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it would be according to fate. "And there are some causes obscure to human reason, which are believed to happen according to certain antipathies, the cause for which they happen being unknown; such as certain amulets are supposed to produce, having no reasonable and plausible cause for doing these things; and furthermore, incantations and certain sorceries of that kind. For of these things it is agreed by all that the cause is obscure; wherefore they also call them uncaused." 6.9.25 And there are many things besides these happening both contingently and by chance, which also would not be according to fate. 6.9.26 "And those things are said to happen contingently for which there is also room for them not to happen, as also the very phrase 'by chance' makes known;" such as "to move one of one's own parts and the casual turning of the neck and the extension of a finger and the raising of the eyelids" "and for the one sitting to stand and the one moving to be still and the one speaking to be silent, and in ten thousand cases one might find a certain inherent power receptive of opposites," which would not happen by fate; for things that happen by fate do not have the power of receiving the opposite of what is in them. 6.9.27 But also, man's ability to deliberate does not exist in him in vain; but he would be deliberative in vain if he did what is done by necessity. But man alone among other animals clearly appears "to have this advantage from nature, not to follow impressions in the same way as they do, but to have reason as a judge of what befalls him; using which, if the things imagined, on examination, are as they at first appeared, he assents to the impression and thus pursues them; but if they appear different, he no longer remains in his preconception, reason having refuted them" through deliberating about them. 6.9.28 For we deliberate only about things we are able to do. But if ever we should act without deliberating, "we often repent and blame ourselves for our lack of counsel; and if we see others acting without counsel, we rebuke them as erring and demand that they use such counselors, as if" such things "are in our power." 6.9.29 "But that their argument about fate was false, it is sufficient testimony that not even its proponents themselves are able to be persuaded by the things said by them." For they profess both to exhort and to teach, and they advise learning and being educated, and they censure and rebuke those not doing what is proper, as erring according to their own choice. 6.9.30 "But they also leave behind very many writings, by which they expect the young to be educated." "And they would have ceased from their ambition in arguments," if they had paid attention to the fact that they also deem those who err involuntarily worthy of pardon, but say that those who transgress voluntarily are worthy of punishment, as if these things were in their power, 6.9.31 clearly both the erring and the not erring being in their power. So that, even according to them, the necessity from fate is destroyed, and it is established that free will exists in us by nature, along with the fact that very many things are also not in our power, such as things according to nature and things from chance, which are themselves also different from the argument of fate, as has been shown before. 6.9.32 Since these things have been abridged by us from many sources, because the argument concerning free will is extensive in our doctrines, with which the cited voices of the philosophers also concurred, on the one hand bearing witness to our divine scriptures, and on the other hand refuting as false the opinions concerning fate not only of most men, but also of the oracle-mongers, of the wondrous gods. And while some have rather cynically addressed the noble oracles, and others have spoken against the wondrous philosophers by those known to them, it is time also to examine the arguments from astrology against those who Chaldaize, of those who profess this malevolent sorcery as a branch of learning. And I will set before you the proofs of these things also from a man who was Syrian by race, but had reached the pinnacle of Chaldaic knowledge. Bardesanes

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εἴη καθ' εἱμαρμένην· «Καὶ ἄδηλα δέ ἐστί τινα αἴτια ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ, ἃ κατά τινας ἀντιπαθείας γίνεσθαι πεπίστευται, ἀγνοουμένης τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν γίνεται· ὁποῖα περίαπτά τινα ποιεῖν προείληπται, οὐδεμίαν εὔλογον καὶ πιθανὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔχοντα· ἔτι δὲ ἐπαοιδαὶ καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες μαγγανεῖαι. τούτων γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων ἄδηλος εἶναι ἡ αἰτία· διὸ καὶ ἀναιτιολόγητα λέγουσιν αὐτά.» 6.9.25 Πολλὰ δ' εἶναι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνδεχομένως καὶ ὁπότερα ἔτυχε γινόμενα, ἃ οὐδὲ ταῦτα εἴη ἂν καθ' εἱμαρμένην· 6.9.26 «Λέγεται δὲ ἐνδεχομένως γίνεσθαι ταῦτα ἐφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι χώραν ἔχει, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ «ὁπότερα ἔτυχε» λεγόμενον ποιεῖ γνώριμον·» οἷον τὸ «κινῆσαί τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν καὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν τοῦ τραχήλου περιστροφὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ δακτύλου ἔκτασιν καὶ τὸ ἐπᾶραι τὰ βλέφαρα» «καὶ τὸν καθεζόμενον στῆναι καὶ τὸν κινούμενον ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ τὸν λαλοῦντα σιγῆσαι καὶ ἐπὶ μυρίων εὕροι τις ἂν δύναμίν τινα ἐνυπάρχουσαν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικήν,» ἃ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐξ εἱμαρμένης· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ εἱμαρμένης οὐκ ἔχει δύναμιν τοῦ δέξασθαι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον. 6.9.27 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ εἰς μάτην αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ἦν δ' ἂν εἰς μάτην βουλευτικός, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπραττε τὰ πραττόμενα. ἀλλ' ἐναργῶς φαίνεται τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνος «τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔχων πλέον, τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις ταῖς φαντασίαις ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τῶν προσπιπτόντων κριτὴν τὸν λόγον· ᾧ χρώμενος, εἰ μὲν ἐξεταζόμενα τὰ φαντασθέντα οἷα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐφάνη, καὶ ἔστι, συγκατατίθεται τῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ οὕτω μέτεισιν αὐτά· εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα φαίνεται, οὐκέτι ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς προλήψεως, ἐλέγξαντος αὐτὰ τοῦ λόγου» διὰ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. 6.9.28 Βουλευόμεθα γοῦν περὶ μόνων ὧν δυνάμεθα πράττειν. εἰ δέ ποτε μὴ βουλευσάμενοι πράττοιμεν, «πολλάκις μετανοοῦμεν καὶ μεμφόμεθα ἑαυτοῖς τῆς ἀβουλίας· ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλους ἴδωμεν ἀβούλως πράττοντας, ἐπικαλοῦμεν ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἀξιοῦμέν τε συμβούλοις τοῖσδε χρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων» τῶν τοιούτων. 6.9.29 «Ὅτι δὲ ψευδὴς ἦν αὐτῶν ὁ περὶ εἱμαρμένης λόγος, ἱκανὸν μαρτύριον τὸ μηδ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς προστάτας αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγομένοις». καὶ γὰρ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἐπαγγέλλονται καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ παιδεύεσθαι συμβουλεύουσιν ἐπιτιμῶσί τε καὶ ἐπιπλήττουσι τοῖς οὐ τὰ προσήκοντα δρῶσιν, ὡς κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἰδίαν ἁμαρτάνουσιν. 6.9.30 «ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγράμματα πλεῖστα καταλείπουσι, δι' ὧν ἀξιοῦσι παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νέους.» «ἐπαύσαντο δ' ἂν τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φιλοτιμίας,» εἰ προσέσχον ὅτι καὶ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτάνοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἑκουσίως πλημμελοῦντας κολάσεως ἀξίους εἶναί φασιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τούτων, 6.9.31 δηλονότι τοῦ τε ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ τοῦ μὴ κειμένου. ὥστε καὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξ εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην, συνίστασθαι δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, μετὰ τοῦ πλεῖστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰ ἐκ τύχης, ἕτερα ὄντα καὶ αὐτὰ παρὰ τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης λόγον, καθὼς προδέδεικται. 6.9.32 Τούτων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ πλείστων ἐπιτετμημένων, τῷ πολὺν εἶναι τὸν περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου λόγον ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς δόγμασιν ᾧ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων συνέδραμον αἱ παρατεθεῖσαι φωναί, τοῖς μὲν καθ' ἡμᾶς θείοις γράμμασιν ἐπιμαρτυροῦσαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ εἱμαρμένης οὐ μόνον τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν χρησμῳδῶν, τῶν θαυμαστῶν θεῶν, τὰς δόξας ψευδεῖς οὔσας ἀπελέγχουσαι. καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τοὺς γενναίους χρησμοὺς κυνικώτερον ἀποταθέντων, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θαυμαστοὺς φιλοσόφους παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς γνωρίμων ἀντειρημένων, ὥρα καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀστρολογίας πρὸς τοὺς Χαλδαΐζοντας τῶν τὴν κακότεχνον ταύτην γοητείαν ὡς ἐν μέρει μαθήματος ἐπαγγελλομένων τοὺς λόγους ἐπισκέψασθαι· παραθήσομαι δέ σοι καὶ τῶνδε τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐξ ἀνδρὸς Σύρου μὲν τὸ γένος, ἐπ' ἄκρον δὲ τῆς Χαλδαϊκῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐληλακότος. Βαρδησάνης