Chap. IX.—Of the Immortality of the Soul, and of Virtue.

By these arguments, therefore, which neither Plato nor any other invented, the immorality of souls can be proved and perceived: which arguments we will briefly collect, since my discourse hastens on to relate the great judgment of God, which will be celebrated on the earth at the approaching end of the world.1334    Appropinquante sæculorum fine.   Before all things, since God cannot be seen by man, lest any one should imagine from this circumstance that God does not exist, because He was not seen by mortal eyes, among other wonderful arrangements.1335    Institutorum miracula.   He also made many things the power of which is manifest, but the substance is not seen, as the voice, smell, the wind, that by the token and example of these things we might perceive God from His power and operation and works, although He did not fall under the notice of our eyes. What is clearer than the voice, or stronger than the wind, or more forcible than smell? Yet these, when they are borne through the air and come to our senses, and impel them by their efficacy, are not distinguished by the eyesight, but are perceived by other parts of the body. In like manner, God is not to be perceived by us through the sight or other frail sense; but He is to be beheld by the eyes of the mind, since we see His illustrious and wonderful works. For as to those who have altogether denied the existence of God, I should not only refuse to call them philosophers, but even deny them the name of men, who, with a close resemblance to dumb animals, consisted of body only, discerning nothing with their mind, and referring all things to the bodily senses, who thought that nothing existed but that which they beheld with their eyes. And because they saw that adversity befell the wicked, or prosperity happened to the good, they believed that all things were carried on by fortune, and that the world was established by nature, and not by providence.  

Hence they at once fell into the absurdities1336    Deliramenta.   which necessarily followed such a sentiment. But if there is a God who is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal, therefore it is credible that the soul, since it is not seen, does not perish after its departure from the body; for it is manifest that something exists which perceives and is vigorous, and yet does not come into sight. But, it is said, it is difficult to comprehend with the mind how the soul can retain its perception without those parts of the body in which the office of perception is contained. What about God? Is it easy to comprehend how He is vigorous without a body? But if they believe in the existence of gods who, if they exist, are plainly destitute of bodies, it must be that human souls exist in the same way, since it is perceived from reason itself, and discernment, that there is a certain resemblance in man and God. Finally, that proof which even Marcus Tullius1337    De Leg., i. 8.   saw is of sufficient strength: that the immortality of the soul may be discerned from the fact that there is no other animal which has any knowledge of God; and religion is almost the only thing which distinguishes man from the dumb creation. And since this falls to man alone, it assuredly testifies that we may aim at, desire, and cultivate that which is about to be familiar and very near.  

Can any one, when he has considered the nature of other animals, which the providence of the Supreme God has made abject, with bodies bending down and prostrated to the earth, so that it may be understood from this that they have no intercourse with heaven, fail to understand that man alone of all animals is heavenly and divine, whose body raised from the ground,1338    [Here again the reference to Ovid’s maxim. See pp. 41, 56, and 58, supra.]   elevated countenance, and upright position, goes in quest of its origin, and despising, as it were, the lowliness of the earth, reaches forth to that which is on high, because he perceives that the highest good is to be sought by him in the highest place, and mindful of his condition in which God made him illustrious, looks towards his Maker? And Trismegistus most rightly called this looking a contemplation of God,1339    θεώπιδα. Others read θεωρίαν, i.e., “a contemplation.”   which has no existence in the dumb animals. Since therefore wisdom, which is given to man alone, is nothing else but the knowledge of God, it is evident that the soul does not perish, nor undergo dissolution, but that it remains for ever, because it seeks after and loves God, who is everlasting, by the impulse of its very nature perceiving either from what source it has sprung, or to what it is about to return. Moreover, it is no slight proof of immortality that man alone makes use of the heavenly element. For, since the nature of the world consists of two elements1340    [See the most instructive pages of Taylor Lewis again: Plato against the Atheists, p. 121.]   which are opposed to one another—fire and water—of which the one is assigned to the heaven, the other to the earth, the other living creatures, because they are of the earth and mortal, make use of the element which is earthly and heavy: man alone makes use of fire, which is an element light, rising upward,1341    Sublime.   and heavenly. But those things which are weighty depress to death, and those which are light elevate to life; because life is on high, and death below. And as there cannot be light without fire, so there cannot be life without light. Therefore fire is the element of light and life; from which it is evident that man who uses it is a partaker of an immortal condition, because that which causes life is familiar to him.  

The gift of virtue also to man alone is a great proof that souls are immortal. For this will not be in accordance with nature if the soul is extinguished; for it is injurious to this present life. For that earthly life, which we lead in common with dumb animals, both seeks pleasure, by the varied and agreeable fruits of which it is delighted, and avoids pain, the harshness of which, by its unpleasant sensations, injures the nature of living beings, and endeavours to lead them to death, which dissolves the living being. If, therefore, virtue both prohibits man from those goods which are naturally desired, and impels him to endure evils which are naturally avoided, it follows that virtue is an evil, and opposed to nature; and he must necessarily be judged foolish who pursues it, since he injures himself both by avoiding present goods, and by seeking equally evils, without hope of greater advantage. For when it is permitted us to enjoy the sweetest pleasures, should we not appear to be without sense if we should not prefer to live in lowliness, in want, in contempt and ignominy, or not to live at all, but to be tormented with pain, and to die, when from these evils we should gain nothing to compensate us for the pleasure which we have given up? But if virtue is not an evil, and acts honourably, inasmuch as it despises vicious and shameful pleasures, and bravely, inasmuch as it neither fears pain nor death, that it may discharge its duty, therefore it must obtain some greater good than those things are which it despises. But when death has been undergone, what further good can be hoped for except immortality?  

0764A CAPUT IX. De aeternitate animae, atque de virtute.

His itaque argumentis, quae nec Plato, nec ullus alius invenit, animarum aeternitas probari ac perspici potest: quae nos breviter collegimus; quoniam properat oratio ad enarrandum judicium Dei maximum, quod in terra propinquante saeculorum fine celebrabitur. Ante omnia, quoniam Deus ab homine videri non potest, ne quis tamen ex eo ipso putaret Deum non esse, quia mortalibus oculis non videretur, inter caetera institutorum miracula, fecit etiam multa, quorum vis quidem apparet, substantia tamen non videretur, sicut est vox, odor, ventus; ut 0764B harum rerum argumento et exemplo, etiam Deum, licet sub oculos non veniret, de sua tamen vi; et effectu, et operibus cerneremus. Quid voce clarius? aut vento fortius? aut odore violentius? Haec tamen, cum per aerem feruntur, ad sensusque nostros veniunt, et eos potentia sua impellunt, non cernuntur acie luminum: sed aliis corporis partibus sentiuntur. Similiter Deus non aspectu nobis aliove fragili sensu comprehendendus est: sed mentis oculis intuendus, cum opera ejus praeclara et miranda videamus. Nam illos, qui nullum omnino Deum esse dixerunt, non modo philosophos, sed ne homines quidem fuisse dixerim, qui mutis simillimi ex solo corpore constiterunt, nihil omnino cernentes animo, 0765A sed ad sensum 0765A corporis cuncta referentes, qui nihil putabant esse, nisi quod oculis contuebantur. Et quia videbant aut bonis accidere adversa, aut malis prospera, fortuitu geri omnia crediderunt, et natura mundum, non providentia constitutum.

Hinc jam prolapsi sunt ad deliramenta, quae talem sententiam necessario sequebantur. Quod si est Deus et incorporalis, et invisibilis, et aeternus; ergo non idcirco interire animam credibile est, quia non videtur, postquam recessit a corpore, quoniam constat esse aliquid sentiens ac vigens, quod non veniat sub aspectum. At enim difficile est animo comprehendere, quemadmodum possit anima retinere sensum sine iis partibus corporis, in quibus inest officium sentiendi. Quid de Deo? num facile est comprehendere, quemadmodum 0765B vigeat sine corpore? Quod si deos esse credunt, qui si sunt, utique sunt expertes corporum, necesse est, humanas animas eadem ratione subsistere; quoniam ex ipsa ratione ac prudentia intelligitur esse quaedam in homine ac Deo similitudo. Denique illud argumentum, quod etiam Marcus Tullius vidit, satis firmum est: ex eo aeternitatem animae posse dignosci, quia nullum sit aliud animal, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei; Religioque sit pene sola, quae hominem discernat à mutis: quae cum in hominem solum cadat, profecto testatur, id affectare nos, id desiderare, id colere, quod nobis familiare, quod proximum sit futurum.

An aliquis, cum caeterarum animantium naturam 0765C consideraverit, quas pronis corporibus abjectas in terramque prostratas summi Dei providentia effecit; ut ex hoc intelligi possit, nihil eas rationis habere cum coelo, potest non intelligere, solum ex omnibus 0766A coeleste ac divinum animal esse hominem, cujus corpus ab humo excitatum, vultus sublimis, status rectus originem suam quaerit, et quasi contempta humilitate terrae, ad altum nititur, quia sentit summum bonum in summo sibi esse quaerendum, memorque conditionis suae, qua Deus illum fecit eximium, ad artificem suum spectat? Quam spectationem Trismegistus θεώπιδα rectissime nominavit: quae in mutis animalibus nulla est. Cum autem sapientia, quae soli homini data est, nihil aliud sit quam Dei notitia, apparet animam non interire, neque dissolvi, sed manere in sempiternum, quia Deum, qui sempiternus est, et quaerit, et diligit, ipsa cogente natura, sentiens vel unde orta sit, vel quo reversura. Praeterea non exiguum immortalitatis argumentum est, quod homo solus coelesti elemento utitur. Nam cum 0766B rerum natura his duobus elementis, quae repugnantia sibi atque inimica sunt, constet igne, et aqua, quorum alterum coelo, alterum terrae adscribitur: caeterae animantes, quia terrenae mortalesque sunt, terreno et gravi utuntur elemento; homo solus ignem in usu habet, quod est elementum leve, sublime, coeleste. Ea vero quae ponderosa sunt, ad mortem deprimunt, et quae levia sunt, ad vitam sublevant, quia vita in summo est, mors in imo. Et ut lux esse sine igne non potest, sic vita sine luce. Ignis igitur elementum est lucis ac vitae: unde apparet hominem, qui eo utitur, immortalem sortitum esse conditionem, quia id illi familiare est, quod facit vitam.

0766C Virtus quoque soli homini data magno argumento, est immortales esse animas. Quae non erit secundum naturam, si anima extinguitur; huic enim praesenti vitae nocet. Nam vita ista terrena, quam communem 0767A cum mutis animalibus ducimus, 0767A et voluptatem expetit, cujus fructibus variis ac suavibus delectatur, et dolorem fugit, cujus asperitas naturam viventium acerbis sensibus laedit, et ad mortem perducere nititur, quae dissolvit animantem. Si ergo virtus et prohibet iis bonis hominem, quae naturaliter appetuntur, et ad sustinenda mala impellit, quae naturaliter fugiuntur; ergo mala est virtus, et inimica naturae, stultumque judicari necesse est qui eam sequitur, quoniam se ipse laedit, et fugiendo bona praesentia, et appetendo aeque mala sine spe fructus amplioris. Nam cum liceat nobis jucundissimis frui voluptatibus, nonne sensu carere videamur, si malimus in humilitate, in egestate, in contemptu, in ignominia vivere, aut ne vivere quidem, sed dolore cruciari, 0767B et mori, ex quibus malis nihil amplius assequamur, quo possit voluptas omissa pensari? Si autem virtus malum non est, facitque honeste, quod voluptates vitiosas turpesque contemnit et fortiter, quod nec dolorem, nec mortem timet, ut officium servet; ergo majus aliquod bonum assequatur necesse est, quam sunt illa quae spernit. At vero morte suscepta, quod ulterius bonum sperari potest, nisi aeternitas?