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for weaving together the absurdity according to the same train of thought; if insofar as he is separated from material admixture, he is called immaterial, in this respect he will not be without anger, and if because he does not admit anger he is without anger, it is not possible for the immaterial to be confessed of him, but by all necessity, in being pure of matter he will be shown to be at once immaterial and wrathful, and in not admitting anger he will be found at the same time to be without anger and material. Thus he will do in the case of all the others as well 2.1.518. And if it seems good, let us propose another such pair of names, I mean the immutable and the incorporeal. For since each of these two names is spoken of the divine life according to its particular significance, the wisdom of Eunomius will similarly construct the absurdity in their case also. For if that which is always in the same state is signified by the term 'immutable' and the intelligible nature of the substance is represented by the appellation 'incorporeal', Eunomius will surely say the same things in these cases also, that the concepts contemplated in these names are incompatible and alien and have no communion with each other. 2.1.519 For in always being in the same state, the divine will be only immutable and not incorporeal, and in the intelligible and formless nature of its substance, it possesses the incorporeal, but is separated from the immutable; so that it follows that when the unalterable is contemplated in the divine life, it is constructed to be a body along with being immutable, and when its intelligible nature is examined, it is determined to be at once incorporeal and mutable. 2.1.520 These are the wise discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to prolong the argument with idle talk by going through them all? For it is possible to see this irrationality being constructed in the same way in all cases. For both the true and the just will likewise be in conflict with each other according to the preceding combination; for the meaning of truth is one thing, and that of justice 2.1.521 another. So that Eunomius might consequently say concerning these also that truth is not present with justice, and justice is lacking to truth, and that it follows that when someone considers what is alien to injustice in God, he declares the divine to be at the same time just and false, and if we consider his alienation from falsehood, we construct 2.1.522 the divine as true and at the same time unjust. Thus the invisible, thus the unfigured. For it will be possible through the * according to a wisdom of a similar manner to that previously set forth, to say neither that the invisible is in the unfigured, nor that the unfigured is in the invisible, but he will connect figure with the invisible, and by inversion will construct the unfigured as visible, saying the same things about these as he artfully argued concerning the incorruptible and the unbegun, that when we consider the uncompounded nature of the divine life, we confess it to be unfigured, but not also invisible, and when we understand that God cannot be seen with bodily eyes, having conceded the invisible to him, we will not agree 2.1.523 that he is without figure. But if these things seem ridiculous and foolish to all alike, much more will one who has sense condemn the absurdity of those things, from which the argument, setting out, consequently advanced the absurdity to these points. But he criticizes the word of the teacher, as one who does not properly contemplate the incorruptible in the endless, nor understand the endless in the incorruptible. Therefore let us also mock something similar to the cleverness of Eunomius. For let us examine what sort of opinion he has concerning these 2.1.524 names. Will he say that 'endless' is something different in meaning from 'incorruptible', or will he put the two together as one? But if he should say both are one, he will agree with our argument; but if he should say that the meaning of 'incorruptible' is one thing and that of 'endless' another, it is altogether necessary in things that are alien to one another that the one not be the same in meaning 2.1.525 as the other. Therefore, if the concept of 'incorruptible' is one thing and that of 'endless' again another, and each of these is what the other is not, he will grant neither that the incorruptible is endless nor that the endless is incorruptible, but corruptible

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γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν εἱρμὸν τὴν ἀτοπίαν συμπλέκων· εἰ καθὸ κεχώρισται τῆς ὑλικῆς ἐπιμιξίας, ἄϋλος λέγεται, κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται ἀόργητος, καὶ εἰ διὰ τὸ μὴ προσίεσθαι τὴν ὀργήν ἐστιν ἀόργητος, οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὁμολογεῖσθαι τὸ ἄϋλον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην ἐν μὲν τῷ καθαρεύειν ὕλης ἄϋλος ὁμοῦ καὶ ὀργίλος ἀναδειχθήσεται, ἐν δὲ τῷ τὴν ὀργὴν μὴ προσίεσθαι ἀόργητός τε καὶ ὑλικὸς κατὰ ταὐτὸν εὑρεθήσεται. οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιήσει 2.1.518 πάντων. καὶ εἰ δοκεῖ, προθῶμεν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὀνομάτων τοιαύτην, τὸ ἄτρεπτον λέγω καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. τῶν γὰρ δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων ἑκατέρου κατὰ τὴν ἰδιάζουσαν ἔμφασιν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας λεγομένων ζωῆς, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἡ τοῦ Εὐνομίου σοφία κατασκευάσει τὴν ἀτοπίαν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ ἀτρέπτου σημαίνεται καὶ τὸ νοερὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἡ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου προσηγορία παρί στησιν, ἐρεῖ πάντως τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ Εὐνόμιος, ὅτι ἀσύμβατά ἐστι καὶ ἀλλότρια καὶ ἀκοινωνήτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνθεωρούμενα τούτοις νοήματα. 2.1.519 ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ πάντοτε ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τὸ θεῖον μόνον ἄτρεπτον ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἀσώματον, ἐν δὲ τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ ἀειδεῖ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον ἔχει, τοῦ δὲ ἀτρέπτου κεχώρισται· ὥστε συμβαίνειν ὅταν μὲν τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον ἐπὶ τῆς θείας θεωρῆται ζωῆς, μετὰ τοῦ ἀτρέπτου καὶ σῶμα αὐτὴν εἶναι κατασκευάζεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ τὸ νοερὸν ἐξετάζηται, ὁμοῦ τε ἀσώματον αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ τρεπτὴν διορίζεσθαι. 2.1.520 ταῦτα τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὰ σοφὰ κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας εὑρήματα. τί γὰρ δεῖ πᾶσιν ἐπεξιόντα παρατείνειν ἐν ἀδολεσχίᾳ τὸν λόγον; ἔστι γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων τὴν ἀλογίαν ταύτην κατασκευαζομένην θεάσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν προλαβοῦσαν πλοκὴν μαχεσθήσεται· ἄλλο γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἕτερον 2.1.521 τοῦ δικαίου τὸ σημαινόμενον. ὥστε εἰπεῖν ἂν ἐκ τοῦ ἀκο λούθου καὶ περὶ τούτων Εὐνόμιον τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ παρεῖναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ λείπειν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ συμ βαίνειν ὅταν τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας ἀλλότριον ἐπὶ θεοῦ τις λογί ζηται, δίκαιόν τε καὶ ψευδὲς εἶναι τὸ θεῖον κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτοῦ ἀλλο τρίωσιν λογιζώμεθα, ἀληθὲς ἅμα καὶ ἄδικον κατασκευάζειν 2.1.522 τὸ θεῖον. οὕτως τὸ ἀόρατον, οὕτως τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον. ἐξέσται γὰρ διὰ τῶν * κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότροπον τοῖς προ εκτεθεῖσι σοφίαν μήτε ἐν τῷ ἀσχηματίστῳ τὸ ἀόρατον εἶναι λέγειν μήτε ἐν τῷ ἀοράτῳ τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ἀοράτῳ συμπλέξει τὸ σχῆμα, ὁρατὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀναστρο φῆς κατασκευάσει τὸ ἀσχημάτιστον, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τούτων εἰπών, ἃ περὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου τε καὶ ἀνάρχου ἐτεχνολόγησεν, ὅτι ὅταν τὸ ἀσύνθετον τῆς θείας ζωῆς λογιζώμεθα, ἀσχη μάτιστον μὲν αὐτὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀόρατον, καὶ ὅταν τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἰδεῖν ἐννοήσωμεν, τὸ ἀόρατον αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες τὸ ἔξω σχή 2.1.523 ματος εἶναι οὐ συνθησόμεθα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καταγέλαστα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως δοκεῖ καὶ ἀνόητα, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνων τὴν ἀτοπίαν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων καταψηφίσεται, ὅθεν ὁρμηθεὶς ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ ταῦτα δι' ἀκολούθου τὴν ἀτοπίαν προήγαγεν. Ἀλλ' ἐπιλαμβάνεται τῆς τοῦ διδασκάλου φωνῆς, ὡς οὐ δεόντως ἐν τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ θεωρούσης τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ νοούσης τὸ ἀτελεύτητον. οὐκοῦν τι παρα πλήσιον τῇ ἀγχινοίᾳ τοῦ Εὐνομίου καὶ ἡμεῖς γελοιάσωμεν. ἐξετάσωμεν γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ γνώμην περὶ τῶν ὀνο 2.1.524 μάτων τούτων, ἥτις ἐστίν. ἄλλο τι φήσει τῷ σημαινομένῳ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἢ ἓν τὰ δύο συνθήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἓν ἀμφότερα λέγοι, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ συναγορεύσει λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ἄλλο φήσει τοῦ ἀφθάρτου εἶναι καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν 2.1.525 τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀφθάρτου ἡ ἔν νοια καὶ τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου πάλιν ἑτέρα, καί ἐστι τούτων ἑκάτερον ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀτε λεύτητον εἶναι δώσει οὔτε τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλὰ φθαρτὸν