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has no commonality according to its meaning, nor again do seamanship and agriculture; but surely it is possible for the concept of each of these to be gathered together around one soul, and the soul does not for this reason become multi-composite, nor are all the names of the occupations blended into one meaning. If, therefore, the human mind is in no way harmed in its simplicity by so many names being spoken of it, how could anyone suppose that God, if he were called wise and just and good and eternal and all the names befitting God, unless one meaning were thought for all the names, either becomes multiform or gathers to himself the perfection of his nature from participation in these things? But let us examine his more vehement accusation against us, which goes like this. "If it is necessary," he says, "to proceed to a more severe argument, he does not even keep the essence itself unmixed and pure from what is worse and from contraries." So much for the accusation; but what is the proof of the charges? Let us see his vehement and rhetorical attack against us. "If according to the endlessness," he says, "of his life alone he is incorruptible and according to his beginninglessness alone he is unbegotten, then in that respect in which he is not incorruptible, he will be corruptible, and in that respect in which he is not unbegotten, he will be begotten." And taking up the same point again, he says: "Therefore, according to his beginninglessness he will be at once unbegotten and corruptible, and according to his endlessness he will be at once incorruptible and begotten." This, then, is his "more severe argument", which he threatened to bring forth against us as proof that we say the essence of God is mixed with contraries and with what is worse. But I think it is clear to those who have within themselves a sound criterion of truth that, since the teacher has given the slanderer no handle in what was said, he has forged what was said to suit his own opinion and has constructed this puerile sophistical game. Nevertheless, so that it may become clearer to all who encounter it, I will read that again word for word and will set against these the words of Eunomius. "Incorruptible," says the teacher, "and unbegotten we call the God of all, using these names according to different conceptions; for when we look back to the ages past, finding the life of God to fall outside all circumscription, we call him unbegotten; and when we direct our mind to the ages to come, that which is undefined and infinite and comprehended by no end, we have named incorruptible. As, therefore, the endlessness of his life is incorruptible, so also its beginninglessness was named unbegotten, as we contemplate these things by conception." This is the teacher's argument, instructing us through what has been said, that the divine life, being one in nature and continuous with itself, neither starts from some beginning nor is circumscribed by any end, and that it is possible to make clear through certain names the concepts contemplated in this life. For we declare his not being from any cause through the terms 'without beginning' and 'unbegotten,' and his not being circumscribed by any end nor being dissolved into corruption, this the word 'incorruptible' and 'endless' signifies; and by this it is determined that concerning the divine life, one ought to say that not having a beginning is to be 'unbegottenly', and to be 'endlessly' is to name 'incorruptible', since everything that has ceased to be certainly comes to annihilation, and hearing of the annihilation of what is, we understood the corruption of that which subsists. He says, therefore, that he who never ceases to be, being also alien to dissolution by corruption, is named incorruptible. What, then, does Eunomius say to this? "If according to the endlessness," he says, "of his life alone he is incorruptible and according to his beginninglessness alone he is unbegotten, then in that respect in which he is not incorruptible, he will be corruptible, and in that respect in which he is not unbegotten, he will be begotten." Who has given this to you, O Eunomius, that incorruptibility is not contemplated with the whole life of God? Who, having divided the divine life into two, names each of the half-sections with peculiar terms, so that by whatever

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οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ ναυτιλία καὶ ἡ γεωπονία· ἀλλὰ μὴν περὶ τὴν μίαν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου τούτων τὸν λόγον δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀθροι σθῆναι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο πολυσύνθετος ἡ ψυχὴ γίνεται οὐδὲ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων πρὸς ἓν σημαινό 2.1.503 μενον ἀνακίρναται. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς διὰ τοσού των ὀνομάτων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λεγομένων οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ἁπλότητα βλάπτεται, πῶς ἄν τις οἰηθείη τὸν θεόν, εἰ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ πάντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καλοῖτο ὀνόματα, εἰ μὴ μία πᾶσι νομισθείη τοῖς ὀνόμασι σημασία, ἢ πολυμερῆ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μετουσίας τούτων τὸ τέλειον ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τῆς φύσεως; 2.1.504 Ἀλλ' ἐξετάσωμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν σφοδροτέραν καθ' ἡμῶν κατηγορίαν ἔχουσαν οὕτως. 20εἰ δὲ δεῖ20, φησίν, 20ἐπὶ τὸν ἀποτομώτερον χωρῆσαι λόγον, οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν ἀνεπίμικτον καὶ καθαρὰν φυ λάσσει τῶν χειρόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων20. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατηγορία τοσαύτη, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἔλεγχος τίς; ἴδωμεν τὴν σφοδρὰν αὐτοῦ καὶ ῥητορικὴν καθ' ἡμῶν ἐπιχείρησιν. 20εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον20, φησί, 20τῆς ζωῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄναρχον μόνον ἀγέννητος, καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, φθαρτὸς ἔσται, καὶ καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν 2.1.505 ἀγέννητος, γεννητὸς ἔσται20. καὶ ἐπαναλαβὼν πάλιν τὸ αὐτό φησιν· 20ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτε λεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεννητός20. ὁ μὲν οὖν 20ἀποτομώτερος αὐτοῦ λόγος20 οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν καθ' ἡμῶν προοίσειν ἠπείλησεν εἰς ἔλεγχον τοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ λέγειν ἡμᾶς ἐπιμεμίχθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις τε καὶ τοῖς χείροσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ φανερὸν μὲν ἡγοῦμαι τοῖς ἐρρωμένον ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις δεδωκότος τοῦ διδασκάλου τῷ συκοφάντῃ λαβήν, παραποιήσας οὗτος πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν τὰ εἰρημένα τὴν μειρακιώδη ταύτην τοῦ σοφίσματος παιδιὰν συνεπέρανεν. 2.1.506 πλὴν ὡς ἂν ἐκδηλότερον πᾶσι γένοιτο τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, ἐκεῖνό τε πάλιν ἐπὶ λέξεως ἀναγνώσομαι καὶ ἀντιπαραθήσω τούτοις τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὰ ῥήματα. "1ἄφθαρτον, φησὶν ὁ δι δάσκαλος, καὶ ἀγέννητον τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων λέγομεν κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τοὺς κατόπιν αἰῶνας ἀποβλέψωμεν, ὑπερεκπί πτουσαν πάσης περιγραφῆς εὑρίσκοντες τὴν ζωὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγέννητον αὐτὸν λέγομεν· ὅταν δὲ τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις αἰῶσι τὸν νοῦν ἐπιβάλωμεν, τὸ ἀόριστον καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ οὐδενὶ 2.1.507 τέλει καταληπτὸν προσηγορεύσαμεν ἄφθαρτον. ὡς οὖν τὸ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ζωῆς ἄφθαρτον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄναρχον αὐτῆς ἀγέννητον ὠνομάσθη, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἐνθεωρούντων ἡμῶν ταῦτα."2 οὗτος τοῦ διδασκάλου ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο παιδεύων ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι μία οὖσα τῇ φύσει καὶ συνεχὴς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ θεία ζωὴ οὔτε ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς τινος ἄρχεται οὔτε πέρατί τινι περιγράφεται, καὶ ὅτι τὰς ἐπιθεωρουμένας τῇ ζωῇ ταύτῃ ἐννοίας ἔξεστι δι' ὀνομάτων τινῶν φανερὰς 2.1.508 καταστῆσαι. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίας εἶναί τινος διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀνάρχου τε καὶ ἀγεννήτου φωνῆς ἐξαγγέλλομεν, καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ περιγράφεσθαι τέλει μηδὲ εἰς φθορὰν διαλύεσθαι, τοῦτο ἡ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου τε καὶ ἀτελευτήτου διασημαίνει λέξις· καὶ τούτῳ διορίζεται τὸ δεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας ζωῆς τὸ μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ ἔχειν ἀγεννήτως εἶναι λέγειν, τὸ δὲ ἀτελευτήτως εἶναι ἄφθαρτον κατονομάζειν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ τοῦ εἶναι παυσάμενον ἐν ἀφανισμῷ γίνεται πάντως, ἀφανισμὸν δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ἀκούσαντες τὴν τοῦ συνεστῶτος φθορὰν ἐνοήσαμεν. τὸν οὖν μηδέποτε τοῦ εἶναι παυόμενον ἀλλότριόν τε τῆς κατὰ φθορὰν διαλύσεως ὄντα ἄφθαρτον ὀνομάζεσθαι λέγει. 2.1.509 Τί οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Εὐνόμιος; 20εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἀτε λεύτητον20, φησί, 20τῆς ζωῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄναρχον μόνον ἀγέννητος, καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, φθαρτὸς ἔσται, καὶ καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, γεννητὸς ἔσται20. τίς ταῦτά σοι δέδωκεν, ὦ Εὐνόμιε, ὡς μὴ πάσῃ συνθεωρεῖσθαι τῇ ζωῇ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν; τίς διελὼν εἰς δύο τὴν θείαν ζωὴν ἰδιαζούσαις φωναῖς ἐπονομάζει τῶν ἡμιτόμων ἑκάτερον, ὥστε ᾧπερ ἂν