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with the greatest, may be disturbed now, when in all these things, having seen or perceived by hearing or even having encountered some of them himself, many impious and terrible things happening to some, and through these very things some men rising from small beginnings to tyrannies and the greatest positions; then because of all such things you are clearly disposed to blame the gods as being the cause of such things, though through kinship you would not wish to, but being led both by irrationality and at the same time being unable to be angry with the gods, you have now come to this state, so that they seem to exist 12.52.3 them, but to despise and neglect human affairs. So that your present opinion may not lead you to a greater state of impiety, but if we can somehow manage to exorcise with words, in turn, the approaching trouble, let us try, by connecting the subsequent argument to that with which we reasoned against the one who did not believe in gods at all 12.52.4 from the beginning, to use it now. But you, O Clinias and Megillus, on behalf of the young man, just as before, take turns in answering; and if anything difficult arises in our arguments, I, taking you up, just as now, will get you across the river. You speak correctly; and so you do these things, and we shall do what you say to the best of our ability. 12.52.5 But perhaps it would not be at all difficult to show this, that the gods are careful of small things no less, or rather more, than of things that excel in greatness. For you heard, I suppose, and were present at our recent discussion, that being good they possess all virtue, the care of all things, which is most proper to them. Did you not? Yes, he heard very well. 12.52.6 After this, then, let us examine together what virtue of theirs we are speaking of when we agree that they are good. Come, do we say that being temperate and possessing sense is of virtue, and the opposites of vice? We do. What then? That courage is of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 12.52.7 Certainly. And shall we say that some of these things are shameful, and others noble? Necessarily. And shall we say that whatever of these are base belong to us, if any, but that of such things the gods have no share, neither great nor small? And everyone would agree to this. 12.52.8 What then? Shall we place carelessness and idleness and luxury among the virtues of the soul? Or what do you say? How could we? But among the opposite? Yes. Then the opposites of these belong to the opposites; so the luxurious, careless, and idle man, whom the poet said was most like the stingless drones, would all such be to us? 12.52.9 Having said it most correctly. Therefore we must not say that God has such a character which he himself hates; and we must not permit anyone who tries to utter such a thing. Certainly not; for how could we? For one whose duty it is to act and to care for something in a superior way, but who, being of this kind, cares for the great things, but neglects the small, by what reasoning, then, in praising such a one, would we not be altogether at fault? Let us consider it in this way: does not he who acts in this way, whether god or man, do so according to two forms? Which do we mean? 12.52.10 Either thinking it makes no difference to the whole if the small things are neglected, or through indolence and luxury, if it does make a difference, he neglects them; or is there any other way that neglect occurs? For surely, when one is unable to take care of all things, then it will not be neglect for him not to care for the small or great things, for which one may be wanting in power, being deficient and becoming unable to care. For how could it be? 12.52.11 Now let them, being two, answer us, being three, they who both agree that gods exist, but one says they are open to persuasion, and the other that they are neglectful of small things. First, you both say that God knows and sees and hears all things, and that it is not possible for anything to escape his notice of all things of which there are senses and knowledge. Do you say that these things are so, or how? So. 12.52.12 What then? That he can do all things of which there is power for mortals and immortals? For how will they not concede that these things are so? And indeed we have agreed, being five, that they are good and best. Very much so. Is it not impossible, then, through indolence and luxury

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μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τὰ νῦν ὅταν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτῶν τινι προστυχής πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισὶ δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους· τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεοὺς εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ' εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν 12.52.3 αὐτούς, τῶν δ' ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλ' ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὖ τὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ᾧ πρὸς τὸν παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς 12.52.4 ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τὰ νῦν προσχρήσασθαι. σὺ δ', ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἐὰν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐγγίγνηται τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν, ὥσπερ νῦν, δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σύ τε οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις. 12.52.5 Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τάχ' ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσὶ θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ τῷ μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν, οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν, κέκτηνται. ἦ γάρ; Καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουε. 12.52.6 Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξεταζόντων, τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀγαθοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαι φαμὲν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία κακίας; Φαμέν. Τί δέ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρίαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας; 12.52.7 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν; Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν. 12.52.8 Τί δέ; ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Καὶ πῶς; Ἀλλ' εἰς τοὐναντίον; Ναί. Τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις εἰς τἀναντία· τρυφῶν δὴ καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶς ἡμῖν; 12.52.9 Ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. Οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον ὅ γε αὐτὸς μισεῖ· τῷ δέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. Οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν; Ὧι δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου τοῦ γένους τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε· ἆρ' οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε ἄνθρωπος; Ποίω λέγομεν; 12.52.10 Ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ· ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που, ὅταν γε ἀδύνατος ᾖ τῶν πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ, ὧν ἂν δυνάμει φαῦλος ᾖ τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; 12.52.11 Νῦν δύο ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν, οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ἀμφότεροί φατε γινώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. ταύτη λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; Οὕτως. 12.52.12 Τί δέ; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων δύναμίς ἐστι θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πέντε ὄντες. Σφόδρα γε. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον