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What follows is consistent. For it is clearly the playthings of children, arranging some constructions of buildings in the sand. For having composed a certain period of a clause and having with difficulty gone through to the end, he shows 20the same life20 20to be without beginning and without end20, fulfilling our prayer in such zeal. For nothing else is said by us than that the divine life is one and continuous with itself, infinite and eternal and in no 2.1.470 way hindered by any limit towards the indefinite. Up to this point the prose-writer grants his own labors and sweat to the truth, showing that the same life is not limited in either part, neither if one were to examine what is before the ages nor if one were to consider what is after this. But in what follows he returns again to his own confusion. For having said that the same life is without beginning and without end, leaving aside the argument concerning life and having arranged all the conceptions contemplated for the divine life into one 2.1.471 notion, he made all things one. 20For if life20, he says, 20is without beginning and without end and incorruptible and unbegotten, incorruptibility would be the same as unbegottenness and being without beginning the same as being without end20. And to these things he adds the support from his reasonings: 20For it is not possible20, he says, 20for life to be one, but for the concept of the incorruptible not to be the same as the concept of the unbegotten20. The noble one adds well. 2.1.472 And it seems that neither the concept of justice happens to be different from what has been said, nor that of wisdom and of power and of goodness and of each of the divinely-fitting names, and let no concept be understood in its particularity, but for the whole catalogue of names let the meaning be one underlying thing, and let one account of a description fulfill the definition concerning each of the things said; and if you are asked the meaning of 'judge,' answer with the interpretation of 'unbegottenness,' and if you must give the definition of 'justice,' let 'bodilessness' be ready for you for the answer, and what 'incorruptibility' means, you will say is entirely the same as what 'mercy' 2.1.473 or the meaning of 'judgment' presents. Thus also let all individual things change into one another, with no particular emphasis distinguishing one from the other. And if Eunomius legislates these things, why in vain do the scriptures call upon the divine nature with many names, naming God judge, just, strong, long-suffering, true, merciful and 2.1.474 many other such things? For if none of the names is understood in terms of any particular notion, but all are jumbled up with each other through the confusion of their meaning, it would be pointless to have used many appellations for the same thing, with no difference in meaning distinguishing the names from one another. 2.1.475 But who is so stupefied as to be ignorant that the divine nature, whatever it is in essence, is one, simple, uniform, and uncompounded, and in no way contemplated in any varied composition, while the human soul, lying on the ground and buried in this earthly life, because it is unable to perceive clearly what is sought, strives in many ways and parts after the ineffable nature with many notions, not hunting for the hidden thing 2.1.476 with any one thought? For comprehension would have been easy, if some one approach to divine knowledge had been set apart for us; but as it is, through the wisdom apparent in the universe we have understood that which presides over the universe is wise, and through the great working of wonders we have received an impression of power, and believing that everything is derived from that becomes proof that it has no cause of its own existence. 2.1.477 Again, having understood the abomination of evil, we apprehend its unchangeable nature and its unmixedness with evil, and considering the corruption of death to be the last of evils, we have named immortal and incorruptible Him who is foreign to every such thought, not dividing along with these notions the underlying reality, but, whatever it is in essence, having believed it to be one with respect to all such 2.1.478
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τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἔχεται. παιδίων γὰρ ἄντικρύς ἐστιν ἀθύρματα κατασκευάς τινας οἰκοδομημάτων ἐν ψάμμῳ διατιθέντων. συνθεὶς γάρ τινα κώλου περίοδον καὶ μόλις ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας διεξελθὼν 20τὴν αὐτὴν ζωὴν20 ἀποδεί κνυσιν 20ἄναρχόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀτελεύτητον20, ἡμε τέραν πληρῶν εὐχὴν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ σπουδῇ. οὐδὲ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν ἄλλο τι λέγεται ἢ ὅτι μία ἐστὶ καὶ συνεχὴς αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ θεία ζωή, ἄπειρός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ οὐδα 2.1.470 μόθεν οὐδενὶ πέρατι κωλυομένη πρὸς τὸ ἀόριστον. μέχρι τούτων ὁ λογογράφος τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πόνους καὶ τοὺς ἱδρῶτας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ χαρίζεται, δεικνὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ζωὴν κατ' οὐδέ τερον μέρος περατουμένην, οὔτε εἰ τὸ πρὸ αἰώνων τις ἐξε τάζοι οὔτε εἰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λογίζοιτο. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπανέρχεται σύγχυσιν. εἰπὼν γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ζωὴν ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ἀφεὶς τὸν περὶ τῆς ζωῆς λόγον καὶ τὰς ἐπιθεωρουμένας ὑπο λήψεις τῇ θείᾳ ζωῇ εἰς μίαν τὰς πάσας ἔννοιαν συντάξας 2.1.471 ἓν τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν. 20εἰ γὰρ ἡ ζωή20, φησίν, 20ἄναρχός τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητος καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ἡ ἀφθαρσία καὶ τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ τὸ ἄναρχον20. καὶ προστίθησι τούτοις τὴν ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίαν· 20οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν20, φησί, 20τὴν μὲν ζωὴν εἶναι μίαν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου λόγον μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου λόγῳ20. καλῶς ὁ γενναῖος προστίθησι. 2.1.472 δοκεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τυγχάνειν μηδὲ τὸν τῆς σοφίας καὶ τὸν τῆς δυνά μεως καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀγαθότητος καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θεοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ μηδεὶς ἔστω λόγος κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον νοού μενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ καταλόγῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἓν ὑπο κείσθω τὸ σημαινόμενον, καὶ εἷς ὑπογραφῆς λόγος τὸν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν λεγομένων ὅρον ἀποπληρούτω· κἂν ἐρω τηθῇς τὸ τοῦ κριτοῦ σημαινόμενον, τὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας ἑρμηνείαν ἀπόκριναι, κἂν τῆς δικαιοσύνης δέῃ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ ἀσώματόν σοι πρόχειρον εἰς τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἔστω, τί δὲ σημαίνει ἡ ἀφθαρσία, ὅπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐλέου πάν 2.1.473 τως ἐρεῖς ἢ ἡ τῆς κρίσεως σημασία παρίστησιν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα μεταχωρείτω, μηδεμιᾶς ἰδιαζούσης ἐμφάσεως τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου δια στελλούσης. καὶ εἰ ταῦτα νομοθετεῖ ὁ Εὐνόμιος, τί μάτην αἱ γραφαὶ πολυωνύμως τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἀνακαλοῦσιν, θεὸν κριτὴν δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν μακρόθυμον ἀληθινὸν ἐλεήμονα καὶ 2.1.474 ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα κατονομάζουσαι; εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπί τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλοις διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον συγχύ σεως ἀναπέφυρται, μάταιον ἂν εἴη πολλαῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἐπωνυμίαις κεχρῆσθαι, μηδεμιᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὸ σημαι νόμενον διαφορᾶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ὀνόματα διαστελλούσης. 2.1.475 ἀλλὰ τίς οὕτως ἀπόπληκτος ὡς ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν θεία φύσις, ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστί, μία ἐστὶν ἁπλῆ τις καὶ μονοειδὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος καὶ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἐν ποικίλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει θεωρουμένη, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ χαμαὶ κειμένη καὶ ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ τούτῳ βίῳ κατορωρυγμένη διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τηλαυγῶς κατιδεῖν τὸ ζητούμενον πολλαῖς ἐν νοίαις τῆς ἀφράστου φύσεως πολυτρόπως καὶ πολυμερῶς ἐπορέγεται, οὐ κατὰ μίαν τινὰ διάνοιαν τὸ κεκρυμμένον 2.1.476 θηρεύουσα; ἦ γὰρ ἂν εὔκολος ἦν ἡ κατάληψις, εἰ μία τις ἡμῖν ἔφοδος πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀποκέκριτο γνῶσιν· νυνὶ δὲ διὰ μὲν τῆς ἐμφαινομένης τῷ παντὶ σοφίας σοφὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιστατοῦν ἐνοήσαμεν, διὰ δὲ τῆς τῶν θαυ μάτων μεγαλουργίας δυνάμεως ἔμφασιν ἐδεξάμεθα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνου πᾶν ἐξῆφθαι πιστεύειν τοῦ μηδεμίαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αἰτίαν εἶναι τεκμήριον γίνεται. 2.1.477 Πάλιν τὸ βδελυκτὸν τῆς κακίας νοήσαντες τὸ ἀναλ λοίωτον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀμιγὲς πρὸς κακίαν καταλαμβάνομεν τήν τε τοῦ θανάτου διαφθορὰν κακῶν ἔσχατον εἶναι νομί σαντες ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον τὸν ἀλλότριον παντὸς τοιούτου νοήματος ὠνομάσαμεν, οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς ἐννοίαις ταύταις συνδιασχίζοντες, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἓν εἶναι πεπιστευκότες πρὸς πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας 2.1.478