BOOK VII, CHAPTER 3

             697. (Lecture 5, 697-701). All things which are altered are altered by sensible things. And there is alteration only of those things which in themselves are said to suffer from these. We will consider these.

             698. Of the other things one will especially think that there is alteration in figures and forms and habits in regard to both their removal and their reception. For this seems to be alteration. But this is not so in these things. Rather these things come to be when certain things are altered. For the matter becomes dense or rarefied, or becomes hot or cold. But there is no alteration.

             699. That from which the form of statue is we do not call form, nor that from which the figure of pyramid or bed is. Rather we denominate this 'bronzen', and that 'waxen' and another 'wooden'. But that which is altered we call form. For we say that bronze is wet or strong or hot. And not only thus, but we say the wet and hot is bronze, predicating the matter equally with the passion. Hence, since that from which the form and figure is and which was made is not equally predicated with the figures which are from it; and since things which are altered are predicated equally with the passions; it is clear that there is alteration only in sensible things.

             700. Further there is another inconsistency. To say that a man or a house is altered, by taking the end, is ridiculous. If we say that the perfection of a house, either the roofing or the bricking, is an alteration, then when the house has been closed or bricked, it is being altered. However it is clear that that which pertains to alteration is not in things which are becoming.

             701. Nor is there alteration in habits. For habits are virtues and vices. And all virtues and vices are relations. Thus health is a certain proportion of cold and hot things, either of those which are within or to the container. Likewise beauty and barrenness are relations. For certain dispositions of the perfect are to the optimum. I call that perfect which is healthy and is disposed concerning nature. Therefore, since virtues and vices are in relation; and since these are not generations, nor is there generation of them or any alteration; it is clear that there is altogether no alteration of habit.

             702 (Lecture 6, 702-708). Nor is there alteration of the virtues and vices of the soul. For virtue is a certain perfection. Each thing is most perfect when it attains its proper virtue, and then it is best in respect to nature. Thus a circle is best in respect to nature when it is most circular. And vice is the corruption and removal of these things.

             703. Both the reception of virtue and the removal of vice occur when something is altered. Nevertheless, there is alteration of neither of these.

             704. It is clear that something is altered. For virtue either is a certain impassiveness or thus passive. But vice is passivity or the passion contrary to virtue.

             705. All moral virtue occurs in pleasant and sad things. The pleasure is either in respect to act or through memory or hope. If it is in respect to act, the sense is the cause. If it is through memory or through hope, it is from one's self. The qualities which we have suffered are in those who remember pleasure, or the qualities which we will suffer are in those who hope.

             706. Nor is there alteration in the intellective part of the soul. For knowing is best called a relation. This is clear: knowledge does not occur in us in respect to any potency for motions, but when something appears. For we take universal knowledge from experience in respect to the part.

             707. Neither, therefore, is there generation of act unless one says that sight and touch are generations. For such things are acts.

             708. Since the reception of knowledge is from a principle, there is neither generation nor alteration. For in rest and quiet the soul becomes knowing and prudent. Thus when a sleeping man awakens, or when a drunken man ceases, or when a sick man is ordered, he is not made a knower, although before he could not use and act in accordance with knowledge. When disturbance is changed and the mind returns to its state, the potency for the suitability of knowledge was there. Therefore in this way a thing comes in the beginning to things which exist of knowledge: there is a certain quiet and rest from disturbance. Hence children cannot learn from and judge sensibles, as do elders. For there is much disturbance and motion about them. Moreover disturbance ceases and is driven away sometimes by nature, sometimes by other things. In both cases something is altered, as when one arises and becomes awake to act. It is clear, therefore, that there is alteration in sensible things and in the sensible part of the soul, but not in any other thing, except accidentally.