Chap. IX.—Of the Law and Precept of God; Of Mercy, and the Error of the Philosophers.

The first head of this law is, to know God Himself, to obey Him alone, to worship Him alone. For he cannot maintain the character of a man who is ignorant of God, the parent of his soul: which is the greatest impiety. For this ignorance causes him to serve other gods, and no greater crime than this can be committed. Hence there is now so easy a step to wickedness through ignorance of the truth and of the chief good; since God, from the knowledge of whom he shrinks, is Himself the fountain of goodness. Or if he shall wish to follow the justice of God, yet, being ignorant of the divine law, he embraces the laws of his own country as true justice, though they were clearly devised not by justice, but by utility. For why is it that there are different and various laws amongst all people, but that each nation has enacted for itself that which it deemed useful for its own affairs? But how greatly utility differs from justice the Roman people themselves teach, who, by proclaiming war through the Fecials, and by inflicting injuries according to legal forms, by always desiring and carrying off the property of other, have gained for themselves the possession of the whole world.1121    [Dan vii. 23. An appeal for reformation.]      Libidinis finis est.   But these persons think themselves just if they do nothing against their own laws; which may be even ascribed to fear, if they abstain from crimes through dread of present punishment. But let us grant that they do that naturally, or, as the philosopher says, of their own accord, which they are compelled to do by the laws. Will they therefore be just, because they obey the institutions of men, who may themselves have erred, or have been unjust?—as it was with the framers of the twelve tables, who certainly promoted the public advantage according to the condition of the times. Civil law is one thing, which varies everywhere according to customs; but justice is another thing, which God has set forth to all as uniform and simple: and he who is ignorant of God must also be ignorant of justice.  

But let us suppose it possible that any one, by natural and innate goodness, should gain true virtues, such a man as we have heard that Cimon was at Athens, who both gave alms to the needy, and entertained the poor, and clothed the naked; yet, when that one thing which is of the greatest importance is wanting—the acknowledgment of God—then all those good things are superfluous and empty, so that in pursuing them he has laboured in vain.1122    [1 Cor. iii. 11–15. But are the heathen to be judged by the New Covenant? See vol. ii. (Clement, sparsim), this series.]      Senescit.   For all his justice will resemble a human body which has no head, in which, although all the limbs are in their proper position, and figure, and proportion, yet, since that is wanting which is the chief thing of all, it is destitute both of life and of all sensation. Therefore those limbs have only the shape of limbs, but admit of no use, as much so as a head without a body; and he resembles this who is not without the knowledge of God, but yet lives unjustly. For he has that only which is of the greatest importance; but he has it to no purpose, since he is destitute of the virtues, as it were, of limbs.  

Therefore, that the body may be alive, and capable of sensation, both the knowledge of God is necessary, as it were the head, and all the virtues, as it were the body. Thus there will exist a perfect and living man; but, however, the whole substance is in the head; and although this cannot exist in the absence of all, it may exist in the absence of some. And it will be an imperfect and faulty animal, but yet it will be alive, as he who knows God and yet sins in some respect. For God pardons sins. And thus it is possible to live without some of the limbs, but it is by no means possible to live without a head. This is the reason why the philosophers, though they may be naturally good, yet have no knowledge and no intelligence. All their learning and virtue is without a head, because they are ignorant of God, who is the Head of virtue and knowledge; and he who is ignorant of Him, though he may see, is blind; though he may hear, is deaf; though he may speak, is dumb. But when he shall know the Creator and Parent of all things, then he will both see, and hear, and speak. For he begins to have a head, in which all the senses are placed, that is, the eyes, and ears, and tongue. For assuredly he sees who has beheld with the eyes of his mind the truth in which God is, or God in whom the truth is; he hears, who imprints on his heart the divine words and life-giving precepts; he speaks, who, in discussing heavenly things, relates the virtue and majesty of the surpassing God. Therefore he is undoubtedly impious who does not acknowledge God; and all his virtues, which he thinks that he has or possesses, are found in that deadly road which belongs altogether to darkness. Wherefore there is no reason why any one should congratulate himself if he has gained these empty virtues, because he is not only wretched who is destitute of present goods, but he must also be foolish, since he undertakes the greatest labours in his life without any purpose. For if the hope of immortality is taken away, which God promises to those who continue in His religion, for the sake of obtaining which virtue is to be sought, and whatever evils happen are to be endured, it will assuredly be the greatest folly to wish to comply with virtues which in vain bring calamities and labours to man. For if it is virtue to endure and undergo with fortitude, want, exile, pain, and death, which are feared by others, what goodness, I pray, has it in itself, that philosophers should say that it is to be sought for on its own account? Truly they are delighted with superfluous and useless punishments, when it is permitted them to live in tranquillity.  

For if our souls are mortal, if virtue is about to have no existence after the dissolution of the body, why do we avoid the goods assigned to us, as though we were ungrateful or unworthy of enjoying the divine gifts? For, that we may enjoy these blessings, we must live in wickedness and impiety, because virtue, that is, justice, is followed by poverty. Therefore he is not of sound mind, who, without having any greater hope set before him, prefers labours, and tortures, and miseries, to those goods which others enjoy in life.1123    [1 Cor. xv. 19.]      Intervallum.   But if virtue is to be taken up, as is most rightly said by these, because it is evident that man is born to it, it ought to contain some greater hope, which may apply a great and illustrious solace for the ills and labours which it is the part of virtue to endure. Nor can virtue, since it is difficult in itself, be esteemed as a good in any other way than by having its hardship compensated by the greatest good. We can in no other way equally abstain from these present goods, than if there are other greater goods on account of which it is worth while to leave the pursuit of pleasures, and to endure all evils. But these are no other, as I have shown in the third book,1124    [See cap. 12, p. 79, supra.]      Perpetuitas.   than the goods of everlasting life. Now who can bestow these except God, who has proposed to us virtue itself? Therefore the sum and substance of everything is contained in the acknowledging and worship of God; all the hope and safety of man centres in this; this is the first step of wisdom, to know who is our true Father, and to worship Him alone with the piety which is due to Him, to obey Him, to yield ourselves to His service with the utmost devotedness: let our entire acting, and care, and attention, be laid out in gaining His favour.1125    In eo promerendo. [John xvii. 3.]      Tusc. Disp., i. 46.    

0662A CAPUT IX. De Lege et Praecepto Dei; de Misericordia, atque errore Philosophorum.

Hujus legis caput primum est, ipsum Deum nosse, soli obtemperare, solum colere. Non potest enim rationem hominis obtinere, qui parentem animae suae Deum nescit; quod est summum nefas. Quae ignoratio facit, ut diis alienis serviat, quo nihil sceleratius committi potest. Hinc jam proclivis est ad malitiam gradus per ignorantiam veri ac singularis boni; quia Deus, quem nosse refugit, fons est ipse bonitatis. Vel si justitiam sequi volet Dei, divini tamen juris ignarus, 0662B gentis suae leges tanquam verum jus amplectitur; quas non utique justitia, sed utilitas reperit. Cur enim per omnes populos diversa et varia jura sunt condita, nisi quod unaquaeque gens id sibi sanxit, quod putavit rebus suis utile? Quantum autem a justitia recedat utilitas, populus ipse Romanus docet, qui per Feciales bella indicendo, et legitime injurias faciendo, semper aliena cupiendo, atque rapiendo, et possessionem sibi totius 0663A orbis comparavit. Verum hi justos se putant, 0663A si contra leges suas nihil faciant; quod etiam timori adscribi potest, si praesentium poenarum metu sceleribus abstineant. Sed concedamus sane, ut id natura, vel (ut ait philosophus) sua sponte faciant, quod legibus facere coguntur. Num idcirco justi erunt, quia parent institutis hominum, qui et ipsi aut errare, aut injusti esse potuerunt! Sicut illi duodecim Tabularum conditores, qui certe publicae utilitati pro conditione temporum servierunt. Aliud est igitur civile jus, quod pro moribus ubique variatur: aliud est vera justitia, quam uniformem ac simplicem proposuit omnibus Deus; quem qui ignorat, et ipsam justitiam ignoret necesse est.

Sed putemus fieri posse, ut aliquis naturali et ingenito 0663B bono veras virtutes capiat, qualem fuisse Cimonem Athenis accepimus, qui et egentibus stipem dedit, et pauperes invitavit, et nudos induit. Tamen cum illud unum quod est maximum deest, agnitio Dei, jam illa bona omnia supervacua sunt et inania, ut frustra in his assequendis laboraverit. Omnis enim justitia ejus similis erit humano corpori caput non habenti; in quo tametsi membra omnia, et locis suis constent, et figura, et habitudine, tamen quoniam deest id, quod est omnium principale, et vita, et 0664A omni sensu caret. Itaque membra illa formam tantummodo membrorum habent, usum non habent, tam scilicet, quam caput sine corpore. Cui similis est, qui cum Deum non ignoret, vivit injuste. Id enim solum habet, quod est summum: sed frustra, quoniam virtutibus tanquam membris eget.

Itaque ut sit vivum ac sensibile corpus, et agnitio Dei necessaria est, quasi caput; et omnes virtutes, quasi corpus. Ita fiet homo perfectus, ac vivus: sed tamen summa omnis in capite est; quamvis constare non possit sine omnibus, sine quibusdam tamen potest. Et erit quidem animal vitiosum ac debile; sed tamen vivet, sicut is qui et Deum novit, et in aliqua re peccat. Dat enim veniam peccatis Deus. Itaque sine membris aliquibus vivi potest, sine capite nullo modo. 0664B Haec res efficit, ut philosophi, etiamsi natura sint boni, tamen nihil sciant, nihil sapiant. Omnis doctrina et virtus eorum sine capite est; quia Deum nesciunt, qui est virtutis ac doctrinae caput: quem qui non agnoscit, licet videat, caecus est; licet audiat surdus; licet loquatur, elinguis est. Cum vero conditorem rerum parentemque cognoverit, tunc et videbit, et audiet, et loquetur. Habere enim caput coepit, in quo sunt sensus omnes collocati, hoc est oculi, aures, et lingua. Nam profecto is videt, qui veritatem in qua Deus est, vel 0665A Deum in quo veritas est, oculis cordis aspexerit: is audit, qui divinas voces ac praecepta vitalia 0665A pectori suo affigit: is loquitur, qui coelestia disserens, virtutem ac majestatem Dei singularis enarrat. Quare non est dubium, quin impius sit, quisquis Deum non agnoverit; omnesque virtutes ejus, quas habere aut tenere se putat, in illa mortifera via reperiuntur, quae est tota tenebrarum. Quapropter nihil est quod aliquis sibi gratuletur, si has inanes virtutes adeptus est; quia non tantum miser, qui bonis praesentibus careat, sed etiam stultus sit necesse est, qui labores in vita sua maximos suscipiat incassum. Nam dempta spe immortalitatis, quam Deus pollicetur in sua Religione versantibus, cujus assequendae gratia virtus appetenda est, et quidquid malorum acciderit perferendum, 0665B maxima erit profecto vanitas, obsequi velle virtutibus, quae frustra homini calamitates afferunt et labores. Nam si virtus est, egestatem, exilium, dolorem, mortem, quae timentur a caeteris, pati fortiter ac subire; quid tandem in se boni habet, cur eam propter seipsam philosophi dicant expetendam? Nimirum supervacuis et inanibus poenis delectantur, quibus licet agere tranquille.

Si enim mortales sunt animae, si virtus dissoluto corpore nihil futura est, quid fugimus attributa nobis bona, quasi aut ingrati, aut indigni qui divinis muneribus perfruamur? Quae bona ut habeamus, scelerate impieque vivendum est; quia virtutem, id est, justitiam paupertas sequitur. Sanus igitur non est, qui nulla spe majore proposita, iis bonis, quibus caeteri 0665C utuntur in vita, labores, et cruciatus, et miserias anteponat. Si autem virtus (ut ab his rectissime dicitur) capessenda est, quia constet ad eam nasci hominem, subesse debet spes aliqua major, quae malorum et laborum, quos perferre virtutis est, magnum afferat praeclarumque solatium. Nec aliter virtus, cum per se dura sit, haberi pro bono potest quam si acerbitatem suam maximo bono penset. 0666A Aeque non aliter his bonis praesentibus abstinendum est, quam si sunt alia majora, propter quae tanti sit, et voluptates omittere, et mala omnia sustinere. Ea vero nulla sunt alia (ut in tertio docui) nisi perpetuae vitae. Hanc autem praestare quis potest, nisi Deus, qui virtutem ipsam proposuit? Ergo in Dei agnitione et cultu rerum summa versatur: in hoc est spes omnis ac salus hominis; hic est sapientiae gradus primus, ut sciamus quis sit nobis verus pater, eumque solum pietate debita prosequamur, huic pareamus, huic devotissime serviamus; in eo promerendo actus omnis, et cura, et opera collocetur.