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Nor again, he said, is anything of that sort said. For Creophylus, O Socrates, the companion of Homer, would appear even more ridiculous than his name in the matter of education, if the things said about Homer are true. For it is said somewhere that he was greatly neglected in his own time, when he was alive. It is indeed said, 12.49.9 I replied. But do you suppose, O Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate men and make them better, because he was capable not of imitating but of knowing about these things, that he would not have made for himself many companions and been honored 12.49.10 and loved by them? But Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a great many others are able to persuade their contemporaries by private association that they will be able to manage neither their own house nor their city unless they themselves preside over their education, and for this wisdom they are so intensely loved that their companions all but carry them about on their heads. 12.49.11 But Homer then, if he were really able to help men toward virtue, or Hesiod—would their contemporaries have allowed them to go about as rhapsodes, and not rather have clung to them more than to gold, and compelled them to stay with them at home? Or, if they could not persuade them, would they not have attended them as pupils wherever they went, until 12.49.12 they had received a sufficient education? Entirely, he said, you seem to me, O Socrates, to speak the truth. Shall we not then assume, beginning with Homer, that all the poets are imitators of images of virtue and of the other things they write about, and do not grasp the truth? But, just as we were saying a moment ago, the painter will make what appears to be a shoemaker, though he himself knows nothing of shoemaking, for those who do not know either, 12.49.13 but judge from the colors and forms? By all means. In this way, then, I think, we shall say that the poet, using his nouns and verbs, applies certain colors from each of the arts, though he himself understands nothing but how to imitate; so that to others like himself, who judge from the words, it seems that if he speaks of shoemaking in meter and rhythm and harmony, it seems to be spoken very well, 12.49.14 or of generalship, or of anything else whatever; so great a natural charm do these things possess. For when stripped of the colors of music, the works of the poets, spoken by themselves, I think you know what they look like. For you have seen them, have you not? I have, he said.» 12.49.15 And since these things are so, it seems good to me to go through a few things from Plato, by which he more logically constructs his argument concerning God and providence, in this too siding with the doctrines of the Hebrews. But first let us see how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists: 12.50.1 50. CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THE ATHEISTS; FROM THE TENTH BOOK OF THE LAWS «Some say, I believe, that all things that are coming into being, have come into being, and will come into being, are some by nature, some by art, and some through art. Is that not well said? It is likely, I suppose, that wise men speak correctly. But let us follow them and examine what it is they happen to mean. 12.50.2 By all means. It seems, they say, that nature and chance accomplish the greatest and most beautiful of them, and art the smaller; which art, receiving from nature the generation of the great and primary works, molds and fashions all the smallest things, which we all call products of art. 12.50.3 How do you mean? I will speak still more clearly, thus: fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and by chance, and none of them by art. And the bodies after these—of the earth and sun and moon and stars—have come into being through these things, which are entirely soulless; and being moved by chance according to the power of each, in whatever way they have happened to combine fittingly somehow, hot with cold or dry with moist and soft with hard, and all the things that by the mixture of opposites according to

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Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀληθῆ ἐστι. λέγεται γάρ που ὡς πολλὴ ἀμέλεια περὶ αὐτὸν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, 12.49.9 ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τε ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ γινώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο 12.49.10 καὶ ἠγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν; ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παρεστάναι ἰδίᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι, ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκεῖν οἷοί τε ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν τῆς παιδείας ἐπιστατήσωσι, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν 12.49.11 αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι. Ὅμηρον δὲ ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οἷός τε ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνινάναι ἀνθρώπους, ἢ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιιόντας εἴων καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἠνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν, ὅπη ᾔεσαν, ἕως 12.49.12 ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὁμήρου ἀρξάμενοι πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσι, τῆς δ' ἀληθείας οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι; ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα εἶναι αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ 12.49.13 ἐπαΐουσιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὕτω δή, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἄττα ἑκάστῳ τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαΐοντα ἀλλ' ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τι λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν 12.49.14 λέγεσθαι ἐάν τε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάν τε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν· ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν τὰ λεγόμενα οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γὰρ ἢ οὔ; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.» 12.49.15 Καὶ τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων εὖ μοι ἔχειν δοκεῖ βραχέα ἄττα τῶν Πλάτωνος διελθεῖν, δι' ὧν λογικώτερον τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ προνοίας συνίστησι λόγον, τοῖς Ἑβραίων κἀν τούτῳ παριστάμενος δόγμασι. πρῶτα δὲ θεασώμεθα ὅπως τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀθέων ἐκτίθησι· 12.50.1 νʹ. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΘΕΩΝ ∆ΟΞΗΣ· ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ∆ΕΚΑΤΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ «Λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τέχνην. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς; Εἰκός γέ τοί που σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν. ἑπόμενοί γε μὴν αὐτοῖς σκεψώμεθα, τί ποτε καὶ τυγχάνουσι διανοούμενοι. 12.50.2 Πάντως. Ἔοικε, φασί, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότατα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. 12.50.3 Πῶς λέγεις; Ὧδ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ· πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων. καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντε λῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων· τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἑκάστων, ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρὰ καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ