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“But as for himself, should he be considered an enemy to himself, or how shall we put it? O Athenian stranger, for I would not be willing to call you Attic, for you seem to me more worthy to be named after the goddess; for by correctly tracing the argument back to its origin, you have made it clearer, so that you will more easily discover that we were right just now in stating that all are enemies to all, both in public and in private, and that they are each enemies to themselves. 12.27.2 How do you mean, O admirable one? And in this, O stranger, for a man to conquer himself is the first and best of all victories, but to be defeated by himself is of all things the most shameful and worst. For these things signify that there is a war in each of us against ourselves.” 12.27.3 And after other things, he adds to these, saying: “Shall we not then assume that each one of us is one? Yes. And that he possesses in himself two contrary and foolish counselors, which we call pleasure and pain? That is so. And besides these two, opinions about the future, whose common name is hope; but the hope that precedes pain is specially called fear, and the hope that precedes the contrary is called confidence. And on top of all these is calculation of what is better or worse for it; which, when it becomes a public decree of a city, is named law.” 12.27.4 And next he says: “This we know, that these passions in us are like certain indwelling cords or strings, which pull us and pull against one another, being contrary, toward contrary actions, wherein virtue and vice lie set apart. For the argument says that each person must always follow one of these pullings and never leave it, pulling against the other measures, and that this is the golden and sacred leading of calculation, called the common law of the city; and that the other cords are hard and of iron, while this one, being golden, is soft, and the others resemble forms of every kind. It is necessary, then, always to cooperate with the most beautiful leading of the law; for since calculation is noble, being gentle and not violent, its leading needs helpers, so that the golden kind within us may conquer the 12.27.5 other kinds. And so the tale of virtue about us as being puppets would be preserved, and the meaning of being stronger than or weaker than oneself would somehow become clearer, and that a city and a private person, the one having received a true account within himself concerning these pullings, must live by following this, while a city, having received an account either from some god or from this man who knows these things, must establish it as law and consort both with itself and with other cities; thus vice and virtue would be more clearly articulated for us.” 12.27.6 And among us, the divine word teaches similar things, saying: “I delight in the law of God according to the inward man, but I see another law warring against the law of my mind.” and again: “their thoughts among one another accusing or also defending” and whatever other things are similar to these.

12.28.1 28. THAT NOT THE BODY BUT THE SOUL IS THE CAUSE OF THE EVIL THINGS DONE BY US

“We remember, I suppose, having agreed in what went before that if the soul should prove to be older than the body, the things of the soul would also be older than those of the body. Certainly. Ways, then, and characters and wishes and calculations and true opinions, and cares and memories would have come into being earlier than the length of bodies and breadth and depth and strength, if indeed soul is also older than body. Necessarily. 12.28.2 Is it not necessary, then, to agree after this, that the soul is the cause of good and bad things, and of noble and shameful, of just and unjust, and of all the opposites, if indeed we are to posit it as the cause of all things

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«Αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν; Ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, οὐ γάρ σε Ἀττικὸν ἐθέλοιμ' ἂν προσαγορεύειν, δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀνευρήσεις ὅτι νῦν δὴ ὀρθῶς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐρρέθη τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσι δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστους αὐτοὺς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. 12.27.2 Πῶς εἴρηκας, ὦ θαυμάσιε; Κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον. ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πολέμου ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σημαίνει.» 12.27.3 Καὶ μεθ' ἕτερα τούτοις προστίθησι λέγων· «Οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν; Ναί. ∆ύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ ξυμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὣ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δὲ φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου. ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅ τί ποτ' αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον· ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.» 12.27.4 Καὶ ἑξῆς φησιν· «Τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσί τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλας ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπ' ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται. μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων ξυνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῆ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας. δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ ξυλλαμβάνειν· ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μένοντος πράου τε καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ 12.27.5 ἄλλα γένη. καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἥττω εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ φανερὸν ἂν γένοιτο μᾶλλον ὃ νοεῖ, καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην, τὸν μὲν λόγον ἀληθῆ λαβόντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῶν ἕλξεων τούτῳ ἑπόμενον δεῖ ζῆν, πόλιν δὲ ἢ παρὰ θεῶν τινος ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου γνόντος ταῦτα λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν νόμον θεμένην αὑτῇ τε ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν· οὕτω κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη.» 12.27.6 Καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος τὰ ὅμοια διδάσκει λόγος φάσκων· «Συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου.» καὶ πάλιν· «Μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων» ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις παραπλήσια.

12.28.1 κηʹ. ΟΤΙ ΟΥ ΤΟ ΣΩΜΑ ΑΛΛ' Η ΨΥΧΗ ΑΙΤΙΑ ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΚΩΣ ΥΦ' ΗΜΩΝ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΩΝ

«Μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος. Ἀνάγκη. 12.28.2 Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν