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Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata, or Miscellanies
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Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
Now the same treatment which applies to demonstration applies also to the following question.
Some, for instance, say that there cannot be several originating causes for one animal. It is impossible that there can be several homogeneous originating causes of an animal; but that there should be several heterogeneous, is not absurd.
Suppose the Pyrrhonian suspense of judgment, as they say, [the idea] that nothing is certain: it is plain that, beginning with itself, it first invalidates itself. It either grants that something is true, that you are not to suspend your judgment on all things; or it persists in saying that there is nothing true. And it is evident, that first it will not be true. For it either affirms what is true or it does not affirm what is true. But if it affirms what is true, it concedes, though unwillingly, that something is true. And if it does not affirm what is true, it leaves true what it wished to do away with. For, in so far as the scepticism which demolishes is proved false, in so far the positions which are being demolished, are proved true; like the dream which says that all dreams are false. For in confuting itself, it is confirmatory of the others.
And, in fine, if it is true, it will make a beginning with itself, and not be scepticism of anything else but of itself first. Then if [such a man] apprehends that he is a man, or that he is sceptical, it is evident that he is not sceptical.1882 Iliad, ix. 533, etc. [The young student must be on his guard as to the philosophical scepticism here treated, which is not the habit of unbelief commonly so called.] And how shall he reply to the interrogation? For he is evidently no sceptic in respect to this. Nay, he affirms even that he does doubt.
And if we must be persuaded to suspend our judgment in regard to everything, we shall first suspend our judgment in regard to our suspense of judgment itself, whether we are to credit it or not.
And if this position is true, that we do not know what is true, then absolutely nothing is allowed to be true by it. But if he will say that even this is questionable, whether we know what is true; by this very statement he grants that truth is knowable, in the very act of appearing to establish the doubt respecting it.
But if a philosophical sect is a leaning toward dogmas, or, according to some, a leaning to a number of dogmas which have consistency with one another and with phenomena, tending to a right life; and dogma is a logical conception, and conception is a state and assent of the mind: not merely sceptics, but every one who dogmatizes is accustomed in certain things to suspend his judgment, either through want of strength of mind, or want of clearness in the things, or equal force in the reasons.
ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ ἐπιχείρησις τῆς ἀποδείξεως κἀπὶ τοῦ τρίτου προβλήματος. φασὶν οὖν τινες μὴ ἐγχωρεῖν πλείους ἀρχὰς ἑνὸς εἶναι ζῴου. ὁμογενεῖς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ πλείους ὑπάρχειν ἑνὸς ζῴου, διαφερούσας δὲ τοῖς γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον. 20Πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνείους.20 Εἴ φησιν ἡ ἐποχὴ βέβαιον εἶναι μηδέν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἀρξαμένη πρῶτον ἀκυρώσει ἑαυτήν. ἢ τοίνυν δίδωσιν ἀληθές τι εἶναι καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων ἐφεκτέον, ἢ ἐνίσταται μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς λέγουσα, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' αὐτὴ πρότερον ἀληθεύσει. ἤτοι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀληθεύει ἢ οὐκ ἀληθεύει. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀληθεύει, δίδωσιν ἄκουσά τι εἶναι ἀληθές, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀληθεύει, ἀληθῆ ἀπολείπει ἅπερ ἀνελεῖν ἐβούλετο. ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ψευδὴς δείκνυται ἡ ἀναιροῦσα ἐποχή, ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἀναιρούμενα ἀληθῆ δείκνυται, ὡς ὁ ὄνειρος ὁ λέγων ψευδεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς ὀνείρους. ἑαυτῆς γὰρ ἀναιρετικὴ οὖσα τῶν ἄλλων γίνεται κυρωτική. καὶ ὅλως εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθής, ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ποιήσεται τὴν ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς οὖσα ἐποχή, ἀλλ' ἑαυτῆς πρῶτον. Ἔπειτα εἰ καταλαμβάνει τις ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ἐπέχει, δῆλός ἐστι μὴ ἐπέχων. πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰς τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν ἀφίκετο περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων; πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ ἀπεκρίνετο πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτηθέν; περὶ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τούτου δῆλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐπέχων, ναὶ μὴν καὶ ἀποφαίνεται ὅτι ἐπέχει, [δι'] ὃ καὶ εἰ δεῖ πειθόμενον αὐτοῖς περὶ πάντων ἐπέχειν, περὶ αὐτῆς πρότερον τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐφέξομεν, εἴτε πειστέον αὐτῇ εἴτε καὶ μή. Ἔτι εἰ τοῦτο αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθές, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀληθές τι παρ' ἐκείνου δίδοται. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἐρεῖ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τἀληθές, ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ δίδωσιν εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς γνώριμον, ἐν ᾧ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐποχὴν φαίνεται μὴ βεβαιῶν. Αἵρεσίς ἐστι πρόσκλισις δογμάτων ἤ, ὥς τινες, πρόσκλισις δό γμασι πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσι πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν συντείνουσα. καὶ τὸ μὲν δόγμα ἐστὶ κατάληψίς τις λογική, κατάληψις δὲ ἕξις καὶ συγκατάθεσις τῆς διανοίας. Οὐ μόνον οἱ ἐφεκτικοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶς δογματικὸς ἔν τισιν ἐπέχειν εἴωθεν ἤτοι παρὰ γνώμης ἀσθένειαν ἢ παρὰ πραγμάτων ἀσάφειαν ἢ παρὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων ἰσοσθένειαν. 20Αἱ τῶν ζητήσεων ἔφοδοι καὶ ἀρχαὶ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τούτοις εἰσίν.20