ARTICLE IV

In the Fourth Article We Ask: WHAT IS THE SUBJECT IN WHICH FAITH EXISTS?

Difficulties:

It seems to be not the cognitive, but the affective, part, for

1. All virtue seems to exist in the affective part, since virtue is a kind of "well-ordered love," as Augustine says. But faith is a virtue. Therefore, it exists in the affective part.

2. Virtue implies some perfection, since it is "the disposition of something perfect to that which is best," as is said in the Physics. But, since faith has some perfection and some imperfection, the imperfection derives from the cognitive element and the perfection derives from the volitional element, namely, that it hold firmly to things invisible. Therefore, in so far as it is a virtue, it is in the affective part.

3. Augustine says: "Although a child does not have the faith which is in the will of those who believe, he has the sacrament of faith." From this we clearly see that faith is in the will.

4. Augustine says: "The Apostle's words, 'Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?' (1 Cor. 4:7), refer to the faith which is in the wills of those who believe." We conclude as before.

5. A disposition and its perfection seem to belong to the same thing. But faith is a disposition for glory, which is in the affective part. Therefore, faith, also, is in the affective part.

6. Merit resides in the will, because only the will is master of its acts. But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore, it is an act of the will, and so it would seem that faith resides in the will.

7. It was said that faith is in both the affective and the cognitive parts.--On the contrary, one habit cannot belong to two powers. Faith, however, is one habit. Therefore, it cannot be in the affective and cognitive parts, which are two powers.

To the Contrary:

1'. A habit which perfects a power has the same object as the power. Otherwise, the act of the power and of the habit could not be one. But faith has the same object, not as the affective part, but as the cognitive part, since the object of both is the true. Therefore, faith is in the cognitive part.

2'. Augustine says that faith is the "enlightening" of the mind for the first truth. But to be enlightened pertains to the cognitive part. Therefore, faith is in the cognitive part.

3'. If faith is said to be in the will, it is so only because we believe willingly. But, in like manner, all the activities of the virtues take place in us knowingly, as is clear from the Ethics. Therefore, for the same reason all the virtues would be in the cognitive part, which is obviously false.

4'. Through grace, which is in the virtues, the image which is in the three powers of memory, intelligence, and will is refashioned. But the three virtues which primarily have reference to grace are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, one of these is in the intelligence. It is evident, however, that neither hope nor charity is there. So, faith is there.

5'. The cognitive power has the same relation to that which can or cannot be proved, as the affective power has to that which can or cannot be approved. But the virtue by reason of which we approve that which, according to human reason, should not be approved is in the affective part. This virtue is charity, by which we love our enemies, a thing which naturally seems something not to be approved. Therefore, faith, by which we prove or assert that which to reason seems incapable of proof, is in the cognitive part.

REPLY:

There are many different opinions about this question. For some have said that faith is in both the affective and cognitive powers. But this cannot be true at all if it means that it is in both equally. For each habit must have one act, and one act cannot belong equally to two powers. Seeing this, some of these people say that faith is principally in the affective power. But this does not seem to be true, since to believe implies some "thought," as is clear from Augustine. Thought, however, is an act of the cognitive part. Faith is also in some sense called scientific knowledge and sight, as was said above. And all of these belong to the cognitive power.

Others say that faith is in the understanding, but the practical understanding, because they say the practical understanding is that to which desire tends, or which desire follows, or which inclines to a work. And these three are found in faith. It is because of desire that one is inclined to faith, for we believe what we will. Desire itself also follows faith, inasmuch as the act of faith in some sense produces the act of charity. It also leads to a work, for "faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5: 6).

But these people do not seem to understand what the practical understanding is. For the practical understanding is the same as the operative understanding. Hence, only extension to a work makes an understanding practical. Reference to desire, however, either antecedent or consequent, does not withdraw the understanding from the category of speculative understanding. For, unless one were attracted to speculating about the truth, there would never be any pleasure in the act of speculative understanding. And this is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that the purest pleasure is in the act of speculative understanding.

Nor does every reference to a work make the understanding practical, because simple speculation can be for someone the remote occasion of doing something. Thus, a philosopher contemplates the immortality of the soul, and from this, as from a remote cause, he takes occasion to do something. But, to be practical, the understanding must be the proximate rule of action, as that by which one studies the thing to be done, the methods of operation, and the causes of the work. It is evident, however, that the object of faith is not a truth which can be produced, but the uncreated truth, which can be an object only of speculative understanding. Consequently, faith is in the speculative understanding, although it is the remote occasion of doing something. For this reason, also, activity is attributed to it only through the mediation of charity.

We must bear in mind, nevertheless, that it is not in the speculative understanding absolutely, but only in so far as it is subject to the will. Similarly, temperance is in the concupiscible power only in so far as it participates to some extent in reason. For, since the good of the act of a power requires its subjection to a higher power by following its command, it is necessary not only that the higher have the perfection to command or direct correctly, but that the lower have the perfection to obey promptly. Hence, he who has right reason, but an uncontrolled concupiscible appetite, does not have the virtue of temperance, because he is harassed by his passions, even though he is not led astray by them. Consequently, he does not perform the act of virtue with the ease and pleasure which are needed for virtue. But, to have temperance, the concupiscible appetite itself must be perfected by a habit so that it is subject to the will without any difficulty. It is in this way that the habit of temperance is said to be in the concupiscible appetite. Similarly, for the understanding promptly to follow the command of the will, there must be a habit in the speculative understanding itself. This is the divinely infused habit of faith.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That passage of Augustine should be understood of the moral virtues, about which he is there speaking. Or it can be said that we are speaking of the virtues with reference to their form, which is charity.

2. The cognitive part has some perfection in so far as it obeys a will which clings to God.

3. Augustine is talking about the act of faith, which, indeed, is said to be in the will not as in a subject, but as in a cause, in so far as it is commanded by the will.

4. The same holds for the fourth difficulty.

5. It is not necessary for disposition and habit to be in the same subject except when the disposition itself becomes the habit. This is evident in members of the body, in which an effect results in one member because of the disposition in another member. Something similar happens in the powers of the soul, for the perfection of knowledge in the understanding follows from a good disposition of the imagination.

6. Not only the act which the will elicits, but also that which it commands, is called an act of the will. Therefore, there can be merit in both, as is clear from what has been said.

7. There cannot be one habit belonging equally to two powers, but there can be a habit of one power in so far as it has an ordination to another. And this is the case with faith.