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this name belongs to a part, 2.1.510 are we to say that the other does not also belong to it? This is the sharpness of your dialectic, to say that the life that is without beginning is perishable, and that the unbegun is not contemplated with the imperishable; just as if one were to say that man is rational and receptive of intellect and knowledge, applying each of these names to the subject according to a different application and concept, and then be mocked by some such person rehearsing similar arguments, that if man is receptive of intellect and knowledge, he cannot for this reason be rational, but insofar as he is receptive of knowledge, he will be this alone, and his nature will not admit the other; and again, if he were to define man as rational, he would no longer concede to him the receptivity of 2.1.511 intellect. For insofar as he is rational, he will be shown to be devoid of thought. But if the ridiculous and foolish nature of this is manifest to everyone in these examples, it is surely not doubtful in that other case either. For if you read the master's saying, you will find the childishness of the sophism is a shadow. For neither in the example concerning man is receptivity of knowledge hindered by reason, nor is reason by the receptivity of thought, nor does the divine life lack eternity or imperishability if it is without beginning, nor, if someone were to bear witness to its 2.1.512 imperishability, will its being without beginning be taken away. But the one who seeks the truth by the art of dialectical cleverness, having inserted from his own ideas what he wished into our argument, fights with himself and overthrows himself, without touching our points. For what was said by us was nothing other than to say that the life that is without beginning is called unbegotten by conception—called, not made— and to signify by the appellation 'imperishable' that which proceeds into the indefinite—not to make it 2.1.513 imperishable, but to signify that it is such. So that the divine life's being indefinite in both respects is a property of the subject, while the fact that the concepts contemplated in the subject are spoken of in this way or that concerns only the word that indicates the meaning signified. One concept concerning the divine life is that it is not from a cause; this the word 'unbegotten' indicates. Another concept concerning the divine life is that it is indefinite and unending; this the appellation 'imperishable' sets forth. So that the subject is what it is, beyond every name and concept, but that it is neither from a cause nor ever turns to non-existence—these things are signified through the conception of these names. 2.1.514 What then in our words moved him to this foolish child's play, so that taking up the same point again he said in these words: 20He will be, therefore, with respect to 'unbegun,' at once unbegotten and perishable, but with respect to 'unending,' at once imperishable and begotten.20 But even if this is not clarified in detail by our argument, it is manifest to everyone who has any share of intelligence at all how ridiculous and foolish it is, or rather, impious and 2.1.515 condemnable. For with the argument by which he constructs the pairing of the perishable with the unbegun, in the same way he mocks every pious and God-befitting name. For not only these two things are contemplated concerning the divine life, being without beginning and not admitting of corruption, but it is also called immaterial and impassible, unchangeable and bodiless, invisible and without form, true and just, and there are countless other concepts concerning the divine life, each of which is declared on its own, according to some particular notion, by significant 2.1.516 words. With every name, therefore—I mean, one that signifies a God-befitting conception—it is possible to weave together the strange pairing devised by Eunomius. For instance, both 'immaterial' and 'impassible' are said of the divine life, but each not according to the same meaning. For through the word 'immaterial' we have understood the divine to be pure of material admixture, while in 'impassible' is signified 2.1.517 the alienation from the passion of anger. Eunomius, therefore, will likely rush upon these things too and perform the same dance among the things we have mentioned. He will say

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τμήματι τοῦτο προσῇ τὸ ὄνομα, 2.1.510 μὴ προσεῖναι λέγειν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον; τῆς σῆς αὕτη διαλεκτικῆς ἡ δριμύτης, τὸ τὴν ἀνάρχως οὖσαν ζωὴν φθαρτὴν εἰπεῖν εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀφθάρτῳ μὴ συνθεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἄναρχον· ὅμοιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λογικόν τε καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λέγοι, ἑκάτερον ἐφαρμόζων τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ κατὰ διά φορον ἐπιβολήν τε καὶ ἔννοιαν, ἔπειτα παρά τινος τοιούτου καταχλευάζοιτο διεξιόντος τὰ ὅμοια, ὅτι εἰ δεκτικὸς νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, λογικὸς κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃ δεκτικός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης, τοῦτο μόνον ἔσται, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον οὐ χωρήσει ἡ φύσις, καὶ πάλιν εἰ λογικὸν ὁρίζοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκέτι αὐτῷ τὸ δεκτικὸν τοῦ 2.1.511 νοῦ συγχωρήσει. καθ' ὃ γὰρ λογικός ἐστιν, ἀμέτοχος δια νοίας ἀναδειχθήσεται. εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ παντὶ τὸ γελοῖόν τε καὶ ἀνόητον, οὐδὲ ἐπ' ἐκείνου πάντως ἀμφίβολον. ἀναγνοὺς γὰρ τοῦ διδασκάλου τὴν ῥῆσιν σκιὰν εὑρήσεις τὴν παιδιὰν τοῦ σοφίσματος. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑποδείγματι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κωλύεται ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεκτικοῦ τῆς διανοίας ὁ λόγος, οὔτε τὸ ἀΐδιον τῆς θείας ζωῆς ἢ τὸ ἄφθαρτον οὐκ ἔχει, ἐὰν ἄναρχον ᾖ, ἢ εἴπερ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν τις αὐτῇ 2.1.512 μαρτυρήσειε, τὸ ἀνάρχως εἶναι ἀφαιρεθήσεται. ἀλλ' ὁ τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀγχινοίας ἀναζητῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ παρενθεὶς ἃ ἐβούλετο ἑαυτῷ μάχεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀνατρέπει, τῶν ἡμετέρων οὐ προσ απτόμενος. τὸ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἦν ἢ τὸ τὴν ἀνάρχως οὖσαν ζωὴν ἀγέννητον δι' ἐπινοίας ὀνομάζεσθαι λέγειν, ὀνομάζεσθαι, οὐχὶ γίνεσθαι, καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀόριστον προϊοῦσαν τῇ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου σημαίνειν προσηγορίᾳ, οὐ ποιεῖν 2.1.513 ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν οὖσαν τοιαύτην. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἀόριστον καθ' ἑκάτερον εἶναι τὴν θείαν ζωὴν τοῦ ὑποκει μένου ἴδιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως τὰ ἐπιθεωρούμενα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ νοήματα λέγεσθαι περὶ τὴν φωνήν ἐστι μόνον τὴν ἐνδεικτικὴν τοῦ σημαινομένου νοήματος. ἓν νόημα περὶ τὴν θείαν ζωὴν τὸ μὴ ἐξ αἰτίας αὐτὴν εἶναι· τοῦτο ἡ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου λέξις ἐνδείκνυται. ἕτερον νόημα περὶ τὴν θείαν ζωὴν τὸ ἀόριστον αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀτελεύ τητον· τοῦτο ἡ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου προσηγορία παρίστησιν· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομά τε καὶ νόημα, τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐξ αἰτίας αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε εἰς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτόν ποτε περιΐστασθαι, ταῦτα διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπινοίας σημαίνεσθαι. 2.1.514 Τί τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀνόητον ταύτην παιδιὰν παρεκίνησεν, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπαναλαβόντα τὸ ἴσον εἰπεῖν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασι· 20ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεννη τός20. τοῦτο δὲ κἂν μὴ παρ' ἡμῶν διευκρινηθῇ τῷ λόγῳ, παντὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστι τῷ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν διανοίας μετέχοντι ὅπως ἐστὶ καταγέλαστον καὶ ἀνόητον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσεβὲς 2.1.515 καὶ κατάκριτον. ᾧ γὰρ λόγῳ κατασκευάζει τὴν τοῦ φθαρτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄναρχον συζυγίαν, τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ παντὸς εὐσεβοῦς τε καὶ θεοπρεποῦς καταπαίζει ὀνόματος. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ δύο ταῦτα περὶ τὴν θείαν θεωρεῖται ζωήν, τὸ ἀνάρχως τε εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄϋλός τε καὶ ἀόργητος λέγεται ἄτρεπτός τε καὶ ἀσώματος ἀόρατός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἀληθής τε καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία περὶ τὴν θείαν ζωήν ἐστι νοήματα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατά τινα ἰδιάζουσαν ἔννοιαν ταῖς σημαντικαῖς 2.1.516 φωναῖς ἐξαγγέλλεται. παντὶ τοίνυν ὀνόματι, τῷ σημαντικῷ λέγω τῆς θεοπρεποῦς ὑπολήψεως, ἔξεστι συμπλέξαι τὴν ἐπινοηθεῖσαν παρὰ τοῦ Εὐνομίου κατὰ τὸ ἀλλόκοτον συζυ γίαν. οἷον τὸ ἄϋλόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀόργητον ἀμφότερα λέγεται περὶ τὴν θείαν ζωήν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἑκάτερον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθαρεύειν ὑλικῆς ἐπιμιξίας τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀΰλου φωνῆς ἐνοήσαμεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀοργήτῳ ἡ 2.1.517 ἀλλοτρίωσις τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὀργὴν πάθους σημαίνεται. ἐπι δραμεῖται τοίνυν καὶ τούτοις κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὁ Εὐνόμιος καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀρχήσεται. λέξει