Chap. VIII.—Of the Immortality of the Soul.

The one chief good, therefore, is immortality, for the reception of which we were originally formed and born. To this we direct our course; human nature regards this; to this virtue exalts us. And because we have discovered this good, it remains that we should also speak of immortality itself. The arguments of Plato, although they contribute much to the subject, have little strength to prove and fill up the truth, since he had neither summed up and collected into one the plan of the whole of this great mystery, nor had he comprehended the chief good. For although he perceived the truth respecting the immortality of the soul, yet he did not speak respecting it as though it were the chief good. We, therefore, are able to elicit the truth by more certain signs; for we have not collected it by doubtful surmise,1331    Suspicione.   but have known it by divine instruction. Now Plato thus reasoned, that whatever has perception by itself, and always moves, is immortal; for that that which has no beginning of motion is not about to have an end, because it cannot be deserted by itself. But this argument would give eternal existence even to dumb animals, unless he had made a distinction by the addition of wisdom. He added, therefore, that he might escape this common1332    Communitatem.   linking together, that the soul of man could not be otherwise than immortal, since its wonderful skill in invention, its quickness in reflection, and its readiness in perceiving and learning, its memory of the past, and its foresight of the future, and its knowledge of innumerable arts and subjects, which other living creatures do not possess, appear divine and heavenly; because of the soul, which conceives such great things, and contains such great things, no origin can be found on earth, since it has nothing of earthly admixture united with it. But that which is ponderous in man, and liable to dissolution, must be resolved into earth; whereas that which is slight and subtle is incapable of division, and when freed from the abode of the body, as from prison, it flies to the heaven, and to its own nature. This is a brief summary of the tenets of Plato, which are widely and copiously explained in his own writings.  

Pythagoras also was previously of the same sentiments, and his teacher Pherecydes, whom Cicero reported to have been the first who discoursed respecting the immortality of the soul. And although all these excelled in eloquence, nevertheless in this contest at least, those who argued against this opinion had no less authority; Dicæarchus first, then Democritus, and lastly Epicurus: so that the matter itself, respecting which they were contending, was called into doubt. Finally, Tullius also having set forth the opinions of all these respecting immortality and death, declared that he did not know what was the truth. “Which of these opinions is true,” he said, “some God may see.”1333    [“We must wait patiently,” said Socrates, “until some one, either a god or man, teach us our moral and religious duties, and remove the darkness from our eyes.”—Alcibiad , ii., Opera, vol. v. p. 101, Bipont.]   And again he says in another place: “Since each of these opinions had most learned defenders, it cannot be divined what is certainty.” But we have no need of divination, since the divinity itself has laid open to us the truth.  

0761B CAPUT VIII. De immortalitate animae.

Unum est igitur summum bonum immortalitas, ad quam capiendam, et formati a principio, et nati sumus. Ad hanc tendimus; hanc spectat humana natura; 0762A ad hanc nos provehit virtus: quod bonum quia deprehendimus, superest etiam ut de ipsa immortalitate dicamus. Platonis argumenta, quamvis ad rem multum conferant, tamen parum habent firmitatis ad probandam et implendam veritatem; quoniam nec rationem totius mysterii magni consummaverat, in unumque collegerat, nec summum bonum comprehenderat. Nam licet verum de animae immortalitate sentiret, tamen non ita de illa tanquam de summo bono disserebat. Nos igitur certioribus signis elicere possumus veritatem, qui eam non ancipiti suspicione collegimus, sed divina traditione cognovimus. Plato autem sic argumentatus est, immortale esse quidquid per seipsum et sentit, et semper movetur; quod enim principium motus non habet, nec finem habiturum, 0762B quia deseri a semetipso non potest. Quod argumentum etiam mutis animalibus aeternitatem daret, nisi adjectione sapientiae discrevisset. Addidit igitur, ut effugeret hanc communitatem, fieri non posse, quin sit immortalis animus humanus, cujus miranda solertia inveniendi, et celeritas cogitandi, et facilitas percipiendi atque discendi, et memoria praeteritorum, 0763A et providentia futurorum, et artium plerumque 0763A innumerabilium scientia, qua caeterae careant animantes, divina et coelestis appareat: quia et origo animi, qui tanta capiat, tanta contineat, nulla reperiatur in terra; siquidem ex concretione terrena nihil habeat admistum: sed necesse esse in terram resolvi, quod est in homine ponderosum et dissolubile; quod autem tenue atque subtile, id vero esse individuum, ac domicilio corporis velut carcere liberatum, ad coelum et ad naturam suam pervolare. Haec fere Platonis collecta breviter, quae apud ipsum late copioseque explicantur.

In eadem sententia fuit etiam Pythagoras antea, ejusque praeceptor Pherecydes, quem Cicero tradit primum de aeternitate animarum disputavisse. Qui 0763B omnes licet eloquentia excellerent; tamen in hac duntaxat contentione non minus auctoritatis habuerunt, qui contra hanc sententiam disserebant, Dicaearchus primo, deinde Democritus, postremo Epicurus: adeo ut res ipsa, de qua inter se pugnabant, in dubium vocaretur. Denique et Tullius, expositis horum omnium de immortalitate ac morte sententiis, nescire se quid sit verum, pronuntiavit. «Harum, inquit, sententiarum quae vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit.» Et rursus alibi: «Quoniam utraque, inquit, earum sententiarum doctissimos habuit auctores; nec quid certi sit divinari potest.» Verum nobis divinatione opus non est, quibus veritatem divinitas ipsa patefecit.