Chap. XVII.—Of the Affections and Their Use; Of Patience, and the Chief Good of Christians.

But I have been carried too far in my desire of refuting them; since it is my purpose to show that those things which the philosophers thought to be vices, are so far from being vices, that they are even great virtues. Of others, I will take, for the sake of instruction, those which I think to be most closely related to the subject. They regard dread or fear as a very great vice, and think that it is a very great weakness of mind; the opposite to which is bravery: and if this exists in a man, they say that there is no place for fear. Does any one then believe that it can possibly happen that this same fear is the highest fortitude? By no means. For nature does not appear to admit that anything should fall back to its contrary. But yet I, not by any skilful conclusion, as Socrates does in the writings of Plato, who compels those against whom he disputes to admit those things which they had denied, but in a simple manner, will show that the greatest fear is the greatest virtue. No one doubts but that it is the part of a timid and feeble mind either to fear pain, or want, or exile, or imprisonment, or death; and if any one does not dread all these, he is judged a man of the greatest fortitude. But he who fears God is free from the fear of all these things. In proof of which, there is no need of arguments: for the punishments inflicted on the worshippers of God have been witnessed at all times, and are still witnessed through the world, in the tormenting of whom new and unusual tortures have been devised. For the mind shrinks from the recollection of various kinds of death, when the butchery of savage monsters has raged even beyond death itself. But a happy and unconquered patience endured these execrable lacerations of their bodies without a groan. This virtue afforded the greatest astonishment to all people and provinces, and to the torturers themselves, when cruelty was overcome by patience. But this virtue was caused by nothing else than the fear of God. Therefore (as I said) fear is not to be uprooted, as the Stoics maintain, nor to be restrained, as the Peripatetics wish, but to be directed into the right way; and apprehensions are to be taken away, but so that this one only may be left: for since this is the only lawful and true one, it alone effects that all other things may not be feared. Desire also is reckoned among vices; but if it desires those things which are of the earth, it is a vice; on the other hand, if it desires heavenly things, it is a virtue. For he who desires to obtain justice, God, perpetual life, everlasting light, and all those things which God promises to man, will despise these riches, and honours, and commands, and kingdoms themselves.  

The Stoic will perhaps say that inclination is necessary for the attainment of these things, and not desire; but, in truth, the inclination is not sufficient. For many have the inclination; but when pain has approached the vitals, inclination gives way, but desire perseveres: and if it effects that all things which are sought by others are objects of contempt to him, it is the greatest virtue, since it is the mother of self-restraint. And therefore we ought rather to effect this, that we may rightly direct the affections, a corrupt use of which is vice. For these excitements of the mind resemble a harnessed chariot, in the right management of which the chief duty of the driver is to know the way; and if he shall keep to this, with whatever swiftness he may go, he will not strike against an obstacle. But if he shall wander from the course, although he may go calmly and gently, he will either be shaken over rough places, or will glide over precipices, or at any rate will be carried where he does not need to go. So that chariot of life which is led by the affections as though by swift horses, if it keeps the right way, will discharge its duty. Dread, therefore, and desire, if they are cast down to the earth, will become vices, but they will be virtues if they are referred to divine things. On the other hand, they esteem parsimony as a virtue; which, if it is eagerness for possessing, cannot be a virtue, because it is altogether employed in the increase or preservation of earthly goods. But we do not refer the chief good to the body, but we measure every duty by the preservation of the soul only. But if, as I have before taught, we must by no means spare our property that we may preserve kindness and justice, it is not a virtue to be frugal; which name beguiles and deceives under the appearance of virtue. For frugality is, it is true, the abstaining from pleasures; but in this respect it is a vice, because it arises from the love of possessing, whereas we ought both to abstain from pleasures, and by no means to withhold money. For to use money sparingly, that is, moderately, is a kind of weakness of mind, either of one fearing lest he should be in want, or of one despairing of being able to recover it, or of one incapable of the contempt of earthly things. But, on the other hand, they call him who is not sparing of his property prodigal. For thus they distinguish between the liberal man and the prodigal: that he is liberal who bestows on deserving objects, and on proper occasions, and in sufficient quantities; but that he is prodigal who lavishes on undeserving objects, and when there is no need, and without any regard to his property.  

What then? shall we call him prodigal who through pity gives food to the needy? But it makes a great difference, whether on account of lust you bestow your money on harlots, or on account of benevolence on the wretched; whether profligates, gamesters, and pimps squander your money, or you bestow it on piety and God; whether you expend it upon your own appetite,1183    Ventri ac gulæ ingeras.   or lay it up in the treasury of justice. As, therefore, it is a vice to lay it out badly, so it is a virtue to lay it out well. If it is a virtue not to be sparing of riches, which can be replaced, that you may support the life of man, which cannot be replaced; then parsimony is a vice. Therefore I can call them by no other name than mad, who deprive man, a mild and sociable animal, of his name; who, having uprooted the affections, in which humanity altogether consists, wish to bring him to an immoveable insensibility of mind, while they desire to free the soul from perturbations, and, as they themselves say, to render it calm and tranquil; which is not only impossible, because its force and nature consist in motion, but it ought not even to be so. For as water which is always still and motionless is unwholesome and more muddy, so the soul which is unmoved and torpid is useless even to itself: nor will it be able to maintain life itself; for it will neither do nor think anything, since thought itself is nothing less than agitation of the mind. In fine, they who assert this immoveableness of the soul wish to deprive the soul of life; for life is full of activity, but death is quiet. They also rightly esteem some things as virtues, but they do not maintain their due proportion.1184    Sed earum modum non tenent. [Augustine’s anthropology better.]    

Constancy is a virtue; not that we resist those who injure us, for we must yield to these; and why this ought to be done I will show presently: but that when men command us to act in opposition to the law of God, and in opposition to justice, we should be deterred by no threats or punishments from preferring the command of God to the command of man. Likewise it is a virtue to despise death; not that we seek it, and of our own accord inflict it upon ourselves, as many and distinguished philosophers have often done, which is a wicked and impious thing; but that when compelled to desert God, and to betray our faith, we should prefer to undergo death, and should defend our liberty against the foolish and senseless violence of those who cannot govern themselves, and with fortitude of spirit we should challenge all the threats and terrors of the world. Thus with lofty and invincible mind we trample upon those things which others fear—pain and death. This is virtue; this is true constancy—to be maintained and preserved in this one thing alone, that no terror and no violence may be able to turn us away from God. Therefore that is a true sentiment of Cicero:1185    De Offic., ii. 11.   “No one,” he says, “can be just who fears death, or pain, or exile, or want.” Also of Seneca, who says, in his books of moral philosophy: “This is that virtuous man, not distinguished by a diadem or purple, or the attendance of lictors, but in no respect inferior, who, when he sees death at hand, is not so disturbed as though he saw a fresh object; who, whether torments are to be suffered by his whole body, or a flame is to be seized by his mouth, or his hands are to be stretched out on the cross,1186    Per patibulum.   does not inquire what he suffers, but how well.” But he who worships God suffers these things without fear. Therefore he is just. By these things it is effected, that he cannot know or maintain at all either the virtues or the exact limits of the virtues, whoever is estranged from the religion of the one God.  

CAPUT XVII. De affectibus ac eorum usu; de patientia et summo bono Christianorum.

Sed evectus sum coarguendi studio longius; cum sit mihi propositum, ea, quae vitia philosophi putaverunt, ostendere non tantum vitia non esse, verum etiam magnas esse virtutes. Ex aliis docendi gratia sumam, quae pertinere ad rem maxime puto. Metum, 0693C seu timorem in maximo vitio ponunt, summamque 0694A imbecillitatem esse animi putant; cui sit contraria fortitudo, quae si sit in homine, locum timori esse nullum. Creditne ergo aliquis, fieri posse, ut idem metus summa sit fortitudo? Minime. Neque enim videtur capere natura, ut aliquid in contrarium recidat. Atqui ego non arguta aliqua conclusione, ut apud Platonem Socrates facit, qui eos, quos contra disputat, cogit ea, quae negaverant, confiteri; sed simpliciter ostendam summum metum summam esse virtutem. Nemo dubitat, quin timidi et imbecilli sit animi, aut dolorem metuere, aut egestatem, aut exilium, aut carcerem, aut mortem: quae omnia quisquis non exhorruerit, fortissimus judicatur. Qui autem Deum metuit, illa universa non metuit. Ad quod probandum argumentis opus non est; spectatae sunt enim semper, spectanturque adhuc per orbem poenae cultorum Dei, in 0694B quibus excruciandis nova et inusitata tormenta excogitata sunt. Nam de mortis generibus horret animus recordari; cum immanium bestiarum, ultra ipsam mortem, carnificina saevierit. Has tamen execrabiles corporum lacerationes felix atque invicta patientia sine ullo gemitu pertulit. Haec virtus omnibus populis, atque provinciis, et ipsis tortoribus miraculum maximum praebuit; cum patientia crudelitas vinceretur. Atqui hanc virtutem nihil aliud, quam metus Dei fecit. Itaque (ut dicebam) non evellendus, ut Stoici, neque temperandus timor, ut Peripatetici volunt; sed in veram viam dirigendus est, auferendique sunt metus; sed ita, ut hic solus relinquatur, qui quoniam legitimus ac verus est, solus efficit, ut possint caetera omnia non timeri. 0694C Cupiditas quoque inter vitia numeratur: sed si haec 0695A quae terrena sunt, concupiscat, vitium est; virtus autem, si coelestia. Qui enim justitiam, qui Deum, qui vitam perpetuam, qui lucem sempiternam, eaque omnia, quae Deus homini pollicetur, consequi cupit, opes istas, et honores, et potentatus, 0695A et regna ipsa contemnet.

Dicet fortasse Stoicus, voluntate opus esse ad haec consequenda, non cupiditate: imo vero parum est velle. Multi enim volunt: sed cum dolor visceribus accesserit, voluntas cedit, cupiditas perseverat; quae si efficit, ut contemptui sint omnia, quae a caeteris appetuntur, summa virtus est, siquidem continentiae mater est. Ideoque illud potius efficere debemus, ut affectus, quibus prave uti vitium est, dirigamus in rectum. Nam istae concitationes animorum juncto 0695B currui similes sunt; in quo recte moderando summum rectoris officium est, ut viam noverit: quam si tenebit, quamlibet concitate ierit, non offendet. Si autem aberraverit, licet placide ac leniter eat, aut per confragosa vexabitur, aut per praecipitia labetur, aut certe, quo non est opus, deferetur. Sic currus ille vitae, qui affectibus, velut equis pernicibus ducitur, si viam rectam teneat, fungetur officio. Metus igitur, et cupiditas, si projiciantur in terram, vitia fient; virtutes autem, si ad divina referantur. Parcimoniam contra virtutis loco habent: quae si studium est habendi, non potest esse virtus; quia in augendis, vel tuendis terrestribus bonis tota versatur. Nos autem summum bonum non referimus ad corpus; sed omne officium solius animae conservatione metimur. Quod 0695C si (ut supra docui) patrimonio minime parcendum est, ut humanitatem, justitiamque teneamus; non est virtus frugi esse: quod nomen virtutis specie fallit ac decipit. Est enim frugalitas, abstinentia quidem voluptatum: sed eo vitium, quia ex habendi amore 0696A descendit; cum sit et voluptatibus abstinendum, et pecuniae minime temperandum. Nam parce, id est, mediocriter uti pecunia, quasi quaedam pusillitas animi est, aut praetimentis, ne sibi desit; aut desperantis, posse se illam reparare; aut contemptum terrestrium non capientis. Sed illi rursus eum, qui rei familiari suae non parcat, prodigum vocant. Nam ita liberalem distinguunt a prodigo, quod is liberalis sit, qui et bene meritis, et cum oportet, et quantum satis est, largiatur; prodigus vero, qui et non meritis, et cum opus non est, et sine respectu rei familiaris effundat.

Quid ergo? Prodigumne dicemus eum, qui misericordiae causa tribuat egentibus victum? Atqui multum refert utrumne scortis propter libidinem largiare, 0696B an miseris propter humanitatem: utrum pecuniam tuam perductores, aleatores, lenonesque diripiant; an illam pietati ac Deo praestes: utrumne illam ventri ac gulae ingeras, an in thesauro justitiae reponas. Ut ergo vitium est, effundere in malam partem: sic in bonam, virtus. Si virtus est, non parcere opibus, quae possunt reparari, ut hominis vitam sustentes, quae reparari non potest; vitium igitur parcimonia est. Quare nihil aliud dixerim, quam insanos, qui hominem, mite ac sociale animal, orbant suo nomine; qui evulsis affectibus, quibus omnis constat humanitas, ad immobilem stuporem mentis perducere volunt; dum student animum perturbationibus liberare, et (ut ipsi dicunt) quietum tranquillumque reddere. Quod fieri non tantum non potest, quia vis 0696C et ratio ejus in motu est; sed ne oportet quidem. Quia sicut aqua semper jacens et quieta insalubris et magis turbida est: sic animus immotus ac torpens inutilis est etiam sibi; nec vitam ipsam tueri poterit, quia nec faciet quidquam, nec cogitabit: cum cogitatio 0697A ipsa nihil aliud sit, quam mentis agitatio. 0697A Denique qui hanc immobilitatem animi asserunt, privare animum vita volunt: quia vita actuosa est, mors quieta. Quaedam etiam recte pro virtutibus habent: sed earum modum non tenent.

Virtus est constantia: non ut inferentibus injuriam resistamus, his enim cedendum est; quod cur fieri debeat, mox docebo: sed ut jubentibus facere nos contra Dei legem contraque justitiam, nullis minis, aut suppliciis terreamur, quominus Dei jussionem hominis jussioni praeferamus. Item virtus est, mortem contemnere: non ut appetamus, eamque ultro nobis inferamus, sicut philosophorum plurimi et maximi saepe fecerunt; quod est sceleratum ac nefarium: sed ut coacti Deum relinquere, ac 0697B fidem prodere, mortem suscipere malimus, libertatemque defendamus adversus impotentium stultam vecordemque violentiam, et omnes saeculi minas atque terrores fortitudine animi provocemus. Sic ea, quae alii timent, excelsa et insuperabili mente dolorem mortemque calcamus. Haec est virtus, haec vera constantia, in hoc tuenda et conservanda solo, ut nullus nos terror, nulla vis a Deo possit avertere. Vera igitur Ciceronis illa sententia est: «Nemo, inquit, justus potest esse, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exilium, qui egestatem timet.» Item Senecae in libris moralis Philosophiae dicentis: «Hic est ille homo honestus, non apice, purpurave, non lictorum insignis ministerio, sed nulla re minor, qui cum mortem in vicinia videt, non sic perturbatur, tanquam rem novam viderit; qui, sive toto corpore tormenta 0697C patienda sunt, sive flamma ore rapienda est, sive extendendae per patibulum manus, non quaerit quid patiatur, sed quam bene.» Qui autem Deum colit, haec patitur, nec timet. Ergo justus est. His rebus 0698A efficitur, ut neque virtutes, neque virtutum exactissimos limites nosse aut tenere possit omnino, quisquis est a Religione Dei singularis alienus.