Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
The introductions and sources of questions are about these points and in them.
But before definitions, and demonstrations, and divisions, it must be propounded in what ways the question is stated; and equivocal terms are to be treated; and synomyms stated accurately according to their significations.
Then it is to be inquired whether the proposition belongs to those points, which are considered in relation to others, or is taken by itself. Further, If it is, what it is, what happens to it; or thus, also, if it is, what it is, why it is. And to the consideration of these points, the knowledge of Particulars and Universals, and the Antecedents and the Differences, and their divisions, contribute.
Now, Induction aims at generalization and definition; and the divisions are the species, and what a thing is, and the individual. The contemplation of the How adduces the assumption of what is peculiar; and doubts bring the particular differences and the demonstrations, and otherwise augment the speculation and its consequences; and the result of the whole is scientific knowledge and truth.
Again, the summation resulting from Division becomes Definition. For Definition is adopted before division and after: before, when it is admitted or stated; after, when it is demonstrated. And by Sensation the Universal is summed up from the Particular. For the starting point of Induction is Sensation; and the end is the Universal.
Induction, accordingly, shows not what a thing is, but that it is, or is not. Division shows what it is; and Definition similarly with Division teaches the essence and what a thing is, but not if it is; while Demonstration explains the three points, if it is, what it is, and why it is.
There are also Definitions which contain the Cause. And since it may be known when we see, when we see the Cause; and Causes are four—the matter, the moving power, the species, the end; Definition will be fourfold.
Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the succession of differences, when cut and divided, completes the “What it is.” There is no necessity for expressing all the differences of each thing, but those which form the species.
Geometrical analysis and synthesis are similar to logical division and definition; and by division we get back to what is simple and more elementary. We divide, therefore, the genus of what is proposed for consideration into the species contained in it; as, in the case of man, we divide animal, which is the genus, into the species that appear in it, the mortal, and the immortal. And thus, by continually dividing those genera that seem to be compound into the simpler species, we arrive at the point which is the subject of investigation, and which is incapable of further division.
For, after dividing “the animal” into mortal and immortal, then into terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly and those who walk; and so dividing the species which is nearest to what is sought, which also contains what is sought, we arrive by division at the simplest species, which contains nothing else, but what is sought alone.
For again we divide that which walks into rational and irrational; and then selecting from the species, apprehended by division, those next to man, and combining them into one formula, we state the definition of a man, who is an animal, mortal, terrestrial, walking, rational.
Whence Division furnishes the class of matter, seeking for the definition the simplicity of the name; and the definition of the artisan and maker, by composition and construction, presents the knowledge of the thing as it is; not of those things of which we have general notions. To these notions we say that explanatory expressions belong. For to these notions, also, divisions are applicable.
Now one Division divides that which is divided into species, as a genus; and another into parts, as a whole; and another into accidents.
The division, then, of a whole into the parts, is, for the most part, conceived with reference to magnitude; that into the accidents can never be entirely explicated, if, necessarily, essence is inherent in each of the existences.
Whence both these divisions are to be rejected, and only the division of the genus into species is approved, by which both the identity that is in the genus is characterized, and the diversity which subsists in the specific differences.
The species is always contemplated in a part. On the other hand, however, if a thing is part of another, it will not be also a species. For the hand is a part of a man, but it is not a species. And the genus exists in the species. For [the genus] is both in man and the ox. But the whole is not in the parts. For the man is not in his feet. Wherefore also the species is more important than the part; and whatever things are predicated of the genus will be all predicated of the species.
It is best, then, to divide the genus into two, if not into three species. The species then being divided more generically, are characterized by sameness and difference. And then being divided, they are characterized by the points generically indicated.
For each of the species is either an essence; as when we say, Some substances are corporeal and some incorporeal; or how much, or what relation, or where, or when, or doing, or suffering.
One, therefore, will give the definition of whatever he possesses the knowledge of; as one can by no means be acquainted with that which he cannot embrace and define in speech. And in consequence of ignorance of the definition, the result is, that many disputes and deceptions arise. For if he that knows the thing has the knowledge of it in his mind, and can explain by words what he conceives; and if the explanation of the thought is definition; then he that knows the thing must of necessity be able also to give the definition.
Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to the definition of man, makes the whole—a rational, mortal, terrestrial, walking, laughing animal. For the things added by way of difference to the definition are the signs of the properties of things; but do not show the nature of the things themselves. Now they say that the difference is the assigning of what is peculiar; and as that which has the difference differs from all the rest, that which belongs to it alone, and is predicated conversely of the thing, must in definitions be assumed by the first genus as principal and fundamental.
Accordingly, in the larger definitions the number of the species that are discovered are in the ten Categories; and in the least, the principal points of the nearest species being taken, mark the essence and nature of the thing. But the least consists of three, the genus and two essentially necessary species. And this is done for the sake of brevity.
We say, then, Man is the laughing animal. And we must assume that which pre-eminently happens to what is defined, or its peculiar virtue, or its peculiar function, and the like.
Accordingly, while the definition is explanatory of the essence of the thing, it is incapable of accurately comprehending its nature. By means of the principal species, the definition makes an exposition of the essence, and almost has the essence in the quality.
Προτακτέον δὴ καὶ τῶν ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ διαιρέσεων ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ζητούμενον τά τε ὁμώνυμα χειριστέον καὶ τὰ συνώνυμα εὐκρινῶς τακτέον κατὰ τὰς σημασίας. ἔπειτα ζητητέον εἰ τῶν πρὸς ἕτερα θεωρουμένων ἐστὶν τὸ προκείμενον ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ λαμβάνεται, ἐπὶ τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστι, τί αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν, ἢ καὶ οὕτως, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστι, διότι ἐστίν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν ἡ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνῶσις καὶ ἡ τῶν καθόλου συνυποβάλλει καὶ τὰ πρότερα καὶ αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αἱ διαιρέσεις αὐτῶν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπαγωγὴ φέρει τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸν ὁρισμόν, αἱ δὲ διαιρέσεις τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄτομον, ἡ δὲ θεωρία τοῦ ποσαχῶς τὴν λῆψιν τοῦ οἰκείου, αἱ δὲ διαπορήσεις τὰς κατ' αὐτὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἄλλως τὴν θεωρίαν συναύξουσι τά τε παρεπόμενα αὐτῇ. ἐκ πάντων δὲ ἐπιστήμη τε παρίσταται καὶ ἀλήθεια. πάλιν τὸ κεφαλαιωθὲν ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως ὅρος γίνεται· λαμβάνεται γὰρ καὶ πρότερος τῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ ὕστερος ὁ διορισμός· πρότερος μὲν ὅταν συγχωρηθῇ ἢ προτεθῇ, ὕστερος δὲ ὅταν ἀποδειχθῇ. καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα κεφαλαιοῦται τὸ καθόλου. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ἡ αἴσθησις, πέρας δὲ τὸ καθόλου. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπαγωγὴ οὐ τὸ τί ἐστι δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἡ διαίρεσις δὲ ὅ τι ἐστὶ παρίστησιν, ὅ τε διορισμὸς ὁμοίως τῇ διαι ρέσει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι διδάσκει, οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ εἰ ἔστιν, ἥ τε ἀπόδειξις τὰ τρία, τό τε εἰ ἔστιν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν καὶ τὸ διὰ τί ἐστιν, σαφηνίζει. εἰσὶ δὲ ἔνιοι καὶ τῆς αἰτίας ἐμπεριεκτικοὶ ὅροι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστιν ὅταν ἴδωμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, αἰτίαι δὲ τέσσαρες, ἡ ὕλη, τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τέλος, τετραχῶς ἔσται ὁ διορισμός. ληπτέον οὖν πρῶτον τὸ γένος, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τῶν ἐπάνω τὰ ἐγγύτατα, μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν προσεχῆ διαφοράν. ἡ δὲ συνέχεια τῶν διαφορῶν τεμνομένη καὶ ἀποδιαιρουμένη τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκπληροῖ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ πάσας λέγειν ἑκάστου τὰς διαφοράς, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἰδοποιούσας. ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀνάλυσις καὶ σύνθεσις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ διαιρέσει καὶ ὁρισμῷ ἔοικεν, καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς διαιρέσεως ἐπὶ τὰ ἁπλούστερα καὶ ἀρχικώτερα ἀνατρέχομεν. τὸ γοῦν γένος τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος διαιροῦμεν εἰς τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αὐτῷ εἴδη, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον γένος ὂν εἰς τὰ ἐμφαινόμενα εἴδη διαιροῦμεν, τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ τὰ σύνθετα δοκοῦντα εἶναι γένη εἰς τὰ ἁπλούστερα εἴδη τέμνοντες ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ζητούμενον καὶ μηκέτι τομὴν ἐπιδεχόμενον παραγινόμεθα. τὸ γὰρ ζῷον εἰς τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον διελόντες, εἶτα μέντοι τὸ θνητὸν εἰς τὸ χερσαῖον καὶ ἔνυδρον, καὶ πάλιν τὸ χερσαῖον εἰς τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ πεζόν, καὶ οὕτως τὸ προσεχὲς τῷ ζητουμένῳ εἶδος, ὃ καὶ περιλαμβάνει τὸ ζητούμενον, διαιροῦντες ἀφιξόμεθα τέμνοντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἁπλούστατον εἶδος, ὅπερ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, μόνον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον περιλαμβάνει. πάλιν γὰρ τὸ πεζὸν εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαιρούμεθα. κἄπειτα τὰ προσεχῆ τῶν ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως λαμβανομένων εἰδῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκλεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπισυνθέντες εἰς ἕνα λόγον τὸν ὅρον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀποδίδομεν, ὅς ἐστι ζῷον θνητόν, χερσαῖον, πεζόν, λογικόν. Ὅθεν ὕλης μὲν τάξιν ἐπέχει ἡ διαίρεσις τῷ ὅρῳ, τὴν ἁπλότητα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀναζητοῦσα, τεχνίτου δὲ καὶ δημισυργοῦ ὁ ὅρος ἐπισυντιθεὶς καὶ κατασκευάζων καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ ὄντος παριστάς. οὔτ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε τῶν ἰδεῶν οἱ ὅροι, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὧν πραγμάτων ὧν ἔχομεν καθολικὰς διανοίας, τούτων τῶν διανοιῶν τοὺς ἑρμηνευτικοὺς λόγους [ὅρους] εἶναί φαμεν· τούτων γὰρ τῶν διανοιῶν καὶ αἱ διαιρέσεις γίνονται. τῶν δὲ διαιρέσεων ἣ μέν τις εἰς εἴδη διαιρεῖ τὸ διαιρούμενον ὡς γένος, ἣ δέ τις εἰς μέρη ὡς ὅλον, ἣ δὲ εἰς τὰ συμβεβηκότα. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὰ μέρη διαίρεσις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον κατὰ μέγεθος ἐπινοεῖται, ἡ δὲ εἰς τὰ συμβεβηκότα οὐδέποτε ὅλη δύναται διαληφθῆναι, εἴ γε καὶ οὐσίαν ἑκάστῳ δεῖ πάντως τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρχειν. ὅθεν ἀδόκιμοι ἄμφω αὗται αἱ διαιρέσεις, μόνη δὲ εὐδοκιμεῖ ἡ τοῦ γένους εἰς εἴδη τομή, ὑφ' ἧς χαρακτηρίζεται ἥ τε ταὐτότης ἡ κατὰ γένος ἥ τε ἑτερότης ἡ κατὰ τὰς ἰδικὰς διαφοράς. τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἔν τινι μέρει θεωρεῖται, οὐ μὴν ἀνάπαλιν, εἴ τι μέρος ἐστί τινος, τοῦτο καὶ εἶδος γενήσεται. ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ μέρος μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἶδος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐνυπάρχει, τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ βοΐ, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει, οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοῖς ποσὶν ὑπάρχει. διὸ κυριώτερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ μέρους, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους κατηγορεῖται, ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τοῦ εἴδους κατηγορηθήσεται. Ἄριστον μὲν οὖν εἰς δύο διαιρεῖν εἴδη τὸ γένος, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς τρία. τὰ τοίνυν εἴδη γενικώτερον μὲν διαιρούμενα χαρακτηρίζεται τῷ τε ταὐτῷ καὶ θατέρῳ, ἔπειτα δὲ διὰ τῶν γενικῶς σημαινομένων διαιρούμενα χαρακτηρίζεται. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ἤτοι οὐσία ἐστὶν (ὥσπερ ὅταν λέγωμεν· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα) ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ πότε [ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν] ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. παντὸς οὑτινοσοῦν ἐπιστήμων τίς ἐστι, τούτου καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀποδώσει, ὡς ὅ γε μὴ δυνάμενος λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν καὶ ὁρίσασθαι ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἐπιστήμων οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴη. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοῦ ὅρου ἀγνοίας καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀπάτας συμβαίνει. εἰ γὰρ ὁ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰδὼς ἔχει κατὰ διάνοιαν τὴν εἴδησιν αὐτοῦ, δύναται δὲ καὶ λόγῳ σαφηνίσαι ὃ διανοεῖται, ἡ δὲ τῆς διανοίας ἑρμηνεία ὅρος ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν εἰδότα τὸ πρᾶγμα δύνασθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀποδιδόναι. Προσλαμβάνεται δὲ ὅροις καὶ ἡ διαφορά, σημείου τάξιν ἐπέχουσα τῷ ὅρῳ. τῷ γοῦν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὅρῳ τὸ γελαστικὸν προστεθὲν ποιεῖ τὸ ὅλον ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, χερσαῖον, πεζόν, γελαστικόν. σημεῖα γάρ ἐστι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν προσαγόμενα τῷ ὅρῳ οἰκείων πραγμάτων, τὴν δὲ φύσιν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ἐνδείκνυται. αὐτίκα ἰδίου ἀπόδοσίν φασιν εἶναι τὴν διαφοράν. καὶ καθὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἔχον τὴν διαφοράν, ἣ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος ἐν τοῖς ὅροις, ἀνάγκη τὸ πρῶτον γένος ὡς ἀρχηγὸν καὶ ὑποστατὸν δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς μακροτέροις ὅροις τὸ πλῆθος τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν ἐξευρισκομένων διὰ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις τὰ προηγούμενα τῶν προσεχῶν εἰδῶν ληφθέντα τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν διασημαίνει τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ δὲ ἐλάχιστος ἐκ τριῶν συνέστηκεν, τοῦ γένους καὶ δυεῖν τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων εἰδῶν. γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο διὰ συντομίαν. φαμὲν οὖν, ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ζῷον [λογικόν,] γελαστικόν. τό τε ἐξαιρέτως συμβεβηκὸς τῷ ὁριζομένῳ προσπαραληπτέον, ἢ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ ἢ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον αὐτοῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων. ἐξηγητικὸς οὖν ὁ ὅρος ὢν τῆς τοῦ πράγματος οὐσίας περιλαβεῖν μὲν ἀκριβῶς τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ἀδυνατεῖ, διὰ δὲ τῶν κυριωτάτων εἰδῶν τὴν δήλωσιν τῆς οὐσίας ποιεῖται καὶ σχεδὸν ἐν ποιότητι ὁ ὅρος τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει.