Chap. V.—Of the Creation of Man, and of the Arrangement of the World, and of the Chief Good.

Let us now assign the reason why He made man himself. For if the philosophers had known this, they would either have maintained those things which they had found to be true, or would not have fallen into the greatest errors. For this is the chief thing; this is the point on which everything turns. And if any one does not possess this, the truth altogether glides away from him. It is this, in short, which causes them to be inconsistent with reason;1293    Virg., Æneid, vi. 542.      Illis non quadrare rationem.   for if this had shone upon them, if they had known all the mystery1294    Posita sunt omnia. There is another reading, “posuit Deus omnia.”      Sacramentum.   of man, the Academy would never have been in entire opposition1295    Pignoribus.      De transverso jugulasset. The Academics, affirming that nothing was certain, opposed the tenets of the other philosophers, who maintained their own opinions respectively.   to their disputations, and to all philosophy. As, therefore, God did not make the world for His own sake, because He does not stand in need of its advantages, but for the sake of man, who has the use of it, so also He made man himself for His own sake. What advantage is there to God in man, says Epicurus, that He should make him for His own sake? Truly, that there might be one who might understand His works; who might be able both to admire with his understanding, and to express with his voice, the foresight displayed in their arrangement, the order of their creation, the power exerted in their completion. And the sum of all these things is, that he should worship God.1296    It was customary in many of the ancient states to connect the year with the name of the chief magistrate who was then in office. Thus at Athens the title of the chief magistrate was Archon Eponymus, giving name to the year; and at Rome, the year was reckoned by the names of the consuls then in office.      [The law of his being is stated in Bacon’s words: “Homo naturæ minister et interpres,” Nov. Org., i. 1. It is his duty to comprehend what he expounds, and to lend his voice to nature in the worship of God. See the Benedicite, or “Song of the Three Children,” in the apocryphal Bible.]   For he who understands these things worships Him; he follows Him with due veneration as the Maker of all things, He as his true Father, who measures the excellence of His majesty according to the invention, the commencement, and completion of His works. What more evident argument can be brought forward that God both made the world for the sake of man, and man for His own sake, than that he alone of all living creatures has been so formed that his eyes are directed towards heaven, his face looking towards God, his countenance is in fellowship with his Parent, so that God appears, as it were, with outstretched hand to have raised man from the ground, and to have elevated him to the contemplation of Himself. “What, then,” he says, “does the worship paid by man confer on God, who is blessed, and in want of nothing? Or if He gave such honour to man as to create the world for his sake, to furnish him with wisdom, to make him lord of all things living, and to love him as a son, why did He make him subject to death and decay? why did He expose the object of His love to all evils? when it was befitting that man should be happy, as though closely connected with God, and everlasting as He is, to the worship and contemplation of whom he was formed.”  

Although we have taught these things for the most part in a scattered manner in the former books, nevertheless, since the subject now specially requires it, because we have undertaken to discuss the subject of a happy life, these things are to be explained by us more carefully and fully, that the arrangement made by God, and His work and will, may be known. Though He was always able by His own immortal Spirit to produce innumerable souls, as He produced the angels, to whom there exists immortality without any danger and fear of evils, yet He devised an unspeakable work, in what manner He might create an infinite multitude of souls, which being at first united with frail and feeble bodies, He might place in the midst between good and evil, that He might set virtue before them composed as they were of both natures; that they might not attain to immortality by a delicate and easy course of life, but might arrive at that unspeakable reward of eternal life with the utmost difficulty and great labours. Therefore, that He might clothe them with limbs which were heavy and liable to injury,1297    [Ut infinita et perpetua potestate dominos se dici velint universi generis humani. A bold hint to Constantine.]      Vexabilibus.   since they were unable to exist in the middle void, the weight and gravity of the body sinking downwards, He determined that an abode and dwelling-place should first be built for them. And thus with unspeakable energy and power He contrived the surpassing works of the world; and having suspended the light elements on high, and depressed the heavy ones to the depths below, He strengthened the heavenly things, and established the earthly. It is not necessary at present to follow out each point separately, since we discussed them all together in the second book.  

Therefore He placed in the heaven lights, whose regularity, and brightness, and motion, were most suitably proportioned to the advantage of living beings. Moreover, He gave to the earth, which He designed as their dwelling-place, fruitfulness for bringing forth and producing various1298    Variis. Another reading is “vanis.”      Varia. Others read, “fæcunditatem variam generandi.”   things, that by the abundance of fruits and green herbs it might supply nourishment according to the nature and requirements of each kind. Then, when He had completed all things which belonged to the condition of the world, He formed man from the earth itself, which He prepared for him from the beginning as a habitation; that is, He clothed and covered his spirit with an earthly body, that, being compacted of different and opposing materials, he might be susceptible of good and evil; and as the earth itself is fruitful for the bringing forth of grain, so the body of man, which was taken from the earth, received the power of producing offspring, that, inasmuch as he was formed of a fragile substance, and could not exist for ever, when the space of his temporal life was past, he might depart, and by a perpetual succession renew that which he bore, which was frail and feeble. Why, then, did He make him frail and mortal, when He had built the world for his sake? First of all, that an infinite number of living beings might be produced, and that He might fill all the earth with a multitude; in the next place, that He might set before man virtue, that is, endurance of evils and labours, by which he might be able to gain the reward of immortality. For since man consists of two parts, body and soul, of which the one is earthly, the other heavenly, two lives have been assigned to man: the one temporal, which is appointed for the body; the other everlasting, which belongs to the soul. We received the former at our birth we attain to the latter by striving, that immortality might not exist to man without any difficulty. That earthly one is as the body, and therefore has an end; but this heavenly one is as the soul, and therefore has no limit. We received the first when we were ignorant of it, this second knowingly; for it is given to virtue, not to nature, because God wished that we should procure life for ourselves in life.  

For this reason He has given us this present life, that we may either lose that true and eternal life by our vices, or win it1299    Philosophiam in oculos impingit. [A warning to the emperor, a reflection on such as the Antonines, and a prolepsis of Julian.]      Mereamur.   by virtue. The chief good is not contained in this bodily life, since, as it was given to us by divine necessity, so it will again be destroyed by divine necessity. Thus that which has an end does not contain the chief good. But the chief good is contained in that spiritual life which we acquire by ourselves, because it cannot contain evil, or have an end; to which subject nature and the system of the body afford an argument. For other animals incline towards the ground, because they are earthly, and are incapable of immortality, which is from heaven; but man is upright and looks towards heaven,1300    [Our author never wearies of this reference to Ovid’s beautiful verses. Compare Cowper (Task, book v.) as follows:—     “Brutes graze the mountain-top with faces prone     And eyes intent upon the scanty herb     It yields them; or, recumbent on its brow,     Ruminate heedless of the scene outspread     Beneath, beyond, and stretching far away     From inland regions to the distant main.     Not so the mind that has been touched from heaven.     . . . She often holds,     With those fair ministers of light to man     That nightly fill the skies with silent pomp,     Sweet conference,” etc.]   because immortality is proposed to him; which, however, does not come, unless it is given to man by God. For otherwise there would be no difference between the just and the unjust, since every man who is born would become immortal. Immortality, then, is not the consequence1301    Sequela.   of nature, but the reward and recompense of virtue. Lastly, man does not immediately upon his birth walk upright, but at first on all fours,1302    Quadrupes.   because the nature of his body and of this present life is common to us with the dumb animals; afterwards, when his strength is confirmed, he raises himself, and his tongue is loosened so that he speaks plainly, and he ceases to be a dumb animal. And this argument teaches that man is born mortal; but that he afterwards becomes immortal, when he begins to live in conformity with the will1303    Ex Deo.   of God, that is, to follow righteousness,1304    [Justitiam sequi. I have substituted righteousness for the translator’s justice here (see c. 25, p. 126, supra). Coleridge remarks on the weakness of the latter word. It may be, our author is quoting St. Paul (1 Tim. vi. 11 and 2 Tim. ii.), sectare justitiam, “follow after righteousness.”]   which is comprised in the worship of God, since God raised man to a view of the heaven and of Himself. And this takes place when man, purified in the heavenly laver, lays aside1305    Exponit.   his infancy together with all the pollution of his past life, and having received an increase of divine vigour, becomes a perfect and complete man.  

Therefore, because God has set forth virtue before man, although the soul and the body are connected together, yet they are contrary, and oppose one another. The things which are good for the soul are evil to the body, that is, the avoiding of riches, the prohibiting of pleasures, the contempt of pain and death. In like manner, the things which are good for the body are evil to the soul, that is, desire and lust, by which riches are desired, and the enjoyments of various pleasures, by which the soul is weakened and destroyed.1306    Enervatus exstinguitur.   Therefore it is necessary, that the just and wise man should be engaged in all evils, since fortitude is victorious over evils; but the unjust in riches, in honours, in power. For these goods relate to the body, and are earthly; and these men also lead an earthly life, nor are they able to attain to immortality, because they have given themselves up to pleasures which are the enemies of virtue. Therefore this temporal life ought to be subject to that eternal life, as the body is to the soul. Whoever, then, prefers the life of the soul must despise the life of the body; nor will he in any other way be able to strive after that which is highest, unless he shall have despised the things which are lowest. But he who shall have embraced the life of the body, and shall have turned his desires downwards1307    In terram dejecerit.   to the earth, is unable to attain to that higher life. But he who prefers to live well for eternity, will live badly1308    i.e., “in discomfort,” liable to the evils of this life.   for a time, and will be subjected to all troubles and labours as long as he shall be on earth, that he may have divine and heavenly consolation. And he who shall prefer to live well1309    i.e., in comfort and luxury. On the whole passage see John xii. 25: “He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world, shall keep it unto life eternal.”   for a time, will live ill to eternity; for he will be condemned by the sentence of God to eternal punishment, because he has preferred earthly to heavenly goods. On this account, therefore, God seeks to be worshipped, and to be honoured by man as a Father, that he may have virtue and wisdom, which alone produce immortality. For because no other but Himself is able to confer that immortality, since He alone possesses it, He will grant1310    Afficiet. Others read “afficit.”   to the piety of the man, with which he has honoured God, this reward, to be blessed to all eternity, and to be for ever in the presence of God and in the society of God.  

N.B.—The following paragraphs to the end of the chapter are wanting many mss., and it is very doubtful whether they were written by Lactantius.  

Nor can any one shelter himself under the pretext that the fault belongs to Him who made both good and evil. For why did He will that evil should exist if He hated it? Why did He not make good only, that no one might sin, no one commit evil? Although I have explained this in almost all the former books, and have touched upon it, though slightly, above, yet it must be mentioned repeatedly, because the whole matter turns on this point. For there could be no virtue unless He had made contrary things; nor can the power of good be at all manifest, except from a comparison with evil. Thus evil is nothing else but the explanation of good. Therefore if evil is taken away, good must also be taken away. If you shall cut off your left hand or foot, your body will not be entire, nor will life itself remain the same. Thus, for the due adjustment of the framework of the body, the left members are most suitably joined with the right. In like manner, if you make chessmen1311    Calculi, called also “latrunculi.” There were two sets, the one white, the other red or black.   all alike, no one will play. If you shall give one colour1312    The chariot-drivers in the contests of the circus were distinguished by different colours. Originally there were but two factions or parties, the white and the red; afterwards they were increased to four, the green and the azure being added. Domitian increased the number to six, but this was not in accordance with the usual practise.   only to the circus, no one will think it worth while to be a spectator, all the pleasure of the Circensian games being taken away. For he who first instituted the games was a favourer of one colour; but he introduced another as a rival, that there might be a contest, and some partisanship1313    Gratia. Thus Pliny, “Tanta gratia, tanta auctoritas in unâ vilissimâ tunicâ.” Cf. Juv., Sat., xi. 195. Gibbon thus describes the scene: “The spectators remained in eager attention, their eyes fixed on the charioteers, their minds agitated with hope and fear for the success of the colour which they favoured.”   in the spectacle. Thus God, when He was fixing that which was good, and giving virtue, appointed also their contraries, with which they might contend. If an enemy and a fight be wanting, there is no victory. Take away a contest, and even virtue is nothing. How many are the mutual contests of men, and with what various arts are they carried on! No one, however, would be regarded as surpassing in bravery, swiftness, or excellence, if he bad no adversary with whom he might contend. And where victory is wanting, there also glory and the reward of victory must be absent together with it. Therefore, that he might strengthen virtue itself by continual exercise, and might make it perfect from its conflict with evils, He gave both together, because each of the two without the other is unable to retain its force. Therefore there is diversity, on which the whole system of truth depends.  

It does not escape my notice what may here be urged in opposition by more skilful persons. If good cannot exist without evil, how do you say that, before he had offended God, the first man lived in the exercise of good only, or that he will hereafter live in the exercise of good only? This question is to be examined by us, for in the former books I omitted it, that I might here fill up the subject. We have said above that the nature of man is made up of opposing elements; for the body, because it is earth, is capable of being grasped, of temporary duration, senseless, and dark. But the soul, because it is from heaven, is unsubstantial,1314    Tenuis.   everlasting, endued with sensibility, and full of lustre;1315    Illustris.   and because these qualities are opposed to one another, it follows of necessity that man is subject to good and evil. Good is ascribed to the soul, because it is incapable of dissolution; evil to the body, because it is frail. Since, therefore, the body and the soul are connected and united together, the good and the evil must necessarily hold together; nor can they be separated from one another, unless when they (the body and soul) are separated. Finally, the knowledge of good and of evil was given at the same time to the first man; and when he understood this, he was immediately driven from the holy place in which there is no evil; for when he was conversant with that which was good only, he was ignorant that this itself was good. But after that he had received the knowledge of good and evil, it was now unlawful for him to remain in that place of happiness, and he was banished to this common world, that he might at once experience both of those things with the nature of which he had at once become acquainted. It is plain, therefore, that wisdom has been given to man that he may distinguish good from evil—that he may discriminate between things advantageous and things disadvantageous, between things useful and things useless—that he may have judgment and consideration as to what he ought to guard against, what to desire, what to avoid, and what to follow. Wisdom therefore cannot exist without evil; and that first author1316    Princeps.   of the human race, as long as he was conversant with good only, lived as an infant, ignorant of good and evil. But, indeed, hereafter man must be both wise and happy without any evil; but this cannot take place as long as the soul is clothed with the abode of the body.  

But when a separation shall have been made between the body and the soul, then evil will be disunited from good; and as the body perishes and the soul remains, so evil will perish and good be permanent. Then man, having received the garment of immortality, will be wise and free from evil, as God is. He, therefore, who wishes that we should be conversant with good only, especially desires this, that we should live without the body, in which evil is. But if evil is taken away, either wisdom, as I have said, or the body, will be taken from man; wisdom, that he may be ignorant of evil; the body, that he may not be sensible of it. But now, since man is furnished with wisdom to know, and a body to perceive, God willed that both should exist alike in this life, that virtue and wisdom may be in agreement. Therefore He placed man in the midst, between both, that he might have liberty to follow either good or evil. But He mingled with evil some things which appear good, that is, various and delightful enjoyments, that by the enticements of these He might lead men to the concealed evil. And He likewise mingled with good some things which appear evil—that is, hardships, and miseries, and labours—by the harshness and unpleasantness of which the soul, being offended, might shrink back from the concealed good. But here the office of wisdom is needed, that we may see more with the mind than with the body, which very few are able to do; because while virtue is difficult and rarely to be found, pleasure is common and public. Thus it necessarily happens that the wise man is accounted as a fool, who, while he seeks good things which are not seen, permits those which are seen to slip from his hands; and while he avoids evils which are not seen, runs into evils which are before the eyes; which happens to us when we refuse neither torture nor death in behalf of the faith, since we are driven to the greatest wickedness, so as to betray the faith and deny the true God, and to sacrifice to dead and death-bearing gods. This is the cause why God made man mortal, and made him subject to evils, although he had framed the world for his sake, namely, that he might be capable of virtue, and that his virtue might reward him with immortality. Now virtue, as we have shown, is the worship of the true God.  

CAPUT V. De hominis creatione, atque de dispositione mundi, et de summo bono.

Reddamus nunc rationem, quare hominem ipsum 0749B fecerit Deus. Quod si philosophi scissent, aut defendissent illa, quae vera invenerant, aut in maximos errores non incidissent. Haec enim summa, hic cardo rerum est. Quem qui non tenuerit, veritas illi omnis elabitur. Hoc est denique, quod efficiat illis non quadrare rationem: quae illis si affulsisset, si sacramentum hominis omne cognovissent, numquam disputationes eorum, et omnem philosophiam de transverso academia jugulasset. Sicut ergo mundum non propter se Deus fecit, quia commodis ejus non indiget, sed propter hominem, qui eo utitur; ita ipsum hominem propter se. Quae utilitas Deo in homine, inquit Epicurus, ut eum propter se faceret? Scilicet, ut esset, qui opera ejus intelligeret, qui providentiam disponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem 0749C consummandi et sensu admirari, et voce proloqui posset. Quorum omnium summa haec est, ut Deum colat. Is enim colit, qui haec intelligit: is artificem rerum omnium, is verum patrem suum debita veneratione 0750A prosequitur, qui virtutem majestatis ejus de suorum operum inventione, inceptione, perfectione metitur. Quod planius argumentum proferri potest, et mundum hominis, et hominem sui causa Deum fecisse, quam quod ex omnibus animantibus solus ita formatus est, ut oculi ejus ad coelum directi, facies ad Deum spectans, vultus cum suo parente communis sit, ut videatur hominem Deus, quasi porrecta manu allevatum ex humo, ad contemplationem sui excitasse? «Quid ergo, inquit, Deo cultus hominis confert, beato, et nulla re indigenti? vel si tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipsius causa mundum fabricaret, ut instrueret eum sapientia, ut dominum viventium faceret, eumque diligeret tamquam filium, cur mortalemque fragilemque constituit? cur omnibus 0750B malis, quem diligebat, objecit? cum oporteret et beatum esse hominem, tamquam conjunctum et proximum Deo, et perpetuum, sicut est ipse, ad quem colendum et contemplandum figuratus est.»

Quamquam haec fere in prioribus libris sparsim docuimus: tamen quoniam proprie id materia nunc exigit, quia de vita beata disserere propositum est, explicanda sunt ista diligentius et plenius, ut dispositio Dei, et opus voluntasque noscatur. Cum posset semper spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare, sicut angelos genuit, quibus immortalitas sine ullo malorum periculo ac metu constat; excogitavit tamen inenarrabile opus, quemadmodum infinitam multitudinem crearet animarum, quas primo fragilibus et imbecillis corporibus illigatas 0750C constitueret inter bonum malumque medias, ut constantibus ex utrisque naturis virtutem proponeret; ne immortalitatem delicate assequerentur ac molliter: sed ad illud aeternae vitae ineloquibile praemium 0751A summa cum difficultate ac magnis laboribus pervenirent. Ergo ut eas gravibus et vexabilibus membris 0751A indueret, quoniam consistere in medio inani non poterant, ponderibus et gravitate corporis deorsum premente, sedem illis ac domicilium primo condendum esse decrevit. Itaque ineffabili virtute ac potentia praeclara mundi opera molitus est, suspensis in altitudinem levibus elementis, et gravibus in ima depressis; et coelestia firmavit, et terrena constituit. Non est necesse nunc exequi singula, quoniam in secundo libro universa executi sumus.

Lumina igitur posuit in coelo, quorum moderatio, et claritas, et motus aptissime ad utilitates viventium temperatus est. Terrae autem, quam sedem voluit esse, foecunditatem varia gignendi ac proferendi dedit, 0751B ut ubertate frugum et herbarum virentium, pro natura et usu cujusque generis, alimoniam administraret. Tum perfectis omnibus, quae ad conditionem mundi pertinebant, hominem finxit ex ipsa terra, quam illi a principio in habitaculum praeparavit; id est spiritum suum terreno corpore induit et involvit, ut et compactus ex rebus diversis ac repugnantibus, 0752A bonum ac malum caperet; et sicut terra ipsa fecunda est ad fruges pariendas: ita corpus hominis, quod assumptum est e terra, generandi copiam, facultatemque procreandae sobolis accepit, ut quoniam fragili materia formatus in aeternum manere non poterat, peracto temporalis vitae spatio cederet, et illud, quod fragile atque imbecillum gerebat, perpetua successione renovaret. Cur igitur eum mortalem finxit et fragilem, cum illius causa mundum aedificasset? Primum, ut infinita vis animarum gigneretur, omnemque terram multitudine oppleret: deinde, ut proponeret homini virtutem, id est, tolerantiam malorum ac laborum, per quam posset praemium immortalitatis adipisci. Nam quia homo ex duabus rebus constat, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum 0752B est, alterum coeleste, duae vitae homine attributae sunt: una temporalis, quae corpori assignatur; altera sempiterna, quae animae subjacet. Illam nascendo accipimus, hanc assequimur laborando ne immortalitas homini (ut ante diximus) sine ulla difficultate constaret. Illa terrena est, sicut corpus, et ideo finitur; haec vero coelestis; sicut anima, et ideo terminum non 0753A habet. Illam primam nescientes accipimus; 0753A hanc secundam scientes; virtuti enim, non naturae datur, quia voluit nos Deus vitam nobis in vita comparare.

Idcirco hanc nobis praesentem dedit, ut illam veram et perpetuam aut vitiis amittamus, aut virtute mereamur. In hac corporali non est summum bonum; quoniam sicut necessitate divina nobis data est, ita rursum divina necessitate solvetur. Ita quod finem habet, summum bonum non habet. In illa vero spiritali, quam per nos ipsi acquirimus, summum bonum continetur; quia nec malum potest habere, nec finem. Cui rei argumentum natura et ratio corporis praebet. Caetera namque animalia in humum vergunt, quia terrena sunt; nec capiunt immortalitatem, quae de coelo est. Homo autem rectus in coelum spectat, quia proposita 0753B est illi immortalitas; nec tamen venit, nisi tribuatur homini a Deo. Nam nihil interesset inter justum et injustum, siquidem omnis homo natus immortalis fieret; ergo immortalitas non sequela naturae, sed merces praemiumque virtutis est. Denique homo non statim quam natus est, rectus ingreditur: sed quadrupes primo, quia ratio corporis et hujus praesentis vitae communis est nobis cum mutis animalibus; post deinde confirmatis viribus erigitur, et lingua ejus in eloquium solvitur, et mutum animal esse desinit. Quae ratio docet, mortalem nasci hominem; postea vero immortalem fieri, cum coeperit ex Deo vivere, id est, justitiam sequi, quae continetur in Dei cultu, cum excitaverit hominem Deus ad aspectum coeli ac sui. Quod tum fit, cum homo coelesti lavacro purificatus, 0753C exponit infantiam cum omni labe vitae prioris, et incremento divini vigoris accepto, fit homo perfectus ac plenus.

0754A Ergo quia virtutem proposuit homini Deus, licet anima et corpus consociata sint; tamen contraria sunt, et impugnant invicem. Animi bona, mala sunt corporis; id est, opum fuga, voluptatum interdictio, doloris mortisque contemptus. Item corporis bona, mala sunt animi; hoc est, cupiditas, et libido, quibus et opes appetuntur et suavitates variarum voluptatum, quibus enervatus animus extinguitur. Ideo necesse est, justum et sapientem in omnibus malis esse, quoniam malorum victrix est fortitudo; injustos autem in divitiis, in honore, in potestate. Haec enim bona corporalia et terrena sunt. Illi autem terrenam vitam agunt, nec assequi immortalitatem queunt, quia se voluptatibus dediderunt, quae sunt virtutis inimicae. Itaque vita haec temporalis illi aeternae debet esse 0754B subjecta, sicut corpus animae. Quisquis ergo animae vitam maluerit, vitam corporis contemnat necesse est; nec aliter eniti ad summum poterit, nisi quae sunt ima despexerit. Qui autem corporis vitam fuerit amplexus, et cupiditates suas in terram dejecerit, illam superiorem vitam consequi non potest. Sed qui mavult bene vivere in aeternum, male vivet ad tempus, et afficietur omnibus molestiis et laboribus, quandiu fuerit in terra, ut habeat divinum et coeleste solatium. Et qui maluerit bene vivere ad tempus, male vivet in aeternum; damnabitur enim sententia Dei ad aeternam poenam, quia coelestibus bonis terrena praeposuit. Propterea igitur coli se Deus expetit, et honorari ab homine tanquam pater, ut virtutem ac sapientiam teneat, quae sola immortalitatem parit. 0754C Nam quia nullus alius praeter ipsum donare eam potest, quia solus possidet, pietatem hominis, qua Deum 0755A honoraverit, hoc afficiet praemio, ut sit in aeternum beatus, sitque apud Deum, et cum Deo semper.

0755A

Quae sequuntur in quibusdam manuscriptis ac in antiquis editionibus reperi. Ea tamen Lactantio abjudicant recentiores interpretes: sed ne aliquid desit, hic apponere visum est; ac monemus ea non esse apprime catholica: sic autem habent.

«Neque nunc aliquis eo confugiat, ut dicat ad ipsius culpam pertinere, qui et bonum instituit, et malum. Cur enim malum voluit esse, si id odio habet? Cur non bonum tantum fecit, ut nemo peccaret, nemo faceret malum? Quanquam hoc in omnibus fere prioribus libris docuerim, et id jam superius, quamvis leviter, attigerim; tamen subinde admonendum est, quia omnis ratio in eo posita est. Nulla enim virtus 0755B esse poterat, nisi diversa fecisset; nec omnino apparere vis boni potest, nisi ex mali comparatione. Adeo malum nihil aliud est, quam boni interpretatio. Sublato igitur malo, etiam bonum tolli necesse est. Si laevam manum, aut pedem amputaveris, nec corpus erit integrum, nec vita ipsa constabit. Adeo ad compagem corporis temperandam, aptissime cum dextris sinistra junguntur. Item si pares calculos feceris, nemo ludet. Si unum colorem Circo dederis, nemo spectandum putabit, sublata omni Circensium voluptate. Quos profecto qui prius instituit, amator unius coloris fuit: sed alterum ei, quasi aemulum posuit, ut posset esse certamen, et aliqua in spectaculo gratia. Sic Deus, quum bonum constitueret, quum virtutem daret, statuit etiam diversa, cum quibus illa confligerent. 0755C Si desit hostis, et pugna, nulla victoria est. Tolle certamen, ne virtus quidem quidquam est. Quam multa sunt hominum inter se, et quam variis artibus constituta certamina? Nemo tamen fortior, velocior, praestantior haberetur, si adversarium, cum quo contenderet, non haberet. Unde autem abest victoria, abesse hinc et gloriam simul, et praemium necesse est. Ut igitur virtutem ipsam exercitatione assidua roboraret, eamque faceret de malorum conflictatione perfectam, utrumque simul dedit, quia utrumque sine altero retinere vim suam non potest. Ergo diversitas est, cui omnis ratio veritatis innititur.

«Non me praeterit, quid hoc loco a peritioribus possit opponi. Si bonum sine malo esse non potest, quomodo primum hominem dicis ante offensum Deum 0755D in solo bono fuisse, aut postea in solo bono futurum? Discutienda nobis haec quaestio est: quod in prioribus 0756A libris praetermisi, ut hic implerem. Diximus superius, ex elementis repugnantibus hominis constare naturam. Corpus enim, quia terra est, comprehensibile est, temporale, brutum, atque tenebrosum est. Anima vero, quia de coelo est, tenuis, aeterna, sensibilis, illustris est. Quae quia inter se contraria sunt, necesse est, hominem bono et malo esse subjectum. Animae adscribitur bonum, quia indissolubilis est: corpori malum; quia fragile est. Quoniam igitur sociata et conjuncta sunt corpus et anima, aeque bonum et malum cohaereat necesse est; nec separari alterutro possunt, nisi quum illa separata sunt. Denique boni malique notitia simul homini primo data est. Qua percepta, statim de loco sancto pulsus est, in quo malum non est. Ubi cum esset in bono 0756B tantum, id ipsum bonum esse, ignorabat. Postquam vero accepit boni malique intelligentiam, jam nefas erat, eum in beatitudinis loco morari, relegatusque est in hunc communem orbem, ut ea utraque simul experiretur, quorum naturam pariter agnoverat. Apparet ergo idcirco datam esse homini sapientiam, ut bonum discernat a malo; ut ab incommodis commoda, ab inutilibus utilia distinguat; ut habeat judicium, et considerantiam, quid cavere, quid appetere, quid fugere, quid sequi debeat. Sapientia igitur constare sine malo non potest; vixitque ille princeps generis humani, quamdiu in solo bono fuit, velut infans, boni ac mali nescius. At enim postea hominem necesse est et sapientem esse, et sine ullo malo beatum. Sed id fieri non potest, quamdiu anima domicilio corporis induta est.

0756C «Quum vero factum fuerit corporis animaeque dissidium, tunc malum a bono separabitur. Et sicut corpus interit, anima manet; ita malum interibit, et bonum permanebit. Tunc homo accepto immortalitatis indumento, erit sapiens, expers mali, sicut Deus. Qui ergo vult nos in bono esse tantum, id potissimum desiderat, ut sine corpore vivamus, in quo est malum. Quod si tollatur, aut sapientia homini, ut dixi, aut corpus adimetur: sapientia, ut ignoret malum; corpus, ut non sentiat. Nunc autem cum homo et sapientia sit instructus, ut sciat, et corpore, ut sentiat, utrumque pariter in hac vita Deus esse voluit, ut ratio virtutis sapientiaeque constaret. Posuit itaque hominem inter utrumque medium, ut haberet licentiam vel mali, vel boni sequendi. Sed 0756D malo admiscuit apparentia quaedam bona, id est varias et delectabiles suavitates, ut earum illecebris induceret 0757A hominem ad latens malum. Bono autem admiscuit apparentia quaedam mala, id est, aerumnas, et miserias, et labores, quorum asperitate ac molestia offensus animus refugeret a bono latenti. Hic ergo sapientiae officium desideratur, ut plus mente videamus, quam corpore: quod pauci admodum facere possunt; quia et virtus difficilis ac rara est, et voluptas communis ac publica. Ita necesse est, sapientem pro stulto haberi, qui dum appetit bona, quae non cernuntur, dimittit e manibus, quae videntur; et dum vitat mala, quae non aspiciuntur, incurrit in mala, quae ante oculos sunt. Quod accidit nobis, cum neque cruciatum, neque mortem pro fide recusamus: quando ad summum nefas compellimur, ut prodita fide atque abnegato Deo vero, diis mortuis 0757B mortiferisque libemus. Haec ratio est, cur hominem Deus et mortalem fecerit, et malis subjecerit; licet ipsius causa mundum aedificasset, scilicet ut virtutem caperet, et ei virtus sua immortalitatem daret. Virtus autem, sicut ostendimus, veri Dei cultus est.»