Chap. XV.—Of the Affections, and the Opinion of the Peripatetics Respecting Them.

For, that these things are natural and not voluntary, the nature of all living beings shows, which is moved by all these affections. Therefore the Peripatetics act better, who say that all these cannot be taken from us, because they were born with us; and they endeavour to show how providently and how necessarily God, or nature (for so they term it), armed us with these affections; which, however, because they generally become vicious if they are in excess, can be advantageously regulated by man,—a limit being applied, so that there may be left to man as much as is sufficient for nature. Not an unwise disputation, if, as I said, all things were not referred to this life. The Stoics therefore are mad who do not regulate but cut them out, and wish by some means or other to deprive man of powers implanted in him by nature. And this is equivalent to a desire of taking away timidity from stags, or poison from serpents, or rage from wild beasts, or gentleness from cattle. For those qualities which have been given separately to dumb animals, are altogether given to man at the same time. But if, as physicians affirm, the affection of joy has its seat in the spleen,1175    [After fifteen centuries, physicians know as little about the spleen as ever. See Dunglison, Med. Dict., sub voce “spleen.”]   that of anger in the gall, of desire in the liver, of fear in the heart, it is easier to kill the animal itself than to tear anything from the body; for this is to wish to change the nature of the living creature. But the skilful men do not understand that when they take away vices from man, they also take away virtue, for which alone they are making a place. For if it is virtue in the midst of the impetuosity of anger to restrain and check oneself, which they cannot deny, then he who is without anger is also without virtue. If it is virtue to control the lust of the body, he must be free from virtue who has no lust which he may regulate. If it is virtue to curb the desire from coveting that which belongs to another, he certainly can have no virtue who is without that, to the restraining of which the exercise of virtue is applied. Where, therefore, there are no vices, there is no place even for virtue, as there is no place for victory where there is no adversary. And so it comes to pass that there can be no good in this life without evil. An affection therefore is a kind of natural fruitfulness1176    Ubertas animorum.   of the powers of the mind. For as a field which is naturally fruitful produces an abundant crop of briars,1177    Exuberat in sentes, “luxuriates into briars.”   so the mind which is uncultivated is overgrown with vices flourishing of their own accord, as with thorns. But when the true cultivator has applied himself, immediately vices give way, and the fruits of virtues spring up.  

Therefore God, when He first made man, with wonderful foresight first implanted in him these emotions of the mind, that he might be capable of receiving virtue, as the earth is of cultivation; and He placed the subject-matter of vices in the affections, and that of virtue in vices. For assuredly virtue will have no existence, or not be in exercise, if those things are wanting by which its power is either shown or exists. Now let us see what they have effected who altogether removes vices. With regard to those four affections1178    [Cap. xiv. p. 179, supra.]   which they imagine to arise from the opinion of things good and evil, by the eradication of which they think that the mind of the wise man is to be healed, since they understand that they are implanted by nature, and that without these nothing can be put in motion, nothing be done, they put certain other things into their place and room: for desire they substitute inclination, as though it were not much better to desire a good than to feel inclination for it; they in like manner substitute for joy gladness, and for fear caution. But in the case of the fourth they are at a loss for a method of exchanging the name. Therefore they have altogether taken away grief, that is, sadness and pain of mind, which cannot possibly be done. For who can fail to be grieved if pestilence has desolated his country, or an enemy overthrown it, or a tyrant crushed its liberty? Can any one fail to be grieved if he has beheld the overthrow of liberty,1179    [After Pharsalia. Note this love of freedom.]   and the banishment or most cruel slaughter of neighbours, friends, or good men?—unless the mind of any one should be so struck with astonishment that all sensibility should be taken from him. Wherefore they ought either to have taken away the whole, or this defective1180    Curta, i.e., “maimed.”   and weak discussion ought to have been completed; that is, something ought to have been substituted in the place of grief, since, the former ones having been so arranged, this naturally followed.  

For as we rejoice in good things that are present, so we are vexed and grieved with evil things. If, therefore, they gave another name to joy because they thought it vicious, so it was befitting that another name should be given to grief because they thought it also vicious. From which it appears that it was not the object itself which was wanting to them, but a word, through want of which they wished, contrary to what nature allowed, to take away that affection which is the greatest. For I could have refuted those changes of names at greater length, and have shown that many names are attached to the same objects, for the sake of embellishing the style and increasing its copiousness, or at any rate that they do not greatly differ from one another. For both desire takes its beginning from the inclination, and caution arises from fear, and joy is nothing else than the expression of gladness. But let us suppose that they are different, as they themselves will have it. Accordingly they will say that desire is continued and perpetual inclination, but that joy is gladness bearing itself immoderately; and that fear is caution in excess, and passing the limits of moderation. Thus it comes to pass, that they do not take away those things which they think ought to be taken away, but regulate them, since the names only are changed, the things themselves remain. They therefore return unawares to that point at which the Peripatetics arrive by argument, that vices, since they cannot be taken away, are to be regulated with moderation. Therefore they err, because they do not succeed in effecting that which they aim at, and by a circuitous route, which is long and rough, they return to the same path.  

CAPUT XV. De affectibus ac de iis Peripateticorum sententia.

Haec enim naturalia esse, non voluntaria, omnium viventium ratio demonstrat, quae iisdem omnibus quatitur affectibus. Peripatetici ergo rectius, qui haec omnia detrahi posse negant, quia nobiscum simul nata sint; et conantur ostendere, quam providenter, et quam necessario Deus, sive natura (sic enim dicunt) his nos armarit affectibus: quos tamen, quia vitiosi plerumque fiunt, si nimii sint, posse ab homine, adhibito modo, salubriter temperari, ut tantum homini, quantum naturae satis est, relinquatur. Non insipiens disputatio, si (ut dixi) non ad hanc vitam 0688C omnia referrentur. Stoici ergo furiosi, qui ea 0689A non temperant, sed abscindunt, rebusque a natura insitis 0689A castrare hominem quodammodo volunt. Quod tale est, quale si velint, aut metum detrahere cervis, aut venenum anguibus, aut iram feris, aut placiditatem pecudibus. Nam quae singula mutis animalibus data sunt, ea vero universa homini simul. Quod si, ut medici affirmant, laetitiae affectus in splene est, irae in felle, libidinis in jecore, timoris in corde; facilius est interficere animal ipsum, quam ex corpore aliquid evellere: quod est animantis naturam velle mutare. Sed homines prudentes non intelligunt, cum vitia ex homine tollunt, etiam se virtutem tollere, cui soli locum faciunt. Nam si virtus est, in medio irae impetu seipsum cohibere ac reprimere, quod negare non possunt; caret ergo virtute, quisquis 0689B ira caret. Si virtus est, libidinem corporis continere; virtute careat necesse est, qui libidinem quam temperet, non habet. Si virtus est, cupiditatem ab alieni appetitione fraenare; nullam certe virtutem potest habere, qui caret eo ad quod cohibendum virtutis usus adhibetur. Ubi ergo vitia non sunt, nec virtuti quidem locus est: sicut nec victoriae quidem, ubi adversarius nullus est. Ita fit, ut bonum sine malo esse in hac vita non possit. Affectus igitur, quasi ubertas 0690A est naturalis animorum. Nam sicut in sentes ager, qui est natura foecundus, exuberat: sic animus incultus, vitiis sua sponte invalescentibus, velut spinis obducitur. Sed cum verus cultor accesserit, statim, cedentibus vitiis, fruges virtutis oriuntur.

Deus itaque, cum hominem primum fingeret, mirabili providentia ingeneravit ei prius istas animi commotiones, ut posset capere virtutem, sicut terra culturam; posuitque materiam vitiorum in affectibus, virtutis, in vitiis. Quae profecto aut nulla erit, aut in usu esse non poterit, si desint ea, per quae vis ejus aut apparet, aut constat. Videamus nunc, iidem illi, qui vitia penitus excidunt, quid effecerint. Quatuor illos affectus, quos ex opinione bonorum malorumque nasci putant; quibus evulsis, sanandum esse animum 0690B sapientis existimant: quoniam intelligunt et natura insitos esse, et sine his nihil moveri, nihil agi posse; alia quaedam in eorum locum vicemque supponunt: ut pro cupiditate, substituunt voluntatem: quasi vero non multo sit praestabilius, bonum cupere, quam velle. Item pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem. At in illo quarto immutandi nominis eos ratio defecit. Itaque aegritudinem penitus, id est, moestitiam doloremque animi sustulerunt: quod fieri nequaquam 0691A potest. Quis enim possit non dolere, si patriam aut pestilentia exhauserit, aut hostis everterit, 0691A aut tyrannus oppresserit? Potest aliquis non dolere, si sublatam viderit libertatem; si proximos, si amicos, si bonos viros aut exterminatos, aut crudelissime trucidatos? nisi cujus mens ita obstupuerit, ut sit ei sensus omnis ereptus. Quare aut omnia tollere debuerunt, aut implenda fuerat curta haec et debilis disputatio; id est, etiam pro aegritudine aliquid reponendum, quoniam, superioribus ita ordinatis, hoc consequens erat.

Ut enim praesentibus laetamur bonis: sic malis angimur, ac dolemus. Si ergo laetitiae, quoniam vitiosam putabant, nomen aliud indiderunt: sic aegritudini, quoniam et ipsam vitiosam putabant, aliud vocabulum tribui congruebat. Unde apparet non illis 0691B rem defuisse, sed verbum; cujus indigentia eum totum affectum, qui est vel maximus, contra quam natura pateretur, auferre voluerunt. Nam illas nominum commutationes poteram coarguere pluribus, et ostendere, aut sermonis ornandi, augendaeque copiae gratia, multa nomina iisdem rebus imposita, aut certe non multum inter se illa distare. Nam et cupiditas a voluntate incipit; et cautio a metu oritur; et laetitia nihil aliud est, quam professum gaudium. Sed putemus, ut ipsi volunt, esse diversa. Nempe igitur cupiditatem esse dicent, perseverantem ac perpetuam voluntatem; laetitiam vero, insolenter se efferens gaudium; metum autem, nimiam et excedentem modum cautionem. Ita fit, ut ea, quae tollenda esse censent, non tollant, sed temperent; siquidem nomina tantummodo immutant, res ipsae manent. Eo igitur 0691C imprudentes revolvuntur, quo Peripatetici ratione perveniunt; ut vitia, quoniam tolli non possunt, medie 0692A temperanda sint. Ergo errant, quia non efficiunt, quod volunt, et longo asperoque circuitu in eamdem viam redeunt.