Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.

Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.

I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (Question 44, Article 2, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being---that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above (Article 1). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.

Reply to Objection 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.

Reply to Objection 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et subsistentium.

Dicitur enim in libro de causis, prima rerum creatarum est esse.

Sed esse rei creatae non est subsistens.

Ergo creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quod creatur est ex nihilo.

Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex suis componentibus.

Ergo compositis non convenit creari.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, illud proprie producitur per primam emanationem, quod supponitur in secunda, sicut res naturalis per generationem naturalem, quae supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in generatione naturali, est materia.

Ergo materia est quae proprie creatur, et non compositum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit deus caelum et terram.

Caelum autem et terra sunt res compositae subsistentes.

Ergo horum proprie est creatio.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est.

Fieri autem ordinatur ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae; sive sint composita, sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est; ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea subiectum est album.

Unde, secundum philosophum, accidens magis proprie dicitur entis quam ens.

Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, et huiusmodi, quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia; ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata.

Proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse non importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem obiecti creationis.

Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum, quod est ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est.

Et est similis modus loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color, quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositae ex principiis praeexistentibus, sed compositum sic dicitur creari, quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur; sed quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione.

Nam creatio est productio totius esse, et non solum materiae.