Chap. XII.—Of the Soul and the Body, and of Their Union and Separation and Return.

Now let us refute the arguments of those who maintain the opposite opinions, which Lucretius has related in his third book. Since, he says, the soul is born together with the body, it must necessarily die with the body. But the two cases are not similar. For the body is solid, and capable of being grasped1351    Comprehensibile.   both by the eyes and the hand; but the soul is slight,1352    Tenuis.   and eluding the touch and sight. The body is formed from the earth, and made firm; the soul has in it nothing concrete, nothing of earthly weight, as Plato maintained. For it could not have such great force, such great skill, such great rapidity, unless it derived its origin from heaven. The body, therefore, since it is made up of a ponderous and corruptible element, and is tangible and visible, is corrupted and dies; nor is it able to repel violence, because it comes under the sight and under the touch; but the soul, which by its slightness avoids all touch, can be dissolved by no attack. Therefore, although they are joined and connected together from birth, and the one which is formed of earthly material1353    De terrenâ concretione.   is, as it were, the vessel of the other, which is drawn out from heavenly fineness, when any violence has separated the two, which separation is called death, then each returns into its own nature; that which was of earth is resolved into earth; that which is of heavenly breath remains fixed, and flourishes always, since the divine spirit is everlasting. In fine, the same Lucretius, forgetting what he asserted, and what dogma he defended, wrote these verses:1354    De Rer. Nat., ii. 999.  —  

But this language was not for him to employ, who contended that souls perished with the bodies; but he was overcome by the truth, and the true system stole upon him unawares. Moreover, that very inference which he draws, that the soul suffers dissolution, that is, that it perishes together with the body, since they are produced together, is both false, and is capable of being turned to the opposite direction. For the body does not perish together with the soul; but when the soul departs it remains entire for many days, and frequently by medical preparations it remains entire for a very long time. For if they both perished together, as they are produced together, the soul would not hastily depart and desert the body, but both would be dispersed alike at one point of time; and the body also, while the breath still remained in it, would dissolve and perish as quickly as the soul departs: yes, truly, the body, being dissolved, the soul would vanish, as moisture poured forth from a broken vessel. For if the earthly and frail body after the departure of the soul does not immediately flow away and waste into earth, from which it has its origin, therefore the soul, which is not frail, endures to eternity, since its origin is eternal. He says, since the understanding increases in boys, and is vigorous in young men, and is lessened in the aged, it is evident that it is mortal. First, the soul is not the same thing as the mind; for it is one thing that we live, another that we reflect. For it is the mind of those who are asleep which is at rest,1356    Sopitur.   not the soul; and in those who are mad, the mind is extinguished, the soul remains; and therefore they are not said to be without a soul, but to be deprived of their mind.1357    Non exanimes, sed dementes vocantur.   Therefore the mind, that is, the understanding, is either increased or lessened according to age. The soul is always in its own condition; and from the time when it receives the power of breathing, it remains the same even to the end, until, being sent forth from the confinement of the body, it flies back to its own abode. In the next place, the soul, although inspired by God, yet, because it is shut up in a dark abode of earthly flesh, does not possess knowledge, which belongs to divinity. Therefore it hears and learns all things, and receives wisdom by learning and hearing; and old age does not lessen wisdom, but increases it, if the age of youth has been passed in virtue; and if excessive old age shall have enfeebled the limbs, it is not the fault of the mind if the sight has vanished, if the tongue has become benumbed, if the hearing has grown deaf, but it is the fault of the body. But, it is said, the memory fails. What wonder, if the mind is oppressed by the ruin of the falling house, and forgets the past, not about to be divine on any other condition than if it shall have escaped the prison in which it is confined?  

But the soul, he says, is also subject to pain and grief, and loses its senses through drunkenness, whence it is evidently frail and mortal. On this account, therefore, virtue and wisdom are necessary, that both grief, which is contracted by the suffering and the sight of unworthy objects, may be repelled by fortitude, and that pleasure may be overcome, not only by abstaining from drinking, but also from other things. For if it be destitute of virtue, if it be given up to pleasure, and thus rendered effeminate, it will become subject to death, since virtue, as we have shown, is the contriver of immortality, as pleasure is of death. But death, as I have set forth, does not entirely extinguish and destroy, but visits with eternal torments. For the soul cannot entirely perish, since it received its origin from the Spirit of God, which is eternal. The soul, he says, is sensible even of disease of the body, and suffers forgetfulness of itself; and as it grows ill, so also it is often healed. This is therefore the reason why virtue is especially to be used, that the mind—not the soul1358    [The original must be compared: Ne ullo corporis dolore frangatur et oblivionem sui non anima, sed mens patiatur. For νου̑ς and ψυχή, see Lewis, ut supra, pp. 219, etc.]  —may not be harassed by any pain of the body, or undergo oblivion of itself. And since this has its seat in a certain part of the body, when any violence of disease has vitiated that part, it is moved from its place; and as though shaken, it departs from its station, about to return when a cure and health shall have remodelled its abode. For, since the soul is united with the body, if it is destitute of virtue, it grows sick by the contagion of the body, and from sharing its frailty the weakness extends to the mind. But when it shall be disunited from the body it will flourish by itself; nor will it now be assailed by any condition of frailty, because it has laid aside its frail covering. As the eye, he says, when torn out and separated from the body, can see nothing, so also the soul, when separated, can perceive nothing, because it is itself also a part of the body. This is false, and dissimilar to the case supposed; for the soul is not a part of the body, but in the body. As that which is contained in a vessel is not a part of the vessel, and these things which are in a house are not said to be a part of the house; so the mind is not a part of the body, because the body is either the vessel or the receptacle of the soul.  

Now, that is a much more empty argument which says that the soul appears to be mortal because it is not quickly sent forth from the body, but gradually unfolds itself from all the members, beginning from the extremity of the feet; as though, if it were eternal, it would burst forth in a single moment of time, which takes place in those who die by the sword. But they who are slain by disease are longer in breathing forth their spirit, so that as the limbs grow cold the soul is breathed forth. For, since it is contained in the material of the blood, as light is in the oil, that material being consumed by the heat of fevers, the extremities of the limbs must grow cold; since the more slender veins are extended into the extremities of the body, and the extreme and smaller streams are dried up when the fountain-spring fails. It must not, however, be supposed that, because the perception of the body fails, the sensibility of the soul is extinguished and perishes. For it is not the soul that becomes senseless when the body fails, but it is the body which becomes senseless when the soul takes its departure, because it draws all sensibility with it. But since the soul by its presence gives sensibility to the body, and causes it to live, it is impossible that it should not live and perceive by itself, since it is in itself both consciousness and life. For as to that which says,  

I never saw any one who complained of his dissolution in death; but he perhaps had seen some Epicurean philosophizing even in death, and with his latest breath discoursing about his dissolution.  

How can it be known whether he feels that he is in a state of dissolution, or that he is being set free from the body, when his tongue grows dumb at his departure? For as long as he perceives and has the power of speech, he is not yet dissolved; when he has suffered dissolution, he is now unable either to perceive or to speak, so that either he is not yet able to complain of his dissolution, or he is no longer able. But, it is said, he understands before he undergoes dissolution, that he must undergo it. Why should I mention that we see many of the dying, not complaining that they are undergoing dissolution, but testifying that they are passing out, and setting forth on their journey and walking? and they signify this by gesture, or if they still are able, they express it also by their voice. From which it is evident that it is not a dissolution which takes place, but a separation; and this shows that the soul continues to exist. Other arguments of the Epicurean system are opposed to Pythagoras, who contends that souls migrate from bodies worn out with old age and death, and gain admission1360    Se insinuare.   into those which are new and recently born; and that the same souls are always reproduced at one time in a man, at another time in a sheep, at another in a wild beast, at another in a bird; and that they are immortal on this account, because they often change their abodes, consisting of various and dissimilar bodies. And this opinion of a senseless man, since it is ridiculous and more worthy of a stage-player than of a school of philosophy, ought not even to have been refuted seriously; for he who does this appears to be afraid lest any one should believe it. Therefore we must pass by those things which have been discussed in behalf of falsehood against falsehood; it is sufficient to have refuted those things which are against the truth.  

CAPUT XII. De anima et corpore; atque de conjunctione eorum, et discessu ac reditu.

Nunc argumenta eorum, qui contra disserunt, refellamus; quae Lucretius tertio libro executus est. Quoniam cum corpore, inquit, anima nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est. At non est par utriusque 0771B ratio. Solidum enim et comprehensibile corpus est, et oculis, et manu: anima vero tenuis, et tactum visumque fugiens. Corpus e terra fictum atque solidatum est: anima in se nihil concreti, nihil terreni ponderis habet, ut Plato disserebat. Nec enim tantam posset habere solertiam, tantam vim, tantam celeritatem, nisi originem traheret e coelo. Corpus igitur quoniam fictum ex ponderoso et corruptibili elemento, et tangibile est, et visibile, corrumpitur atque occidit; 0772A nec vim repellere potest, quia sub aspectum et sub tactum venit. Anima autem, quia tenuitate sua omnem tactum fugit, nullo ictu dissolvi potest. Ergo quamvis inter se conjuncta et sociata nascantur, et alterum, quod est de terrena concretione formatum, quasi vasculum sit alterius, quod est a coelesti subtilitate deductum: cum vis aliqua utrumque discreverit, quae discretio mors vocatur; tum utrumque in naturam suam recedit: quod ex terra fuit, id in terram resolvitur; quod ex coelesti spiritu, id constat ac viget semper, quoniam divinus spiritus sempiternus est. Denique idem Lucretius oblitus quid assereret, et quod dogma defenderet, hos versus posuit: Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante In terram, sed quod missum est ex aetheris oris, 0772B Id rursus coeli fulgentia templa receptant.Quod ejus non erat dicere, qui perire animas cum corporibus disserebat: sed victus est veritate, et imprudenti ratio vera surrepsit.

Praeterea id ipsum, quod colligit, dissolvi animam, hoc est, simul cum corpore interire, quoniam simul nascantur, et falsum est, et in contrarium converti potest. Non enim simul interit: sed anima discedente, integrum per dies multos manet, et plerumque medicatum 0773A diutissime durat. Nam si ut simul nascuntur, simul interirent, non discederet repente anima, corpusque desereret: sed uno temporis puncto utrumque pariter dissiparetur, et tam celeriter etiam corpus, adhuc spiritu in eo manente, deliquesceret ac periret, quam celeriter anima secedit; immo vero dissoluto corpore anima vanesceret, velut humor fracto vase 0773A diffusus. Nam si terrenum et fragile corpus post secessum animae non statim diffluit, in terramque tabescit, ex qua illi origo est; ergo anima, quae fragilis non est, in aeternum manet, quoniam origo ejus aeterna est. Quoniam crescit, inquit, sensus in pueris, et in juvenibus viget, et in senibus diminuitur, apparet esse mortalem. Primum non est idem mens et anima; aliud est enim quo vivimus, aliud quo cogitamus. 0773B Nam dormientium mens, non anima sopitur; et in furiosis mens extinguitur, anima manet; et ideo non exanimes, sed dementes vocantur. Mens ergo, id est intelligentia, vel augetur, vel minuitur pro aetate. Anima in statu suo semper est, et ex quo tempore spirandi accipit facultatem, eadem usque ad ultimum durat, donec emissa corporis claustro, ad sedem suam revolet. Deinde quod anima, quamvis a Deo sit inspirata, tamen quia tenebroso domicilio terrenae carnis inclusa est, scientiam non habet, quae est divinitatis. 0774A Audit igitur ac discit omnia, et sapientiam discendo et audiendo capit; et senectus non minuit sapientiam, sed auget, si tamen juvenilis aetas virtute decursa est. Sed si nimia senectus fregerit membra, non est animae vitium, si visus evanuit, si lingua torpuit, si auditus obsurduit, sed corporis. At enim memoria deficit. Quid mirum, si labentis domicilii ruina premitur mens, et praeterita obliviscitur, non aliter futura divina, quam si carcerem, quo cohibetur, effugerit?

Verum eadem, inquit, dolori et luctui obnoxia est, et ebrietate dementit, unde fragilis et mortalis apparet. Idirco igitur virtus et sapientia necessaria est, ut et moeror, qui contrahitur indigna patiendo ac videndo, fortitudine repellatur, et voluptas non modo potandi, sed etiam rerum caeterarum abstinentia superetur. 0774B Nam si careat virtute, si voluptatibus dedita molliatur, morti fiet obnoxia, quoniam et virtus, ut docuimus, immortalitatis est fabricatrix, et voluptas mortis. Mors autem, sicut ostendi, non funditus perimit ac delet, sed aeternis afficit cruciatibus. Nam interire prorsus anima non potest; quoniam ex Dei spiritu, qui aeternus est, originem cepit. Anima, inquit, etiam morbum corporis sentit, et oblivionem sui patitur, et sicut aegrescit, ita etiam saepe sanatur. Hoc est ergo, cur maxime virtus adhibenda sit, ne 0775A ullo corporis dolore frangatur, et oblivionem sui non anima, sed mens patiatur. Quae quoniam certa corporis regione consistit, cum eam partem vis aliqua morbi vitiaverit, movetur loco, et quasi conquassata, de sede sua emigrat, 0775A reditura scilicet, cum medela et sanitas domicilium suum reformaverit. Nam quia juncta est anima cum corpore, si virtute careat, contagio ejus aegrescit, et imbecillitas de societate fragilitatis redundat ad mentem. Cum autem dissociata fuerit a corpore, vigebit ipsa per se, nec ulla jam fragilitatis conditione tentabitur, quia indumentum fragile projecit. Sicut oculus, inquit, evulsus ac separatus a corpore nihil potest videre: ita et anima separata nihil sentire, quia et ipsa pars est corporis. Falsum hoc, et dissimile est; anima enim non 0775B pars corporis, sed in corpore est. Sicut id, quod vase continetur, vasis pars non est, nec ea quae in domo sunt, partes domus esse dicuntur: ita nec anima pars est corporis, quia corpus vel vas animae est, vel receptaculum.

Jam illud argumentum multo magis inane est, quo ait animam, quia non citius emittatur ex corpore, mortalem videri, sed paulatim se ex omnibus membris explicet, a summis pedibus incipiens: tanquam si esset aeterna, uno temporis momento erumperet; quod fit in iis, qui ferro intereunt. Quos autem morbus interimit, spiritum diutius exhalant, ut paulatim frigescentibus membris anima effletur. Quae cum materia sanguinis contineatur, sicut lumen oleo, ea materia febrium calore consumpta, necesse est 0775C membrorum summa quaeque frigescere; quoniam venae exiliores in extrema corporis porriguntur, et 0776A extremi ac tenuiores rivi deficiente vena fontis arescunt. Nec tamen, quia sensus corporis deficit, animae sensum extingui et occidere putandum est. Non enim anima corpore deficiente, sed corpus anima decedente brutescit, quia sensum omnem trahit secum. Cum autem praesens anima sensum suum tribuat corpori, et vivere id efficiat; fieri non potest, ut non ipsa per se et vivat, et sentiat, quoniam ipsa est et sensus et vita. Nam quod ait: Quod si immortalis nostra foret mens, Non tam se moriens dissolvi conquereretur: Sed magis ire foras, vestemque relinquere, ut anguis, Gauderet.Equidem nunquam vidi, qui se quereretur in morte dissolvi. Sed ille fortasse Epicureum aliquem viderat etiam dum moritur philosophantem, ac de sua dissolutione 0776B in extremo spiritu disserentem.

Quomodo sciri potest, utrum dissolvi se sentiat, an corpore liberari, cum in exitu lingua mutescat? Nam dum sentit, et loqui potest, nondum dissolutus est: ubi dissolutus est, jam nec sentire, nec loqui potest; ita queri de dissolutione aut nondum potest, aut jam non potest. At enim priusquam dissolvatur, intelligit se dissolutum iri. Quid, quod videmus plerosque morientium non dissolvi conquerentes, ut ait, sed exire se, et proficisci, et ambulare testantes; idque aut gestu significant, aut si adhuc possunt, et voce pronuntiant? Unde apparet non dissolutionem fieri, sed separationem, quae declarat animam permanere. Caetera Epicurei dogmatis argumenta Pythagorae repugnant 0776C disserenti, migrare animas de corporibus vetustate ac morte confectis, et insinuare se novis ac 0777A recens natis, 0777A et easdem semper renasci modo in homine, modo in pecude, modo in bestia, modo in volucre, et hac ratione immortales esse, quod saepe variorum ac dissimilium corporum domicilia commutent. Quae sententia deliri hominis, quoniam ridicula est, et mimo dignior quam schola fuit, ne refelli quidem serio debuit: quod qui facit, videtur vereri ne quis id credat. Praetereunda sunt igitur nobis ea, quae pro falso contra falsum disserebantur: satis est ea refutasse quae contra verum disputata sunt.