155

of comprehension, knowledge is set before all in common, with the judgment of the senses 2.1.573 producing no doubt about the subject. For the differences of colors and of the other qualities, whatever we judge through the sense of hearing or smell or touch or taste, all we who share the same nature unanimously know and name, and whatever other matters encountered in life seem to have a more superficial comprehension, which are concerned with both the political 2.1.574 and the ethical aim of life. But in the contemplation of the intellectual nature, because it transcends sensory perception, with the thought conjecturally pursuing those things that escape sense-perception, we are moved in different ways concerning the object of inquiry, and according to the thought that arises in each person concerning the subject, as best we can, we declare what has been thought, approaching as much as possible the meaning of the things thought through the significance of words. 2.1.575 And in these matters, it is often possible for what is sought to be achieved by both, with the thought not failing to grasp the object of inquiry and the voice accurately declaring what is thought through fitting interpretation; but it is possible to fail in both, or at least in one of these, with either the apprehensive thought or the interpretive power 2.1.576 having missed the mark. Since, therefore, there are two things by which all discourse is guided, namely, the certainty of the mind and the utterance in words, it would be better to be successful in both, but it is no less good not to err from the proper conception, even if the expression happens to be inferior to the thought. When, therefore, the mind is occupied with high and invisible things, which the sense does not reach (I mean concerning the divine and ineffable nature, in which it is bold even to conceive something readily with the mind, and bolder still to entrust to chance words the interpretation of the conception that arises in us) then, bidding farewell to the sound in the words, which is uttered this way or that according to the ability of the speakers, we examine only the thought made manifest in the words, whether it is sound or otherwise, having conceded these verbal or nominal precisions 2.1.577 to the arts of the grammarians. Since, therefore, we signify only known things by a nominal designation, but it is not possible to apprehend things that are beyond knowledge with any signifying appellations (for how could anyone signify what is unknown?), for this reason, since no fitting appellation is found for them, which will sufficiently represent the subject, with many and various names, as best we can, we strive to reveal the notion 2.1.578 of the divine that has arisen in us. But indeed, the things that come under our apprehension are of such a kind that beings are in all cases contemplated either in some dimensional extension or provide the concept of a local space, in which each particular thing is apprehended to be, or by the circumscription according to beginning and end it comes within our view, being equally circumscribed at either limit by non-being (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its being begins from non-being and ends in non-being), or last of all we apprehend the phenomenon through the corporeal composition of qualities, with which corruption and passion and change and 2.1.579 alteration and such things are conjoined. For this reason, so that the transcendent nature might seem to have no affinity with things below, we use, with respect to the divine nature, thoughts and words that are separative of such things, calling that which is above the ages "before-the-ages" and that which is beyond beginning "without beginning" and that which is not completed "without end" and "incorporeal" that which has its subsistence without a body and that which does not corrupt "incorruptible" and that which is not subject to change or passion or alteration "impassible" and "immutable" and "unalterable". 2.1.580 But as for such names, let those who wish treat them technically as is pleasing to them, and names

155

τῆς κατανοήσεως κοινὴ πρόκειται πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις, οὐδεμίαν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφιβολίαν ἐμποιούσης 2.1.573 τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἐπικρίσεως. τάς τε γὰρ τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοράς, ὅσα δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἢ τὴν γεῦσιν αἰσθήσεως ἐπικρίνομεν, ὁμοφώνως πάντες οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοῦντες φύσεως γινώσκομέν τε καὶ ὀνομάζομεν, καὶ ὅσα τῶν λοιπῶν τὴν κατάληψιν ἐπιπολαιοτέραν ἔχειν δοκεῖ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστρεφομένων πραγμάτων, ἃ πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν 2.1.574 καὶ τὸν ἠθικὸν τοῦ βίου σκοπὸν καταγίνεται. ἐν δὲ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως διὰ τὸ ὑπερκεῖσθαι αὐτὴν τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καταλήψεως στοχαστικῶς τῆς διανοίας ἐπορε γομένης τῶν ἐκφευγόντων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἄλλοι ἄλλως κινού μεθά τε περὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐγγινομένην ἑκάστῳ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διάνοιαν, ὅπως ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, τὸ νοηθὲν ἐξαγγέλλομεν, ἐγγίζοντες ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν νοηθέντων διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεως. 2.1.575 ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστι μὲν πολλάκις καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρων κατορ θωθῆναι τὸ σπουδαζόμενον, τῆς τε διανοίας οὐχ ἁμαρτούσης τοῦ ζητουμένου καὶ τῆς φωνῆς εὐθυβόλως τὸ νοηθὲν διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς ἑρμηνείας ἐξαγγελλούσης· ἔστι δὲ τυχὸν καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου γε τούτων ἀποτυχεῖν, ἢ τῆς καταληπτικῆς διανοίας ἢ τῆς ἑρμηνευτικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ 2.1.576 προσήκοντος παρενεχθείσης. δύο τοίνυν ὄντων δι' ὧν ἅπας εὐθύνεται λόγος, τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ῥήμασι προφορᾶς, κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ δι' ἀμφοτέρων εὐδόκιμον, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ ἀγαθὸν τῆς προσηκούσης μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ὑπολήψεως, κἂν ὁ λόγος ἐλάττων τῆς διανοίας τύχῃ. ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀθεάτων ἡ διά νοια τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχῃ, ὧν οὐκ ἐφικνεῖται ἡ αἴσθησις (λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀφράστου φύσεως, ἐν οἷς τολμηρὸν μὲν καὶ τὸ προχείρως τι τῇ διανοίᾳ λαβεῖν, τολμηρότερον δὲ τὸ ταῖς ἐπιτυχούσαις ἐπιτρέπειν φωναῖς τὴν τῆς ἐγγι νομένης ἡμῖν ὑπολήψεως ἑρμηνείαν) τότε χαίρειν ἐάσαντες τὸν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἦχον, οὕτως ἢ ἑτέρως κατὰ τὴν δύ ναμιν τῶν φθεγγομένων ἐξαγγελλόμενον, μόνην ἐξετάζομεν τὴν διάνοιαν τὴν ἐμφαινομένην τοῖς ῥήμασιν, εἴτε ὑγιῶς εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, τὰς ῥηματικὰς ταύτας ἢ ὀνοματικὰς ἀκρι 2.1.577 βολογίας γραμματιστῶν τέχναις παραχωρήσαντες. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν μόνα τὰ γινωσκόμενα διὰ τῆς ὀνοματικῆς σημειού μεθα κλήσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν ὄντα σημειωτικαῖς τισι προσηγορίαις διαλαμβάνειν οὐχ οἷόν τε (πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ἀγνοούμενον σημειώσαιτο;) διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῶν προσφυοῦς εὑρισκομένης προσηγορίας, ἣ τὸ ὑποκεί μενον ἱκανῶς παραστήσει, πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις ὀνόμασιν, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ δυνατόν, ἀνακαλύψαι βιαζόμεθα τὴν ἐγγενομένην 2.1.578 ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ θείου ὑπόνοιαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ ὑπὸ κατά ληψιν ἡμετέραν ἐρχόμενα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὥστε πάντως ἢ ἐν διαστηματικῇ τινι παρατάσει θεωρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἢ τοπι κοῦ χωρήματος παρέχειν τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶναι καταλαμβάνεται, ἢ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος περιγραφῇ ἐντὸς γίνεται τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἐπίσης καθ' ἑκάτερον πέρας τῷ μὴ ὄντι περιγραφόμενα (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον τοῦ εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἄρχεται καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν καταλήγει), ἢ τὸ πάντων ἔσχατον διὰ τῆς σωματικῆς τῶν ποιοτήτων συνθήκης καταλαμβά νομεν τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾗ φθορὰ καὶ πάθος καὶ τροπὴ καὶ 2.1.579 ἀλλοίωσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα συνέζευκται. διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν οἰκειότητα πρὸς τὰ κάτω πράγματα ἡ ὑπερκει μένη φύσις ἔχειν δοκοίη, τοῖς ἀποχωριστικοῖς τῶν τοιούτων νοήμασί τε καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας κεχρήμεθα φύσεως, τὸ ὑπεράνω τῶν αἰώνων προαιώνιον λέγοντες καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀρχὴν ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ τελειούμενον ἀτελεύτητον ἀσώ ματόν τε τὸ χωρὶς σώματος τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον καὶ τὸ μὴ φθειρόμενον ἄφθαρτον καὶ τὸ τροπῆς ἢ πάθους ἢ ἀλλοιώσεως ἀνεπίδεκτον ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλ 2.1.580 λοίωτον. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τεχνολογούντων μὲν ὡς ἂν ᾖ φίλον αὐτοῖς οἱ βουλόμενοι καὶ ὀνόματα