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188

that which is in the best state is least altered and moved by another, for instance a body by foods and drinks and labours, and every plant by sunshine and winds and such affections, is it not the healthiest and most graceful that is least altered? How could it not be? 13.3.21 And as for the soul, would not the bravest and wisest be least disturbed and altered by any external affection? Yes. And surely, indeed, all composite things, implements and buildings and garments, by the same reasoning, those that are well-made and in a good state are least 13.3.22 altered by time and other affections. That is so. Everything, then, which is in a good state, either by nature or by art or by both, admits of the least change from another. It seems so. But surely God and the things of God are in every way in the best state. How could they not be? In this way, then, God would least of all have many forms. Least of all, indeed. But would he then change 13.3.23 and alter himself? Obviously, he said, if he is altered at all. Does he then change himself for the better and more beautiful, or for the worse and more shameful than himself? Necessarily, he said, for the more shameful than himself, if he is altered; for we shall not, I suppose, say that God is lacking in beauty or excellence. You speak most correctly, I said. and this being so, does it seem to you, Adeimantus, that anyone, whether of gods or of men, would willingly make himself worse 13.3.24 in any way? Impossible, he said. It is impossible, then, for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it seems, being most beautiful and best as possible, each of them remains ever simply in his own form. It seems to me, he said, an absolute necessity. Then, I said, my good sir, let none of the poets tell us that 'the gods, in the likeness of strangers from other lands, assuming all sorts of forms, wander through the cities;' 13.3.25 and let no one lie about Proteus and Thetis, nor in tragedies or in other poems introduce Hera transformed, like a priestess collecting for the life-giving children of Inachus, the Argive river. 13.3.26 and let them not tell us many other such lies; nor again let the mothers, persuaded by these tales, frighten the children, telling the myths badly, how some gods wander about by night in the likeness of many and various creatures, lest they at the same time blaspheme against the gods, and also make their children 13.3.27 more cowardly. They should not, he said. But, I said, are the gods themselves such as not to change, but make us think that they appear in all sorts of forms, deceiving and bewitching us? Perhaps, he said. What? I said. Would a god be willing to lie, either in word or in deed, by presenting appearances? I do not know, 13.3.28 he said. Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if one may say so, all gods and men hate? What do you mean? he said. You know, I suppose, I said, that to be false in the most sovereign part of themselves and about the most sovereign things, no one is willingly so, but most of all fears to possess it there. Even now, 13.3.29 he said, I do not yet understand. For you think, I said, that I am saying something profound; but I am saying that to be false in the soul about realities, and to have been deceived, and to be ignorant, and there to have and possess the lie, all would least accept, 13.3.30 and they hate it most of all in such a case. Very much so, he said. But surely, most correctly, as I was just saying, this would be called a true lie, the ignorance in the soul of the one who has been deceived, since the lie in words is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, and an image produced later, not a completely unmixed lie. 13.3.31 Is it not so? Certainly. The lie in reality, then, is hated not only by gods, but also by men. It seems so to me. What then? The lie in words, when and wherein is it useful, so as not to be deserving of hatred? Is it not against our enemies, and of those who are called friends, when through madness or some folly they attempt to do something bad, that it then becomes useful as a sort of medicine for the sake of turning them from it? 13.3.32 and in the mythologies we were just speaking of, because of not knowing the truth about ancient things, making the lie like the truth

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ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται, οἷον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἱλήσεών τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατόν τε καὶ χαριέστατον ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται; Πῶς δ' οὔ; 13.3.21 Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ' ἄν τι πάθος ἔξωθεν ταράξειέ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειε; Ναί. Καὶ μήν που καὶ τά γε ξύνθετα πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα 13.3.22 ἀλλοιοῦται. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται. Ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντη ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Ταύτη μὲν δὴ ἥκιστ' ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός. Ἥκιστα δή. Ἀλλ' ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μετα13.3.23 βάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ; ∆ηλονότι, ἔφη, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ αἴσχιον αὑ τοῦ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. Ὀρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἄν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἑκὼν αὑτὸν χείρω ποιεῖν 13.3.24 ὁπηοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ θεὸν ἐθέλειν αὑτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ. Πᾶσα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν ὡς θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι, παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας· 13.3.25 μηδὲ Πρωτέως τε καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδεὶς μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις. 13.3.26 καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθωσαν· μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοί τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ζῴοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας 13.3.27 ἀπεργάζωνται δειλοτέρους. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ἆρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοί εἰσιν οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμᾶς δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι ὁ θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φαντάσματα προτείνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, 13.3.28 ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσι; Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οἶσθά που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι. Οὐδὲ νῦν 13.3.29 πω, ἦ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω. Οἴει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστ' ἂν δέξαιντο 13.3.30 καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Πολύ γ', ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γε ἄν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου ἄγνοια, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστι παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. 13.3.31 ἢ οὐχ οὕτω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. ∆οκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ ἐν τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἆρ' οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνε13.3.32 ται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπη τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος