Chap. XI.—Of the Persons Upon Whom a Benefit is to Be Conferred.

Therefore humanity is to be preserved, if we wish rightly to be called men. But what else is this preservation of humanity than the loving a man because he is a man, and the same as ourselves? Therefore discord and dissension are not in accordance with the nature of man; and that expression of Cicero is true, which says1139    De Offic., iii. 5.   that man, while he is obedient to nature, cannot injure man. Therefore, if it is contrary to nature to injure a man, it must be in accordance with nature to benefit a man; and he who does not do this deprives himself of the title of a man, because it is the duty of humanity to succour the necessity and peril of a man. I ask, therefore, of those who do not think it the part of a wise man to be prevailed upon and to pity, If a man were seized by some beast, and were to implore the aid of an armed man, whether they think that he ought to be succoured or not? They are not so shameless as to deny that that ought to be done which humanity demands and requires. Also, if any one were surrounded by fire, crushed by the downfall of a building, plunged in the sea, or carried away by a river, would they think it the duty of a man not to assist him? They themselves are not men if they think so; for no one can fail to be liable to dangers of this kind. Yes, truly, they will say that it is the part of a human being, and of a brave man too, to preserve one who was on the point of perishing. If, therefore, in casualties of this nature which imperil the life of man, they allow that it is the part of humanity to give succour, what reason is there why they should think that succour is to be withheld if a man should suffer from hunger, thirst, or cold? But though these things are naturally on an equality with those accidental circumstances, and need one and the same humanity, yet they make a distinction between these things, because they measure all things not by the truth itself, but by present utility. For they hope that those whom they rescue from peril will make a return of the favour to them. But because they do not hope for this in the case of the needy, they think that whatever they bestow on men of this kind is thrown away. Hence that sentiment of Plautus is detestable:1140    Trinumm., ii. 2. 58.  —  

But perhaps the poet spoke for the actor.1141    Pro personâ.    

What does Marcus Tullius say in his books respecting Offices? Does he not also advise that bounty should not be employed at all? For thus he speaks:1142    De Offic., ii. 15.   “Bounty, which proceeds from our estate, drains the very source of our liberality; and thus liberality is destroyed by liberality: for the more numerous they are towards whom you practice it, the less you will be able to practice it towards many.” And he also says shortly afterwards: “But what is more foolish than so to act that you may not be able to continue to do that which you do willingly?” This professor of wisdom plainly keeps men back from acts of kindness, and advises them carefully to guard their property, and to preserve their money-chest in safety, rather than to follow justice. And when he perceived that this was inhuman and wicked, soon afterwards, in another chapter, as though moved by repentance, he thus spoke: “Sometimes, however, we must exercise bounty in giving: nor is this kind of liberality altogether to be rejected; and we must give from our property to suitable1143    Idoneis. Lactantius uses this word as though its meaning were “the rich;” and though it seems to have passed into this sense in later times, it is plain from the very words of Cicero himself that he uses it of deserving persons who need assistance.   persons when they are in need of assistance.” What is the meaning of “suitable?” Assuredly those who are able to restore and give back the favour.1144    [Luke vi. 32–34.]   If Cicero were now alive, I should certainly exclaim: Here, here, Marcus Tullius, you have erred from true justice; and you have taken it away by one word, since you measured the offices of piety and humanity by utility. For we must not bestow our bounty on suitable objects, but as much as possible on unsuitable objects. For that will be done with justice, piety, and humanity, which you shall do without the hope of any return!  

This is that true and genuine justice, of which you say that you have no real and life-like figure.1145    De Offic., iii. 17. Solidam et expressam.   You yourself exclaim in many places that virtue is not mercenary; and you confess in the books of your Laws1146    [De Leg., iii., and De Offic., i. cap. 16.]   that liberality is gratuitous, in these words: “Nor is it doubtful that he who is called liberal and generous is influenced by a sense of duty, and not by advantage.” Why therefore do you bestow your bounty on suitable persons, unless it be that you may afterwards receive a reward? With you, therefore, as the author and teacher of justice, whosoever shall not be a suitable person will be worn out with nakedness, thirst, and hunger; nor will men who are rich and abundantly supplied, even to luxuriousness, assist his last extremity. If virtue does not exact a reward; if, as you say, it is to be sought on its own account, then estimate justice, which is the mother and chief of the virtues, at its own price, and not according to your advantage: give especially to him from whom you hope for nothing in return. Why do you select persons? Why do you look at bodily forms? He is to be esteemed by you as a man, whoever it is that implores you, because he considers you a man. Cast away those outlines and sketches of justice, and hold fast justice itself, true and fashioned to the life. Be bountiful to the blind, the feeble, the lame, the destitute, who must die unless you bestow your bounty upon them. They are useless to men, but they are serviceable to God, who retains them in life, who endues them with breath, who vouchsafes to them the light. Cherish as far as in you lies, and support with kindness, the lives of men, that they may not be extinguished. He who is able to succour one on the point of perishing, if he fails to do so, kills him. But they, because they neither retain their nature, nor know what reward there is in this, while they fear to lose, do lose, and fall into that which they chiefly guard against; so that whatever they bestow is either lost altogether, or profits only for the briefest time. For they who refuse a small gift to the wretched, who wish to preserve humanity without any loss to themselves, squander their property, so that they either acquire for themselves frail and perishable things, or they certainly gain nothing by their own great loss.  

For what must be said of those who, induced by the vanity of popular favour,1147    Populari levitate ducti: an expression somewhat similar to “popularis aura.”   expend on the exhibition of shows wealth that would be sufficient even for great cities? Must we not say that they are senseless and mad who bestow upon the people that which is both lost to themselves, and which none of those on whom it is bestowed receives? Therefore, as all pleasure is short and perishable, and especially that of the eyes and ears, men either forget and are ungrateful for the expenses incurred by another, or they are even offended if the caprice of the people is not satisfied: so that most foolish men have even acquired evil for themselves by evil; or if they have thus succeeded in pleasing, they gain nothing more than empty favour and the talk1148    Fabulam.   of a few days. Thus every day the estates of most trifling men are expended on superfluous matters. Do they then act more wisely who exhibit to their fellow-citizens more useful and lasting gifts? They, for instance, who by the building of public works seek a lasting memory for their name? Not even do they act rightly in burying their property in the earth; because the remembrance of them neither bestows anything upon the dead, nor are their works eternal, inasmuch as they are either thrown down and destroyed by a single earthquake, or are consumed by an accidental fire, or they are over through by some attack of an enemy, or at any rate they decay and fall to pieces by mere length of time. For there is nothing, as the orator says,1149    Cic., Pro Marcello [Nihil opere et manu factum.]   made by the work of man’s hand which length of time does not weaken and destroy. But this justice of which we speak, and mercy, flourish more every day. They therefore act better who bestow their bounty on their tribesmen and clients, for they bestow something on men, and profit them; but that is not true and just bounty, for there is no conferring of a benefit where there is no necessity. Therefore, whatever is given to those who are not in need, for the sake of popularity, is thrown away; or it is repaid with interest, and thus it will not be the conferring of a benefit. And although it is pleasing to those to whom it is given, still it is not just, because if it is not done, no evil follows. Therefore the only sure and true office of liberality is to support the needy and unserviceable.  

CAPUT XI. De personis in quas beneficium sit conferendum.

Conservanda est igitur humanitas, si homines recte dici velimus. Id autem ipsum conservare humanitatem, quid aliud est, quam diligere hominem, quia homo sit, et idem quod nos sumus? Discordia igitur atque dissensio non est secundum hominis rationem. Verumque est illud Ciceronis, quod ait, hominem naturae obedientem homini nocere non posse. 0671B Ergo si nocere homini contra naturam est, prodesse igitur homini secundum naturam sit necesse est. Quod qui non facit, hominis se appellatione dispoliat; quia humanitatis officium est, necessitati hominis ac periculo subvenire. Quaero igitur ab iis, qui flecti ac misereri non putant esse sapientis: si homo ab aliqua bestia comprehensus, auxilium sibi armati hominis imploret, utrumne succurrendum putent, an minime? Non sunt tam impudentes, ut negent fieri oportere quod flagitat, quod exposcit humanitas. Item si aliquis circumveniatur igni, ruina opprimatur, mergatur mari, flumine rapiatur, num putent hominis esse, non auxiliari? non sunt ipsi homines, si putent. Nemo enim potest ejusmodi periculis non esse subjectus. 0671C Imo vero et hominis et fortis viri esse dicent, 0672A servare periturum. Si ergo in ejusmodi casibus, qui periculum vitae homini afferunt, succurrere humanitatis esse concedunt, quid causae est, cur, si homo esuriat, sitiat, algeat, succurrendum esse non putent? Quae cum sint paria natura cum illis casibus fortuitis, et unam eamdemque humanitatem desiderent, tamen illa discernunt, quia non re ipsa vera, sed utilitate praesenti omnia metiuntur. Illos enim, quos periculo surripiunt, sperant sibi gratiam relaturos. Egentes autem, quia non sperant, perire arbitrantur quidquid ejusmodi hominibus impertiant. Hinc est illa Plauti detestanda sententia: Male meretur, qui mendico dat, quod edat. Nam et illud, quod dat, perit; Et illi producit vitam ad miseriam.0672B Atenim poeta fortasse pro persona locutus est.

Quid Marcus Tullius in suis Officialibus libris, nonne hoc idem suadet, non esse omnino largiendum? Sic enim dixit: «Largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit; ita benignitate benignitas tollitur, qua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis.» Et idem paulo post: «Quid autem est stultius, quam quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutius facere non possis?» Videlicet professor sapientiae refrenat homines ab humanitate, monetque ut rem familiarem diligenter custodiant; malintque arcam, quam justitiam conservare. Quod cum intelligeret inhumanum esse, ac nefarium, mox alio capite, quasi actus poenitentia, sic ait: «Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum; nec hoc benignitatis genus omnino 0672C repudiandum, et saepe idoneis hominibus egentibus 0673A de re familiari impertiendum.» Quid est idoneis? nempe iis, qui restituere ac referre gratiam possint. Si nunc Cicero viveret, exclamarem profecto: Hic, hic, Marce Tulli, aberrasti a vera justitia; eamque uno verbo sustulisti; cum pietatis et humanitatis officia utilitate metitus es. 0673A Non enim idoneis hominibus largiendum est, sed quantum potest, non idoneis. Id enim juste, id pie, id humane sit, quod fine spe recipiendi feceris.

Haec est vera illa et germana justitia, cujus solidam et expressam nullam tenere vos dicis. Ipse pluribus locis clamas, mercenariam non esse virtutem; faterisque in libris Legum tuarum, liberalitatem gratuitam esse, his verbis: «Nec est dubium, quin is, qui liberalis benignusque dicitur, officium, non fructum sequatur.» Cur ergo idoneis potius largiris, nisi ut 0673B postea mercedem recipias? Te igitur auctore ac praeceptore justitiae, quisquis idoneus non erit, nuditate, siti, fame conficietur; nec homines copiosi, et usque ad delicias abundantes subvenient ultimae necessitati. Si virtus mercedem non exigit, si propter se ut dicis, expetenda est; ergo justitiam matrem principemque 0674A virtutum suo pretio, non tuo commodo aestima. Ei potissimum tribue, a quo nihil speres. Quid personas eligis? quid membra inspicis? Pro homine tibi habendus est, quisquis ideo precatur, quia te hominem putet. Abjice umbras illas imaginesque justitiae, atque ipsam veram et expressam tene. Largire caecis, debilibus, claudis, destitutis; quibus, nisi largiare, moriendum est. Inutiles sunt hominibus, sed utiles Deo, qui eos retinet in vita, qui spiritu donat, qui luce dignatur. Fove, quantum in te est, et animas hominum, ne extinguantur, humanitate sustenta. Qui succurrere perituro potest, si non succurrerit, occidit. Verum isti, quia neque naturam retinent, neque praemium in eo quod sit sciunt, dum perdere timent, perdunt; et in id, quod maxime cavent, incidunt, ut 0674B quidquid largiuntur, aut pereat omnino, aut ad tempus brevissimum prosit. Nam qui exiguam stipem miseris negant, qui conservare humanitatem sine damno suo volunt, patrimonia sua effundunt, ut aut peritura et fragilia sibi comparent, aut certe maximis suis damnis nihil consequantur.

Quid enim dicendum est de iis, qui populari levitate 0675A ducti, vel magnis urbibus suffecturas opes 0675A exhibendis muneribus impendunt? nisi eos dementes atque furiosos, qui praestent id populo, quod et ipsi perdant, et nemo eorum, quibus praestatur, accipiat. Itaque ut est omnis voluptas caduca et brevis, oculorum maxime et aurium, aut obliviscuntur homines, et alterius damna pro ingratis habent; aut etiam offenduntur, si non est libidini vulgi satisfactum: ut etiam homines stultissimi malum sibi malo comparaverint; aut si adeo placuerunt, nihil amplius, quam inanem favorem paucorumque dierum fabulas assequuntur. Sic quotidie levissimorum hominum patrimonia in res supervacuas prodiguntur. Num ergo illi sapientius, qui utiliora et diuturniora civibus suis exhibent munera? ii scilicet, qui publicis operibus extructis, memoriam nomini suo quaerunt? ne isti quidem recte bona 0675B sua in terra sepeliunt; quia nec memoria quidquam mortuis confert, nec opera eorum sempiterna sunt: siquidem aut uno tremore terrae dissipantur et corruunt, aut fortuito consumuntur incendio, aut hostili aliquo impetu diruuntur, aut certe vetustate ipsa dissoluta labuntur. «Nihil est enim ut ait orator, opere et manufactum quod non conficiat et consumat vetustas. At haec justitia et lenitas florescit quotidie magis.» Illi ergo melius, qui tribulibus suis aut clientibus largiuntur: 0676A aliquid enim praestant hominibus, et prosunt: sed non est illa vera et justa largitio. Beneficentia enim nulla est, ubicumque necessitas non est. Perit ergo quidquid gratiae causa tribuitur non indigentibus; aut cum foenore redit, et beneficentia non erit. Quod et si gratum est iis, quibus datur, justum tamen non est, quia si non fiat, nihil mali sequitur. Unum igitur certum et verum liberalitatis officium est, egentes atque inutiles alere.