Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all knowledge."

Objection 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown (Question 12, Article 4), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.

On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men can know God through their natural principles; according to Rm. 1:19: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more so can the angels.

I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel knows himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye---thirdly, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above (Question 12, Article 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures, according to Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not known by any created intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as was said above.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli per sua naturalia deum cognoscere non possint.

Dicit enim dionysius, I cap. De div. Nom., quod deus est super omnes caelestes mentes incomprehensibili virtute collocatus.

Et postea subdit quod, quia est supra omnem substantiam, ab omni cognitione est segregatus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, deus in infinitum distat ab intellectu Angeli. Sed in infinitum distantia non possunt attingi. Ergo videtur quod Angelus per sua naturalia non possit deum cognoscere.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, I Cor. XIII dicitur, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.

Ex quo videtur quod sit duplex dei cognitio, una, qua videtur per sui essentiam, secundum quam dicitur videri facie ad faciem; alia, secundum quod videtur in speculo creaturarum. Sed primam dei cognitionem Angelus habere non potuit per sua naturalia, ut supra ostensum est.

Visio autem specularis Angelis non convenit, quia non accipiunt divinam cognitionem e rebus sensibilibus, ut dicit dionysius, VII cap. De div. Nom..

Ergo Angeli per sua naturalia deum cognoscere non possunt.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, Angeli sunt potentiores in cognoscendo quam homines. Sed homines per sua naturalia deum cognoscere possunt; secundum illud Rom. I, quod notum est dei, manifestum est in illis.

Ergo multo magis Angeli.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli aliquam cognitionem de deo habere possunt per sua naturalia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid tripliciter cognoscitur. Uno modo, per praesentiam suae essentiae in cognoscente, sicut si lux videatur in oculo, et sic dictum est quod Angelus intelligit seipsum.

Alio modo, per praesentiam suae similitudinis in potentia cognoscitiva, sicut lapis videtur ab oculo per hoc quod similitudo eius resultat in oculo. Tertio modo, per hoc quod similitudo rei cognitae non accipitur immediate ab ipsa re cognita, sed a re alia, in qua resultat, sicut cum videmus hominem in speculo.

Primae igitur cognitioni assimilatur divina cognitio, qua per essentiam suam videtur. Et haec cognitio dei non potest adesse creaturae alicui per sua naturalia, ut supra dictum est.

Tertiae autem cognitioni assimilatur cognitio qua nos cognoscimus deum in via, per similitudinem eius in creaturis resultantem; secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.

Unde et dicimur deum videre in speculo. Cognitio autem qua Angelus per sua naturalia cognoscit deum, media est inter has duas; et similatur illi cognitioni qua videtur res per speciem ab ea acceptam. Quia enim imago dei est in ipsa natura Angeli impressa per suam essentiam, Angelus deum cognoscit, inquantum est similitudo dei. Non tamen ipsam essentiam dei videt, quia nulla similitudo creata est sufficiens ad repraesentandam divinam essentiam. Unde magis ista cognitio tenet se cum speculari, quia et ipsa natura angelica est quoddam speculum divinam similitudinem repraesentans.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dionysius loquitur de cognitione comprehensionis, ut expresse eius verba ostendunt.

Et sic a nullo intellectu creato cognoscitur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod propter hoc quod intellectus et essentia Angeli in infinitum distant a deo, sequitur quod non possit ipsum comprehendere, nec per suam naturam eius essentiam videre. Non tamen sequitur propter hoc, quod nullam eius cognitionem habere possit, quia sicut deus in infinitum distat ab Angelo, ita cognitio quam deus habet de seipso, in infinitum distat a cognitione quam Angelus habet de eo.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio quam naturaliter Angelus habet de deo, est media inter utramque cognitionem, et tamen magis se tenet cum una, ut supra dictum est.