143

we have supposed that the conception is proper to the thing conceived. For the names do not fight against one another according to the nature of opposites, as if when one exists, the other could not be contemplated with it, just as it is not possible for life and death to be conceived together concerning the same thing, but such is the significance of each of the things said of the divine nature, that even if it is particular in what it signifies, it has no 2.1.479 opposition to what is named with it. For what is opposed to incorporeal in "just," even if the terms do not correspond to one another in meaning? What conflict does goodness have with invisibility? So too the eternity of the divine life, being known by double names and concepts, the endless and the unbegun, is not cut apart by the difference of the names; and neither is the one the same as the other in meaning (for one showed the absence of a beginning, the other of an end) nor has the difference of the concepts contemplated in it produced any division of the subject. 2.1.480 These things, then, are from us, but those from our opponent are such, according to the very phrasing of his language, as to have no support from reasoning, as he bizarrely spits out such bombastic and unintelligible utterances in the form of clauses and periods as occasion arises. The aim of what is said is this, that there is no difference in the 2.1.481 significance of the various names. But it is altogether necessary, as it seems, to set forth his statement word for word, so that we may not seem to slanderously attribute to him something that is not his. 20For since true20 he says 20arguments take their verdict from the underlying and signified realities and different things are fitted to different realities, just as20 again 20the same things to the same, it is necessary that one of two things be the case, either the reality signified is entirely different, 2.1.482 or the argument signifying it is not different either20. These things and many others like them he goes through in order to establish the aim he has set before himself, having cast out from his argument certain relations and juxtapositions and form and measure and part and time and place, so that through the removal of these things, unbegottenness might become indicative of essence. The argument has this form, and I will state the thought in my own 2.1.483 words. 20There is not some other20, he says, 20life besides the essence, so that no composition may be conceived in the simple nature, with the concept being divided into that which participates and that which is participated in; but that very thing20, he says, 20which is life, is essence20, philosophizing well on such matters. For none who has sense would object that these things are not so. 2.1.484 But how did he bring his argument to its conclusion? 20If in signifying the unbegun20, he says, 20we signified life, and the argument of truth compels us to say this life is essence, of the divine essence itself20 he says 20the unbegotten is significant20. But as for the divine life not having been begotten by another, which the concept of "unbegun" signifies, we ourselves also agree, but to think that what is signified by the word "not having been begotten" is essence we think is for those alone who are 2.1.485 carried away by madness. For who is so out of his mind as to declare "not being begotten" a definition of essence? For as begetting is proper to what is begotten, so clearly also "not being begotten" will be applied to the unbegotten. What, therefore, is not about the Father when unbegottenness is indicated, how do we combine into essence the indication of what is not present? But having granted to himself what is conceded to him neither by us nor from the sequence of what has been laid down, he concluded that unbegottenness is what is significant of the divine life of God. 2.1.486 And that his nonsense on this point might become most manifest, let us examine his argument in this way. For by the same means through which he has brought the argument for essence in the case of the Father to unbegottenness, let us examine whether we will not equally, through the same arguments, also reduce the essence of the Son to unbegottenness. 2.1.487 20It is necessary20, he says, 20of the same life and of the purely

143

ὑπολήψεις οἰκείως ἔχειν τὸ νοηθὲν ὑπειλήφαμεν. οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ὀνόματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντιθέτων φύσιν, ὡς εἰ τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχοι, μὴ ἂν αὐτῷ συνθεωρηθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον, ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζωὴν ἅμα καὶ θάνατον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτη ἐστὶν ἑκάστου τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λεγομένων ἡ ἔμφασις, ὥστε κἂν ἰδιάζῃ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, μηδεμίαν ἴσχειν πρὸς τὸ συνονομαζόμενον 2.1.479 ἐναντίωσιν. τί γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ δίκαιον, κἂν μὴ συμβαίνῃ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀλλήλοις τὰ ῥήματα; ποίαν δὲ μάχην ἡ ἀγαθότης ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀόρατον; οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀΐδιον τῆς θείας ζωῆς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασί τε καὶ νοήμασι γνωριζόμενον, τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ, τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὀνομάτων συνδιατέμνεται· καὶ οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ τὴν σημασίαν τὸ ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς τὸ δὲ τὴν τοῦ τέλους ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἔδειξεν) οὔτε μερισμόν τινα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἡ τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων αὐτῷ νοημάτων διαφορὰ παρεσκεύασε. 2.1.480 Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τοῦ πολε μοῦντος ἡμῖν κατ' αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν τῆς λέξεως σύμφρασιν τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς μηδεμίαν τὴν ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμα χίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλοκότως αὐτοῦ τὰς τοιαύτας στομφώδεις καὶ ἀδιανοήτους φωνὰς ἐν κώλων καὶ περιόδων σχήματι πρὸς τὸ συμβὰν ἀποπτύοντος. ὁ δὲ σκοπὸς τῶν λεγομένων οὗτός ἐστι, τὸ μηδεμίαν εἶναι τῶν ποικίλων ὀνομάτων κατὰ τὰς 2.1.481 ἐμφάσεις διαφοράν. ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὴν ἐπὶ λέξεως παραθέσθαι τὴν ῥῆσιν, ὡς ἂν μὴ συκοφαντικῶς ἐπιφέρειν αὐτῷ τι τῶν οὐ προσόντων δοκοίημεν. 20τῶν γὰρ ἀληθῶν20 φησι 20λόγων ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ δηλουμένων πραγμάτων λαμβανόντων τὴν ἐπί κρισιν καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἑτέροις πράγμασι συν αρμοζομένων ὥσπερ20 αὖ 20καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ δηλούμενον πάντως ἕτερον 2.1.482 ἢ μηδὲ τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον ἕτερον20. ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προτεθέντος αὐτῷ σκοποῦ κατασκευὴν διεξέρχεται, ἐκβαλὼν τοῦ λόγου σχέσεις τινὰς καὶ παραθέσεις καὶ εἶδος καὶ μέτρον καὶ μέρος καὶ χρόνον καὶ τόπον, ὡς διὰ τῆς τούτων ὑπεξαι ρέσεως τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδεικτικὴν τὴν ἀγεννησίαν γενέσθαι. ἡ δὲ κατασκευὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, λέξω δὲ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ 2.1.483 λέξει τὸ νόημα. 20οὐκ ἄλλη τις20, φησίν, 20ἡ ζωὴ παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μή τις σύνθεσις περὶ τὴν ἁπλῆν νοοῖτο φύσιν, πρὸς τὸ μετέχον καὶ μετεχόμενον τῆς ἐννοίας μεριζομένης· ἀλλ' αὐτό20, φησίν, 20ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή, οὐσία ἐστί20, κα λῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἀντείποι τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων μὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. 2.1.484 Ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὸν σκοπὸν συνεπέρανεν; 20εἰ τὸ ἄναρχον σημαίνοντες20, φησί, 20τὴν ζωὴν ἐση μήναμεν, ταύτην δὲ τὴν ζωὴν οὐσίαν λέγειν ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκάζει λόγος, αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς θείας οὐσίας20 φησὶ 20σημαντικὸν τὸ ἀγέννη τον20. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ μὲν μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι παρ' ἑτέρου τὴν θείαν ζωήν, ὅπερ σημαίνει ἡ τοῦ ἀνάρχου διάνοια, καὶ αὐτοὶ συντιθέμεθα, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διὰ τῆς τοῦ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι λέξεως σημαινόμενον οὐσίαν νομίζειν μόνων τῶν ἐκ μανίας 2.1.485 παραφερομένων οἰόμεθα. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἐξέστηκεν ὡς ὁρισμὸν οὐσίας τὴν μὴ γέννησιν ἀποφήνασθαι; ὡς γὰρ οἰκείως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ γεννητὸν ἡ γέννησις, οὕτω δηλαδὴ καὶ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ἐφαρμοσθήσεται ἡ μὴ γέννησις. ὃ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι περὶ τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀγεννησίας ἐνδεικνυμένης, πῶς ἡμεῖς εἰς οὐσίαν τὴν τοῦ μὴ προσόντος ἔνδειξιν συντι θέμεθα; ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ δοὺς τὸ μήτε παρ' ἡμῶν μήτε ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεθέντων ἀκολουθίας αὐτῷ συγχωρούμενον, τὸ σημαντικὸν τῆς θείας ζωῆς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ 2.1.486 συνεπέρανεν. ὡς δ' ἂν μάλιστα καταφανὴς ὁ περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον αὐτοῦ γένοιτο λῆρος, οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον διασκο πήσωμεν. δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν τὸν τῆς οὐσίας περιήγαγε λόγον, ἐξετάσωμεν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἀνάξομεν. 2.1.487 20∆εῖ20, φησί, 20τῆς αὐτῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς εἰλικρι νῶς