Chap. X.—Of Vices and Virtues, and of Life and Death.

Let us now in turn pass on to those things which are opposed to virtue, that from these also the immortality of the soul may be inferred. All vices are for a time; for they are excited for the present. The impetuosity of anger is appeased when vengeance has been taken; the pleasure of the body puts an end1342    [Dan vii. 23. An appeal for reformation.]      Libidinis finis est.   to lust; desire is destroyed either by the full enjoyment of the objects which it seeks, or by the excitement of other affections; ambition, when it has gained the honours which it wished for, loses1343    [1 Cor. iii. 11–15. But are the heathen to be judged by the New Covenant? See vol. ii. (Clement, sparsim), this series.]      Senescit.   its strength; likewise the other vices are unable to stand their ground and remain, but they are ended by the very enjoyment which they desire. Therefore they withdraw and return. But virtue is perpetual, without any intermission; nor can he who has once taken it up depart from it. For if it should have any interruption,1344    [1 Cor. xv. 19.]      Intervallum.   if we can at any time do without it, vices, which always oppose virtue, will return. Therefore it has not been grasped, if it deserts its post, if at any time it withdraws itself. But when it has established for itself a firm abode, it must necessarily be engaged in every act; nor can it faithfully drive away and put to flight vices, unless it shall fortify with a perpetual guard the breast which it inhabits. Therefore the uninterrupted duration1345    [See cap. 12, p. 79, supra.]      Perpetuitas.   of virtue itself shows that the soul of man, if it has received virtue, remains permanent, because virtue is perpetual, and it is the human mind alone which receives virtue. Since, therefore, vices are contrary to virtue, the whole systems must of necessity differ from and be contrary to each other. Because vices are commotions and perturbations of the soul; virtue, on the contrary, is mildness and tranquillity of mind. Because vices are temporary, and of short duration; virtue is perpetual and constant, and always consistent with itself. Because the fruits of vices, that is, pleasures, equally with themselves, are short and temporary, therefore the fruit and reward of virtue are everlasting. Because the advantage of vices is immediate, therefore that of virtue is future.  

Thus it happens that in this life there is no reward of virtue, because virtue itself still exists. For as, when vices are completed in their performance, pleasure and their rewards follow; so, when virtue has been ended, its reward follows. But virtue is never ended except by death, since its highest office is in the undergoing of death: therefore the reward of virtue is after death. In fine, Cicero, in his Tusculan Disputations,1346    In eo promerendo. [John xvii. 3.]      Tusc. Disp., i. 46.   perceived, though with doubt, that the chief good does not happen to man except after death. “A man will go,” he says, “with confident spirit, if circumstances shall so happen, to death, in which we have ascertained that there is either the chief good or no evil.” Death, therefore, does not extinguish man, but admits him to the reward of virtue. But he who has contaminated himself,1347    Ibid., i. 30.   as the same writer says, with vices and crimes, and has been the slave of pleasure, he truly, being condemned, shall suffer eternal punishment, which the sacred writings call the second death, which is both eternal and full of the severest torments.1348    [Tayler Lewis, Plato, etc., pp. 294–300; more especially, pp. 318–322.]   For as two lives are proposed to man, of which the one belongs to the soul, the other to the body; so also two deaths are proposed,—one relating to the body, which all must undergo according to nature, the other relating to the soul, which is acquired by wickedness and avoided by virtue. As this life is temporary and has fixed limits, because it belongs to the body; so also death is in like manner temporary and has a fixed end, because it affects the body.  

CAPUT X. De vitiis et virtutibus, atque de vita et morte.

Transeamus nunc vicissim ad ea quae virtuti repugnant, ut etiam ex his immortalitas animae colligatur. Vitia omnia temporalia sunt; ad praesens enim commoventur. Irae impetus recepta ultione sedatur. 0767C Libidinis voluptas corporis finis est. Cupiditatem aut satietas earum rerum, quas expetit, aut aliorum affectuum commotiones interimunt. Ambitio, postquam honores quos voluit adepta est, consenescit. Item caetera vitia consistere ac permanere non possunt: sed ipso fructu quem expetunt finiuntur. Recedunt ergo, et redeunt. Virtus autem sine ulla intermissione 0768A perpetua est, nec discedere ab ea potest, qui eam semel cepit. Nam si habeat intervallum, si aliquando ea carere possumus, redibunt protinus vitia, quae virtutem semper impugnant. Non est igitur comprehensa, si deserit, si aliquando secedit. Cum vero sibi domicilium stabile collocavit, in omni actu versari eam necesse est; nec potest fideliter depellere vitia, et fugare, nisi pectus, quod insedit, perpetua statione munierit. Ipsa ergo virtutis perpetuitas indicat, humanum animum, si virtutem ceperit, permanere; quia et virtus perpetua est, et solus animus humanus virtutem capit. Quoniam igitur contraria sunt vitia virtuti, omnis ratio diversa et contraria sit necesse est. Quia vitia commotiones et perturbationes animi sunt, virtus e contrario lenitudo et tranquillitas animi 0768B est. Quia vitia temporalia et brevia sunt; virtus perpetua et constans, et par sibi semper. Quia vitiorum fructus, id est, voluptates, aeque ut ipsa, breves temporalesque sunt, virtutis ergo fructus ac praemium sempiternum est, quia vitiorum commodum in praesenti est, virtutis igitur in futuro.

Ita fit, ut in hac vita virtutis praemium nullum sit, quia virtus adhuc ipsa est. Nam sicut vitia, cum in actu suo finiuntur, voluptas et praemia eorum sequuntur: ita virtus, cum finita est, merces ejus insequitur. Virtus autem nunquam nisi morte finitur, quoniam et in morte suscipienda summum ejus officium est. Ergo praemium virtutis post mortem est. Denique Cicero in Tusculanis, quamvis dubitanter, tamen sensit, summum homini bonum non nisi post mortem 0768C contingere. «Fidenti animo, inquit, si ita res feret, gradietur ad mortem; in qua aut summum bonum, aut nullum malum esse cognovimus.» Mors igitur non extinguit hominem, sed ad praemium virtutis admittit. Qui autem se (ut ait idem) vitiis ac sceleribus contaminaverit, voluptatique servierit, is vero damnatus aeternam luet poenam; quam divinae 0769A litterae secundam mortem 0769A nominant, quae est et perpetua, et gravissimis cruciatibus plena. Nam sicuti duae vitae propositae sunt homini, quarum altera est animae, altera corporis: ita et mortes duae propositae sunt, una pertinens ad corpus, qua cunctos secundum naturam fungi necesse est; altera pertinens ad animam, quae scelere acquiritur, virtute vitatur; et ut vita haec temporalis est, certosque terminos habet, quia corporis est: sic et mors aeque temporalis est, certumque habet finem, quia corpus attingit.