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of one, for the account to be one and the same, even if in names and in manner and in order it appears different; for since true accounts receive their verification from the underlying and signified realities, and since different accounts are fitted to different realities, just as the same accounts are to the same, it must of necessity be one of two things, either the reality being signified is entirely different, or the signifying account is not different, with no underlying reality besides the20 Son's 20life, upon which one might either base 2.1.488 one's thought or cast the other account20. Is there any inconsistency in what has been said, as if it were not proper to say or write such things about the Only-begotten? Is not the Son himself also 20one pure life20? Is it not also fitting for 20the account of him to be one and the same, even if in names or in manner and in order it appears different20? Will not 20one of the two20 things 20of necessity20 also stand in his case, 20either the reality being signified is entirely different, or the signifying account is not, with no underlying reality besides his life, upon which one might either base one's thought or cast the other account20? 2.1.489 Nothing from us has been mixed in with the things said by Eunomius about the Father, but we have come to the very same confession and sequence, only inserting "1of the Son"2 the name. If therefore he too is one pure life, separated from all composition and doubleness, and no reality underlies besides the life of the Son (for how could <a> mixture of a foreign reality be suspected in what is simple? for what is conceived with another would no longer be simple), and the essence of the Father is also simple life, and of simple life, according to the very account of both life and simplicity, there is no difference whatsoever, with neither intensification nor remission nor otherness in respect to quantity or quality producing variation, it is altogether necessary that the things which correspond to the same concepts also 2.1.490 be called by the same appellations. If, therefore, the one reality according to the simplicity of life is apprehended in the Father and the Son, admitting no variation in the account of simplicity, as has been said, it is altogether necessary that the name applied to the one also be suitably related to the other; so that if the simplicity of the Father's life is signified by the name of unbegottenness, the term is not 2.1.491 unfittingly related to the Son's simplicity either. For just as that which is rational and mortal and receptive of intellect and knowledge is called man, equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and nothing has altered the designation of the nature, neither in Abel's case having come into life through generation nor in Adam's case without generation, so if the name for the simple and uncompounded life of the Father is unbegottenness, likewise also in the case of the Son's life the same concept will necessarily be applied with the same term, if indeed 20it must be20, as Eunomius says, 20one of two things, either the reality being signified is entirely different, or the signifying account is not different20. 2.1.492 But why do we idly occupy ourselves with vain things, when we ought to propose to the more industrious the book of Eunomius itself for the refutation of the folly of his arguments, and without correctives to show at once to the intelligent not only the blasphemy of the dogma, but also the feebleness of his style? For in many ways, not according to our concept but according to what seems good to him, he misinterprets the name of "conception," and just as in a night battle where no one distinguishes friend from foe, he does not realize that through the means by which he thinks he is fighting against us, he is stabbing his own 2.1.493 dogma. For that by which he thinks he must especially alienate himself from the church of the pious is this: to argue that 20God became Father at some late point, and that the name of Fatherhood is more recent than the other names that are said of him. For he was called Father from the time when he purposed to become Father and 2.1.494 became so20. Since, therefore, in this argument he establishes that 20all the appellations applied to the divine nature according to their signification with one another

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μιᾶς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον, κἂν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ τῇ τάξει φαί νηται διάφορος· τῶν γὰρ ἀληθῶν λόγων ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ δηλουμένων πραγμάτων λαμβανόντων τὴν ἐπίκρισιν καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἑτέροις πράγμασι συναρμοζομένων, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ δη λούμενον πάντως ἕτερον ἢ μηδὲ τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον ἕτερον, μηδενὸς ὑποκειμένου πράγματος παρὰ τὴν20 τοῦ υἱοῦ 20ζωήν, ᾧ τις ἂν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν 2.1.488 ἐπερείσειεν ἢ τὸν ἕτερον λόγον ἐπιρρίψειε20. μή τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀναρμοστία, ὡς οὐ δέον ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ γράφειν; οὐχὶ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτός ἐστι 20ζωὴ εἰλικρινῶς μία20; οὐχὶ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ 20ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι20 προσήκει 20λόγον, κἂν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἢ τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ τῇ τάξει φαίνηται διάφορος20; οὐχὶ καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνου 20τῶν δύο20 τὸ 20ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης20 στήσεται, 20ἢ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ δηλούμενον πάντως ἕτερον ἢ μηδὲ τὸν δη λοῦντα λόγον, μηδενὸς ὑποκειμένου πράγματος παρὰ τὴν ζωὴν αὐτοῦ, ᾧ τις ἂν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπερείσειεν ἢ τὸν ἕτερον λόγον ἐπιρρίψειεν20; 2.1.489 οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμῶν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰρημένοις παρὰ τοῦ Εὐνομίου ἐμμέμικται, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἤλθομεν τῆς ὁμολογίας καὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, μόνον "1τοῦ υἱοῦ"2 παρεν θέντες τὸ ὄνομα. εἰ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς μία ζωὴ εἰλικρινὴς πάσης συνθέσεως καὶ διπλόης κεχωρισμένη καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπό κειται πρᾶγμα παρὰ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ζωήν (πῶς γὰρ <ἂν> ἐν τῷ ἁπλῷ μίξις ἀλλοτρίου πράγματος ὑποπτεύοιτο; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἁπλοῦν εἴη τὸ μεθ' ἑτέρου νοούμενον), ἁπλῆ δὲ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσία, ἁπλῆς δὲ ζωῆς κατ' αὐτὸν τόν τε τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὸν τῆς ἁπλότητος λόγον οὐδεμία τίς ἐστι διαφορά, οὔτε ἐπιτάσεως οὔτε ὑφέσεως οὔτε τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἑτερότητος τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐμποιούσης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὰ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐννοίαις συμβαίνοντα καὶ 2.1.490 ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προσηγοριῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι. εἰ οὖν ἓν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἁπλότητα τῆς ζωῆς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδεμίαν τοῦ τῆς ἁπλότητος λόγου καθὼς εἴρηται παραλλαγὴν δεχομένου, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸ τῷ ἑνὶ ἐφαρμοζόμενον ὄνομα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον προσφυῶς ἔχειν· ὥστε εἰ ἡ ἁπλότης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς τῷ τῆς ἀγεννησίας ὀνόματι διασημαίνεται, μηδὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ἁπλότητα 2.1.491 τὴν φωνὴν ἀνοικείως ἔχειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ θνητὸν καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται ὁμοίως ἐπί τε τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ τοῦ Ἄβελ καὶ οὐδὲν τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐπωνυμίαν ὑπήμειψεν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἄβελ τὸ διὰ γεννήσεως οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ τὸ ἄνευ γεννήσεως εἰς ζωὴν παρελθεῖν, οὕτως εἴπερ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀσύνθετον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς ὄνομα τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἔχει, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ζωῆς ἡ αὐτὴ ἔννοια τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐφαρμοσθήσεται, εἴπερ 20δεῖ20, καθώς φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, 20δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ δηλούμενον πάντως ἕτερον ἢ μηδὲ τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον ἕτερον20 εἶναι. 2.1.492 Ἀλλὰ τί τοῖς ματαίοις ἐμφιλοχωροῦμεν εἰκῇ, δέον αὐτὴν τοῖς φιλοπονωτέροις εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς ἀνοίας τῶν λό γων προτείνειν τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὴν βίβλον καὶ δίχα τῶν εὐθυ νόντων αὐτόθεν οὐ μόνον τὸ τοῦ δόγματος βλάσφημον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς συνηθείας ἄτονον τοῖς συνετοῖς ἐπιδεικνύναι; πολυτρόπως γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐννοίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτῷ δοκοῦν τὸ τῆς ἐπινοίας ὄνομα παρερμηνεύων, καθ άπερ ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ μηδενὸς διακρίνοντος τὸ φίλιόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν προσπολεμεῖν οἴεται, τὸ ἴδιον δόγμα 2.1.493 κατακεντῶν οὐ συνίησιν. ᾧ γὰρ μάλιστα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῶν εὐσεβούντων ἑαυτὸν ἀλλοτριοῦν οἴεται δεῖν τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ κατασκευάζειν 20ὀψέ ποτε τὸν θεὸν γεγενῆσθαι πατέρα καὶ τὸ τῆς πατρότητος ὄνομα νεώτερον εἶναι τῶν λοιπῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅσα περὶ αὐτὸν λέγεται. ἐξ ἐκείνου γὰρ αὐτὸν κληθῆναι πα τέρα ἀφ' οὗ προέθετο γενέσθαι πατὴρ καὶ 2.1.494 ἐγένετο20. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ κατα σκευάζει 20πάσας τὰς ἐπιλεγομένας τῇ θείᾳ φύσει προσηγορίας κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀλ λήλαις