151

grievous things would not have been, if man had not sinned, on account of whom death entered in; for when man was <sinless>, the venom of serpents did not work, nor the ener<gies> of evil plants, nor did the vexations of demons occur, nor did it have the nature for any other suffering to be present in him; but through sin, having fallen away from being immortal, as I said, he has become susceptible to every suffering. But if you will say: Why then in the beginning was human nature made susceptible to death? I say to you: On account of free will. For if we were not susceptible to death, we would not have been able to be punished as immortals for a sin of free will, and thus on account of impassibility we would have been more evil in our choice, or else justice would have been weakened, since those having evil choices were unable to be punished on account of impassibility. And Simon said to this: What else do I have to say about the evil one, other than that God made him out of things that are not, and in this respect the maker is evil, who made what was not to be, and this when he was able to make him good, so that the one who came into being would not even possess a nature of his own for an evil choice? And Peter: To make him out of things that are not, having a choice, is similar to the argument we have previously stated, that by making his temperament for him to rejoice in evils, he himself appears to be the cause of what happened. Since, therefore, the solution for both is one, we shall later say why He made him to rejoice in the destruction of the evil. And Simon: If He made the angels also with free will, and the evil one fell away from being righteous, and because of this has been honored with rule, the one who honored him, by that with which he honored him, appears as one who rejoices in evils. And Peter: If God appointed him, after he had fallen away, to rule over those like him, having commanded him by law to bring punishment upon sinners, He is not unjust. But if it is that He honored him after he had fallen away, the one who honored him foresaw what was useful: that the honor is temporary, and that it is just for the evil to be ruled by one who is evil, and for sinners to be punished by him. And Simon: Is it not that by being eternal, the principles of monarchy are thus destroyed, since another power, that related to matter, co-rules? And Peter: If they are different in their substances, they are also different in their powers, and the stronger rules the weaker; but if they are of the same substance, then they happen to be of equal power and similarly good or evil. But that they are not of equal power is apparent; for by the creator, matter was brought into whatever form of a world He wished, and surely one cannot say that it was always an existing substance, not matter as God's storehouse. For it is not possible to say: There was <a time> when God was without possessions, but He was always its sole ruler. Wherefore He would also be rightly called an eternal mo<narch> even on this hypothesis, since both the ruler and the <ruled> are <eternal>. And Simon said: What then? <if> the evil one made himself? And is God good in this, that knowing he would be for evil, He did not destroy him as he was coming into being, when, as imperfect, he was able to be destroyed? For if he came into being suddenly, and that perfectly, [and that perfectly] and for this reason wages war against the creator, as having suddenly become of equal power with him. And Peter: You say impossible things; for even as he was coming into being little by little, He was able by His own choice to destroy him as an enemy. And foreknowing that his coming into being was not good, He <would not have> allowed it, unless He knew that his coming into being was for a purpose useful to Himself. And perfect

151

χα>λεπὰ οὐκ ἂν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἡμαρτήκει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὗ εἵνεκεν θάνατος παρεισῆλθεν· <ἀναμαρτήτου> γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐχ ἑρπετῶν ὁ ἰὸς εἰργάζετο, οὐ τῶν κακῶν βοτανῶν αἱ ἐνέρ<γειαι>, οὐ δαιμόνων ὀχλήσεις ἐγίνοντο οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι πάθος αὐτῷ προσεῖναι φύσιν εἶχε· δι' ἁμαρτίαν δὲ ἐκπεσὼν τοῦ ἀθάνατος εἶναι, ὡς ἔφην, παντὸς πάθους γέγονε δεκτικός. εἰ δὲ ἐρεῖς· ∆ιὰ τί οὖν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγένετο ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις θανάτου δεκτική; φημί σοι· ∆ιὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἦμεν θανάτου δεκτικοί, ἐπὶ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἁμαρτήματι τιμωρεῖσθαι ὡς ἀθάνατοι οὐκ ἐδυ- νάμεθα καὶ οὕτως διὰ τὸ ἀπαθὲς πλεῖόν τι κἂν τῇ προαιρέσει ἦμεν κακοί, ἢ καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἐξησθένει, τῶν κακὰς ἐχόντων προαιρέσεις αἰτίᾳ ἀπα- θείας τιμωρηθῆναι μὴ δυναμένων. καὶ ὁ Σίμων πρὸς ταῦτα ἔφη· Περὶ πονηροῦ τί ἔτι ἔχω ἕτερον λέγειν ἢ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κακὸς ὁ ποιήσας, ὃς τὸ μὴ Χν ἐποίησεν εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα δυνά- μενος αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι τῷ τὸν γενόμενον μηδὲ πρὸς κακίας προαίρεσιν ἰδίαν κεκτῆσθαι φύσιν; καὶ ὁ Πέτρος· Τὸ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι προαί- ρεσιν ἔχοντα ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ προειρήκαμεν λόγῳ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χαίρειν αὐτὸν κακοῖς τὴν κρᾶσιν ποιήσας αὐτὸς αἴτιος φαίνεται τοῦ γενομένου. μιᾶς οὖν οὔσης τῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιλύσεως τὸ διὰ τί χαίρειν αὐτὸν ἐπ' ὀλέθρου κακῶν ἐποίησεν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. καὶ ὁ Σίμων· Eἰ αὐτεξου- σίους ἐποίησε καὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς ἀπέστη τοῦ δίκαιος εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀρχῇ τετίμηται, ὁ τιμήσας δι' οὗ τετίμηκεν ὡς κακοῖς χαίρων φαίνεται. καὶ ὁ Πέτρος· Eἰ ἀποστάντα αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ἄρχειν τῶν ὁμοίων κατέστησε, νόμῳ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐπάγειν τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι κελεύ- σας αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἄδικός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἀποστάντα τετίμηκε, τὸ χρήσιμον ὁ τιμήσας προεῖδεν, ὅτι καὶ ἡ τιμὴ πρόσκαιρος καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον τοὺς κα- κοὺς ὑπὸ κακοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σίμων· Μήτι ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ οὕτως ἀναιρεῖται τὰ τῆς μοναρχίας, συναρ- χούσης καὶ ἑτέρας τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην δυνάμεως; καὶ ὁ Πέτρος· Eἰ διά- φοροί εἰσι ταῖς οὐσίαις, διάφοροί εἰσι καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσι, καὶ ὁ κρείττων ἄρχει τοῦ ἥττονος· εἰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσιν οὐσίας, τότε ἰσοδύναμοι τυγχά- νουσι καὶ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. ὅτι δὲ οὔκ εἰσιν ἰσοδύναμοι, φαίνονται· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἡ ὕλη εἰς οἷον ἠθέλησε κόσμου ἠνέχθη σχῆμα καὶ μήτιγε ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀεὶ ἦν οὐσία οὖσα, οὐχ ὕλη ὡς θεοῦ ταμεῖον. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· Ἠν <ποτε,> ὅτε ἀκτήμων ἦν ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ἦν μόνος ἄρχων αὐτῆς. διὸ καὶ ἀίδιος μο<νάρχης> καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποθέσει καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο <ἀιδίου> ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ τοῦ <ἀρχομέν>ου. καὶ ὁ Σίμων ἔφη· Τί οὖν; <εἰ> ἑαυτὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ πονηρός; καὶ οὕτως ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεός, ὅτι εἰδὼς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐσόμενον, γινόμενον αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν ὅτε ὡς ἀτελὴς ἀναιρεθῆναι δυνατὸς ἦν; εἰ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης συμβέβηκε καὶ ταῦτα τέλειος, [καὶ ταῦτα τέλειος] καὶ διὰ ταῦτα προσπολεμεῖ τῷ δη- μιουργῷ ὡς ἐξαίφνης ἰσοδύναμος αὐτῷ γεγονώς. καὶ ὁ Πέτρος· Ἀδύνατα λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ κατ' ὀλίγον γινόμενον αὐτὸν ὡς ἐχθρὸν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προαιρέ- σει ἀνελεῖν ἠδύνατο. καὶ προγινώσκων γίνεσθαι αὐτὸν οὐ καλόν, <οὐκ ἂν> συνεχώρει, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῷ χρήσιμον γινόμενον ἠπίστατο. καὶ τέλειος