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with examples. And Peter: You, then, speak to us about God, not using human examples, yet in such a way that what is said can be understood; but you will not be able to. For instance, what were you saying at first? If the evil one was begotten of God, being of the same substance as him, he is also evil. But when I showed from the very example you yourself gave that evil men come from good, and good men from evil, you did not accept it, saying that the example was a human one. Wherefore I too now do not even accept that God begets, because begetting is a property of men, not of God. But God can be neither good nor evil, neither just nor unjust, nor indeed prudent or a living being, nor whatever else can belong to men; for such things belong to men. And if, when inquiring about God, one must not assign to him the good things that belong to men, there is nothing left to understand or to say, or to seek this alone, his purpose, which he himself has permitted us to understand, so that when judged we may be without excuse concerning those things which we knew but did not keep. And Simon, on hearing this, said: You will not embarrass me into being silent about his substance and inquiring only about his purpose. For it is possible both to understand and to speak about his substance, I mean, from the good things that belong to men. For example, it belongs to man to live and to die, but to God, not to die, but to live, and to live eternally. Furthermore, it belongs to men to be evil and good, but to God to be incomparably good. And, not to prolong the argument, the better of those things that belong to men eternally belong to God. And Peter said: Tell me, Simon, does it belong to men to beget evil and good and to do evil and good? And Simon said: It does belong. And Peter said: Since you said so, we must assign the better of those things that belong to men to God. While men beget evil and good, God can beget only good, and while men do evil and good, he himself delights in doing only good things. Thus concerning God, either one must not speak of things that belong to men and be silent, or of the good things that belong to men it is reasonable to assign to him the better, and thus he alone is the cause of all good things. And Simon: If, then, God is the cause of good things only, what is left to understand but that some other principle begot evil, if indeed it is begotten? And Peter: Neither did some other power beget the evil one, nor is evil unbegotten, as I shall show at the end. For now it is my purpose to demonstrate (as I promised from the beginning), that in <πάντα> way God is blameless. We have granted, then, that God has the better of those things that belong to men incomparably. Wherefore it is also possible for him to be the projector of the four substances, I mean, of hot and cold, and of moist and dry. These, being primary, simple, and unmixed, have no inclination towards either extreme, but being projected by God and mixed outside [him], they became a living being, having a purpose to destroy the wicked. And thus, since all things were made from him, the evil one is neither from another source nor has he received wickedness from God himself who made all things, in whom it is impossible for it to exist, because the substances, being neutral, have been projected from him, disposed to be judged, and outside him-

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παραδείγμασιν. καὶ ὁ Πέτρος· Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν λέγε περὶ θεοῦ, ἀνθρωπίνοις μὴ χρώμενος παραδείγμασιν, μετὰ τοῦ μέντοι νοηθῆναι δύνασθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· ἀλλ' οὐ δυνήσῃ. αὐτίκα γοῦν τί τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔλεγες; εἰ ἐκ θεοῦ ὁ πονηρὸς γεγέννηται, τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτῷ ὢν οὐσίας, καὶ πονηρός ἐστιν. ἐμοῦ δὲ δείξαντος ἐξ οὗπερ αὐτὸς ἔδωκας παραδείγματος ὅτι ἐξ ἀγα- θῶν κακοὶ γίνονται καὶ ἐκ κακῶν ἀγαθοί, οὐ παρεδέξω, ἀνθρώπινον φήσας εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα. ὅθεν καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὸ γεγεννῆσθαι θεὸν παραδέχομαι, ὅτι τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐ θεοῦ. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακὸς ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος εἶναι δύναται ὁ θεός, οὔτε μὴν φρόνιμος ἢ ζῷον ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνθρώποις προσεῖναι δύναται· ἀνθρώπων γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα. καὶ εἰ μὴ χρὴ ζητοῦντας περὶ θεοῦ διδόναι αὐτῷ τὰ ἀνθρώποις προσόντα καλά, οὐδέν ἐστιν τοῦ λοιποῦ νοεῖν ἢ λέγειν ἢ τοῦτο μόνον ζητεῖν, τὸ τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἣν αὐτὸς συνεχώρησεν ἡμῖν νοεῖν, ὅπως κρινόμενοι ἀν- απολόγητοι ὦμεν περὶ ὧν γνόντες οὐκ ἐφυλάξαμεν. καὶ ὁ Σίμων ἀκούσας ἔφη· Oὐ δυσωπήσεις με περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ σιωπήσαντα περὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν μόνης. ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν, λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώποις προσόντων καλῶν. οἷον πρόσ- εστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ οὐ τὸ τεθνάναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν, καὶ τὸ ζῆν αἰωνίως. ἔτι μὴν πρόσεστιν ἀνθρώποις τὸ κακοῖς εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοῖς, τῷ δὲ θεῷ τὸ ἀσυγκρίτῳ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. καὶ ἵνα μὴ εἰς πολὺ μηκύνω τὸν λόγον, τῶν προσόντων ἀνθρώποις τὰ κρείττονα αἰωνίως πρόσεστιν τῷ θεῷ. καὶ ὁ Πέτρος ἔφη· Λέγε μοι, Σίμων, πρόσεστιν ἀνθρώποις γεν- νᾶν κακοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ποιεῖν κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθά; καὶ ὁ Σίμων ἔφη· Πρόσεστιν. καὶ ὁ Πέτρος ἔφη· Ἐπεὶ οὕτως ἔφης, τῶν ἀνθρώποις προσόντων τὰ κρείττονα ἀπονέμειν δεῖ τῷ θεῷ· ἀνθρώπων γεννώντων κακοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς, ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθοὺς μόνους γεννῆσαι δύναται, ἔτι τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ποιούντων κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, αὐτὸς μόνον τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιῶν τέρπεται. οὕτως περὶ θεοῦ ἢ οὐ δεῖ τὰ ἀνθρώποις προσόντα λέγειν καὶ σιωπᾶν ἔστιν ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώποις προσόντων καλῶν εὔλογόν ἐστιν ἀπονέμειν αὐτῷ τὰ κρείττονα, καὶ οὕτως πάντων καλῶν μόνος ἐστὶν αἴτιος. καὶ ὁ Σίμων· Oὐκοῦν εἰ ὁ θεὸς μόνων τῶν καλῶν αἴτιός ἐστιν, τοῦ λοιποῦ τί ἐστιν νοεῖν ἢ ὅτι τὸ πονηρὸν ἑτέρα τις ἐγέννησεν ἀρχή, εἰ ἄρα γεννητόν ἐστιν; καὶ ὁ Πέτρος· Oὔτε ἑτέρα τις δύναμις ἐγέννησεν τὸν πονηρὸν οὔτε ἀγέννητόν ἐστι τὸ κακόν, ὡς ἐπὶ τέλει δείξω· νῦν γὰρ ἀποδεῖξαί μοι πρόκειται (ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὑπεσχόμην), ὅτι κατὰ <πάντα> τρόπον ὁ θεὸς ἄμεμπτός ἐστιν. δεδώκαμεν οὖν ὅτι ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἀνθρώποις προσόντων τὰ κρείττονα ἀσυγκρί- τως ἔχει. διὸ καὶ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν προβολέα γενέσθαι τῶν τεσσάρων οὐ- σιῶν, θερμοῦ λέγω καὶ ψυχροῦ, ὑγροῦ τε καὶ ξηροῦ. ταῦτα μὲν ὡς πρῶτα ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀμιγῆ ὄντα πρὸς οὐθέτερον ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν, προβλη- θέντα δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἔξω κραθέντα γενέσθαι ζῷον, προαίρεσιν ἔχον ὀλοθρεῦσαι κακούς. καὶ οὕτως ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντων γεγενημένων ὁ πο- νηρὸς οὔτε ἄλλοθέν ἐστιν οὔτε ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάντα πεποιηκότος θεοῦ τὴν κακίαν εἴληφεν, παρ' ᾧ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν οὐσίαι οὐθέτεραι οὖσαι, πεφιλοκρινημέναι ἐξ αὐτοῦ προβέβληνται, καὶ ἔξω αὐ-