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to the divine and which to the mortal? Or does it not seem to you that the divine is of a nature to rule and to lead, while the mortal is of a nature to be ruled 11.27.13 and to be a slave? It does to me. To which, then, is the soul like? It is clear, Socrates, that the soul is like the divine, and the body like the mortal. Consider then, he said, Cebes, if from all that has been said this follows for us: that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and that which is always in the same state in the same respects, while the body, in turn, is most like the human and mortal and unintelligible and multiform and dissoluble and that which is never in the same state in the same respects. 11.27.14 Can we say anything else against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so? We cannot. What then? This being so, is it not fitting for the body to be quickly dissolved, and for the soul, on the other hand, to be altogether indissoluble, 11.27.15 or nearly so? How could it not be? You understand then, he said, that when a man dies, his visible part, the body, which lies in the visible world, which we call a corpse, whose lot it is to be dissolved and to fall apart and to be blown away, does not immediately suffer any of these things, but remains for a considerable time; and if a man dies with his body in a graceful condition and at such a season, for a very long time indeed. For the body, when it has collapsed and been embalmed, like those embalmed in Egypt, remains almost whole for an incredibly long time. And some parts of the body, even if it decays, the bones and sinews and all such things, 11.27.16 are nevertheless, so to speak, immortal, are they not? Yes. Then the soul, the invisible, which departs to another place of such a kind, noble and pure and invisible, to Hades in very truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God wills, my own soul must shortly go, does this soul of ours, being of such a nature and disposition, when it is separated from the body, is it immediately blown away 11.27.17 and destroyed, as most men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias; but it is much more like this: if it is separated in a pure state, dragging nothing of the body with it, since it had no willing association with it in life, but fled from it and gathered itself into itself, since it was always practicing this—and this is nothing else than philosophizing rightly and in fact practicing how to die easily; or would this not be 11.27.18 the practice of death? Absolutely. Then in this state it goes away to what is like itself, the invisible, the divine and immortal and wise, and when it arrives there it is its lot to be happy, freed from wandering and folly and fears and wild loves and all other human evils, and, as is said of the initiated, truly spends the rest of time with the gods. Shall we say so, Cebes, or otherwise? So, by Zeus, said 11.27.19 Cebes. But if, I suppose, it is separated from the body polluted and impure, as always being with the body and serving it and loving it and being bewitched by it, by its desires and pleasures, so that it thinks nothing else to be true than the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and use for sexual pleasure, while that which is dark to the eyes and invisible, but intelligible and grasped by philosophy, this it is accustomed to hate and tremble at and flee; do you think a soul in such a state will be separated pure in itself by itself? Not in any way, he said.” 11.27.20 This is from Plato; but Porphyry explains the thought in the first of his books *Against Boethus on the Soul*, writing in this manner:

11.28.1 29. Porphyry on the Same. “Immediately, an argument which seemed strong to Plato for the proof of the soul’s immortality, is the one from likeness. For if it is like the divine and immortal and invisible and

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θείῳ καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί 11.27.13 τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικε; ∆ῆλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει· τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχήν, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιό11.27.14 τατον αὖ εἶναι τὸ σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ὡς οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἆρ' οὐ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ 11.27.15 εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Συννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον· ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐὰν σαπῇ, ὀστᾶ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 11.27.16 πάντα, ὅμως, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀθάνατά ἐστιν ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπε11.27.17 φύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία· ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδε ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς αὑτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως· ἢ οὐ 11.27.18 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἷ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένῃ, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα, οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως; Οὕτως νὴ ∆ία, ἔφη 11.27.19 ὁ Κέβης. Ἂν δέ γε, οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ ἄν τις ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν· οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξασθαι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.» 11.27.20 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων· ἐξαπλοῖ δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Πρὸς Βόηθον Περὶ ψυχῆς τοῦτον γράφων τὸν τρόπον·

11.28.1 κθʹ. ΠΟΡΦΥΡΙΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ «Αὐτίκα λόγον ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦντα τῷ Πλάτωνι εἰς παράστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου. εἰ γὰρ ὁμοία τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἀειδεῖ καὶ