶν κατὰ λόγον γινομένων γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐπί τινα σκοπὸν ἡ ἀναφορὰ πᾶσιν 6.9.12 αὐτοῖς. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ λόγον γινόμενα ὅσα ὑπὸ τῶν ποιούντων αὐτὰ γίνεται λογιζομένων τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ συντιθέντων καθ' ὃν ἂν τρόπον γένοιτο. οὕτως γίνεται τά τε κατὰ τὰς τέχνας γινόμενα πάντα καὶ τὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν· 6.9.13 ἃ διαφέρει τῶν γινομένων φύσει τῷ τὰ μὲν φύσει γινόμενα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύτης γενέσεως τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ φύσις καὶ γίνεσθαι μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινά, οὐ μὴν τῆς ποιούσης αὐτὰ φύσεως ὁμοίως 6.9.14 ταῖς τέχναις λογισμῷ περὶ αὐτῶν χρωμένης. τὰ δὲ γινόμενα κατὰ τέχνην τε καὶ προαίρεσιν ἔξωθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ποιοῦσαν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν αὑτοῖς, καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν ὁ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἡγεῖται 6.9.15 περὶ αὐτῶν λογισμός. τρίτον δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης τε καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι πεπιστευμένα, ταύτη τῶν προηγουμένως ἕνεκά του γινομένων διαφέροντα, ᾗ ἐπ' ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ πρὸ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ τέλους χάριν γίνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων τὰ μὲν γινόμενα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους ἄλλου χάριν γίνεται, ἀπαντᾷ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἄλλου χάριν γινομένοις ὡς τέλος τὸ αὐτομάτως τε καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γίνεσθαι λεγόμενον. 6.9.16 Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ πάντων τῶν γινομένων εἰς τούτους τοὺς τρόπους νενεμημένων ἀκόλουθον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν ποιητικῶν 6.9.17 αἰτίων χρὴ τιθέναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. ἆρά γε ἐν τοῖς οὐδενὸς γινομένοις χάριν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν παντάπασιν ἄλογον; αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλους τινὸς τῷ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὀνόματι χρώμεθα καθ' εἱμαρμένην [τε] αὐτὸ λέγοντες γεγονέναι· διὸ ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις ἀναγκαῖον τιθέναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην.» 6.9.18 Ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ῥήμασιν ὁ προδηλωθεὶς ἀνὴρ διελὼν διὰ πλειόνων ἑξῆς συνίστησιν οὐδ' ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἢ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ λογισμὸν ἡμέτερον καὶ κατὰ τέχνην ἐπιτελουμένοις τὴν 6.9.19 τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι. φησὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν πλεῖστα ἐμποδίζεσθαι συμβαίνειν, ἃ καὶ καλεῖσθαι παρὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὰ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην λέγεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ὅλως παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν γίνεταί τινα, γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ καθ' εἱμαρμένην. 6.9.20 «Ὁρῶμεν γοῦν, φησίν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῷ τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἐν νόσοις καὶ φθοραῖς ἀκολούθως τῇ φυσικῇ συστάσει γίνεται, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἱκαναὶ γὰρ ἐκκροῦσαι πολλάκις τὴν τοιάνδε ἕξιν ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ βίων ὑπαλλαγαὶ καὶ προστάξεις ἰατρῶν καὶ συμβουλίαι 6.9.21 θεῶν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εὕροι τις ἂν παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κατασκευὴν διαφόρους ἐν ἑκάστῳ προαιρέσεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ βίους ἐξ ἀσκήσεως καὶ ἀπὸ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀπὸ λόγων κρειττόνων βελτιουμένων.» 6.9.22 «εἰπόντος γοῦν ποτε τοῦ φυσιογνώμονος περὶ Σωκράτους τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἄτοπά τινα καὶ πλεῖστον ἀφεστῶτα τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Σωκράτη καταγελωμένου, οὐδὲν εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐσφάλθαι τὸν Ζώπυρον· ἦν γὰρ ἂν τοιοῦτος, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν ἀμείνων τῆς φύσεως ἐγένετο.» 6.9.23 Καὶ τοιαῦτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἃ καὶ μηδέν φησι διαφέρειν τῶν καθ' εἱμαρμένην· τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης τοιαῦτα· «Ὅταν ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν γενομένῳ τινὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπαντήσῃ οὗ χάριν ἐγένετο, ἄλλο δέ τι ὅπερ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ ἠλπίζετο. θησαυρόν τε γάρ φασιν ἀπὸ τύχης εὑρηκέναι τινά, ὅταν ἄλλου χάριν ὀρύσσων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ θησαυρὸν εὑρεῖν, θησαυρῷ περιπέσῃ· καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ἀπὸ τύχης κεκομίσθαι τινὰ λέγουσιν, ὅταν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν προελθὼν ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν ἀργύριον ἔχοντι περιπεσὼν τῷ χρεώστῃ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον αὑτῷ λάβῃ· καὶ ὁ ἵππος δὲ αὐτομάτως τισὶ λέγεται σεσῶσθαι, ὅταν τροφῆς μὲν ἐλπίδι ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν ἀποφύγῃ τοὺς κατέχοντας αὐτόν, ἀπαντήσῃ δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ φυγῇ καὶ τῷ δρόμῳ τὸ τοῖς δεσπόταις περιπεσεῖν.» 6.9.24 Ὧν οὕτως ἐχόντων οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἂν