Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?"

Objection 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (Article 1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 3; Question 6, Articles 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.

Objection 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."

I answer that, As appears from what was said (Article 1), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above (Question 4, Article 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said (Article 1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2, ad 2; Question 48, Article 2), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply to Objection 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply to Objection 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod summum bonum, quod est deus, sit causa mali.

Dicitur enim Isai. XLV, ego dominus, et non est alter deus, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum.

Et Amos III, si erit malum in civitate, quod dominus non fecerit.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, effectus causae secundae reducitur in causam primam.

Bonum autem est causa mali, cum igitur omnis boni causa sit deus, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod etiam omne malum sit a deo.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sicut dicitur in II physic., idem est causa salutis navis, et periculi.

Sed deus est causa salutis omnium rerum.

Ergo est ipse causa omnis perditionis et mali.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod deus non est auctor mali, quia non est causa tendendi ad non esse.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, semper causatur ex defectu agentis. In deo autem nullus defectus est, sed summa perfectio, ut supra ostensum est.

Unde malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, vel quod ex defectu agentis causatur, non reducitur in deum sicut in causam. Sed malum quod in corruptione rerum aliquarum consistit, reducitur in deum sicut in causam. Et hoc patet tam in naturalibus quam in voluntariis.

Dictum est enim quod aliquod agens, inquantum sua virtute producit aliquam formam ad quam sequitur corruptio et defectus, causat sua virtute illam corruptionem et defectum. Manifestum est autem quod forma quam principaliter deus intendit in rebus creatis, est bonum ordinis universi. Ordo autem universi requirit, ut supra dictum est, quod quaedam sint quae deficere possint, et interdum deficiant. Et sic deus, in rebus causando bonum ordinis universi, ex consequenti, et quasi per accidens, causat corruptiones rerum; secundum illud quod dicitur I Reg. II, dominus mortificat et vivificat.

Sed quod dicitur Sap. I, quod deus mortem non fecit, intelligitur quasi per se intentam.

Ad ordinem autem universi pertinet etiam ordo iustitiae, qui requirit ut peccatoribus poena inferatur. Et secundum hoc, deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa, ratione supra dicta.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de malo poenae, non autem de malo culpae.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod effectus causae secundae deficientis reducitur in causam primam non deficientem, quantum ad id quod habet entitatis et perfectionis, non autem quantum ad id quod habet de defectu. Sicut quidquid est motus in claudicatione, causatur a virtute motiva; sed quod est obliquitatis in ea, non est ex virtute motiva, sed ex curvitate cruris. Et similiter quidquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala, reducitur in deum sicut in causam, sed quod est ibi defectus, non causatur a deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod submersio navis attribuitur nautae ut causae, ex eo quod non agit quod requiritur ad salutem navis.

Sed deus non deficit ab agendo quod est necessarium ad salutem.

Unde non est simile.