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you say."

12.51.1 51. HOW PLATO CONSTRUCTS HIS ARGUMENT CONCERNING GOD "Come now, if ever we must call upon God, let this be done now; indeed, for the proof that they exist, let them be earnestly and altogether invoked; and holding on to this, as to a safe anchor, let us embark on our present argument. And when I am being examined about such things with questions of this kind, it seems safest to me to an12.51.2 swer as follows: 'O stranger,' whenever someone asks, 'do all things stand still, and nothing moves, or the very opposite of this?' 'Or do some of them move, and others remain at rest?' 'Some things move,' I will say, 'and others remain at rest.' 'Then are not the things that stand still, standing still in some place, and the things that are moving, moving in some place?' 'Of course.' And some 12.51.3 would do this in one position, but others in more than one. 'Do you mean those things which, having the power of things that are at rest in the center, move in one place, just as the circumference of what we call standing circles revolves?' we will say. 'Yes.'" 12.51.4 And next he adds: "Further, let us speak in this way and answer ourselves again: if all things were to come to a standstill, as many of these thinkers dare to say, what, then, must of necessity be the first motion to arise in them among those that have been mentioned? 12.51.5 That which moves itself, surely; for it would never previously be changed by another, since there would be no prior change among them. 12.51.6 Therefore, we shall say that the principle of all motions, and the first to arise in things at rest and to be in things that are moved, that which moves itself, is of necessity the eldest and mightiest of all changes; and that which is altered by another and moves others is second. You speak most truly. 12.51.7 Since, then, we are at this point in the argument, let us answer this. What is that? If we see this motion arise somewhere in an earthy, watery, or fiery substance, whether separate or mixed, what state shall we say is present in such a thing? 12.51.8 Are you asking me if we shall say it is 'living' when it moves itself? Yes. Living; of course! And what then? When we see soul in certain things, must we not admit that this is the same as living? Nothing else. By Zeus, hold on; would you not be willing to conceive of three things concerning each one? 12.51.9 How do you mean? One is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name. And furthermore, that there are two questions about every being. How so? Sometimes, each of us, when the name is put forward, demands the definition; and at other times, when the definition itself is put forward, we ask for the name. Is this what we wish to say now? 12.51.10 What is that? There is something divided in two into equal parts, both in other things and in number. For this, in respect to number, the name is 'even,' and the definition is 'a number divisible into two equal parts.' Yes. 12.51.11 I mean this sort of thing. Do we not, then, call it the same thing in either case, whether, being asked for the definition, we give the name, or for the name, the definition, calling the same being 'even' by name, and by definition 'a number divisible in two'? Certainly. 12.51.12 For that which has the name 'soul,' what is its definition? Do we have any other than the one just stated, 'the motion that can move itself'? Do you say that 'to move itself' is the definition of that very same substance which we all call 'soul'? 12.51.13 I do. And if this is so, do we still feel it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that the soul is identical with the first origin and motion of things that are, that have been, and that will be, and of all their contraries, since it has been revealed as the cause of all change and motion to all things? No, but it has been most sufficiently demonstrated that soul is the eldest of all things, being the principle of motion. 12.51.14 Then is not the motion that arises in one thing because of another, but which never causes anything to be moved in itself,

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λέγεις.»

12.51.1 ναʹ. ΩΣ Ο ΠΛΑΤΩΝ ΤΟΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΟΥ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙ ΛΟΓΟΝ «Ἄγε δή, θεὸν εἴ ποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον· ἐπί γε ἀπόδειξιν τὴν αὑτῶν ὥστ' εἰσὶ σπουδῇ παντάπασι παρακεκλήσθων· ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἐπεισβαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον. καί μοι ἐλεγχομένῳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήσεσι τοιαῖσδε ἀσφαλέστατα ἀπο12.51.2 κρίνεσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τάδε· ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἆρα ἕστηκε πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν, ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον; ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ μένει; τὰ μὲν κινεῖταί που, φήσω, τὰ δὲ μένει. μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κινεῖται; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ τὰ 12.51.3 μέν γε ἐν μιᾷ ἕδρᾳ που τοῦτο ἂν δρῴη, τὰ δὲ ἐν πλείοσι. τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται περιφορά; ναί.» 12.51.4 Καὶ ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἴπωμεν καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσιν· εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίνα ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων; 12.51.5 Τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν δήπου κινοῦσαν· ὑπ' ἄλλης γὰρ οὐ μή ποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως. 12.51.6 Ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσι γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν, τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν, φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολῶν πασῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα, δευτέραν. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. 12.51.7 Ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηΐνῳ ἢ ἐνύδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ ξυμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος ἐνεῖναι; 12.51.8 Μῶν ἆρά με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ; Ναί. Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί δέ; ὅταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῆν ὁμολογητέον; Οὐκ ἄλλο. Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς ∆ιός· ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν; 12.51.9 Πῶς λέγεις; Ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο. Πῶς; Τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾶν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν; 12.51.10 Τὸ ποῖον; Ἔστι που δίχα διαιρούμενον εἰς ἴσα μέρη ἐν ἄλλοισί τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὄνομα μὲν ἄρτιον, λόγος δὲ «ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη.» Ναί. 12.51.11 Τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. Μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἐάν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν ἐάν τε τοὔνομα τὸν λόγον, ἄρτιον ὀνόματι καὶ λόγῳ «δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμὸν» προσαγορεύοντες, ταὐτὸν ὄν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 12.51.12 Ὧι δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν; «Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν» φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἥνπερ τοὔνομα, ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν; 12.51.13 Φημί γε. εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρ' ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. 12.51.14 Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι' ἕτερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κίνησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδέν,