ARTICLE II

In the Second Article We Ask: DID THE SOUL OF CHRIST SEE THE WORD THROUGH A HABIT?

Difficulties:

It seems that it did not, for

1. To see through a habit is to see through a medium. But the soul of Christ sees the Word without a medium. Therefore, it does not see it through a habit.

2. The soul of Christ is beatified because it sees the Word. But beatitude, or happiness, consists not in habit but in act, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not see the Word through a habit.

3. The more simple a thing is, the closer it is to God. And the closer it is to God, the more noble it is. Therefore, since the soul of Christ has nobility especially because it sees God perfectly, it seems that it gets no composition in that vision, as it would if it understood the Word through a habit conjoined to the soul.

4. The soul of Christ is more noble than the angels, especially with reference to what belongs to vision of the Word. But the angels do not see the Word through habits, since, as Maximus says: "It is not fitting to think that the great Dionysius said that attributes [habitudines] exist in divine intellects in the manner of accidents, as they do in us, and that they exist differently in different subjects, as if they were made into qualities. For every accident is excluded from those divine intellects." Therefore, neither did the soul of Christ see the Word through a habit.

5. The soul of Christ can be considered only as united to the Word, or according to its own nature. But, in so far as it is united to the Word, it does not befit it to see the Word through the medium of a habit, since it is not united to the Word through the medium of a habit. Likewise, this does not befit it by reason of its proper nature, for, just as every whole is greater than the part, so every whole is better and more perfect than any of its parts. But a part of the soul, the agent intellect, carries on its activity without the mediation of a habit, and this seems to pertain to the nobility of the agent intellect. So, with much greater reason, the whole soul engages in activity without the mediation of a habit. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not in any way see the Word through a habit.

6. As the Gloss says: "After God there is nothing better than the nature of the human mind such as Christ assumed." But some creatures even without sense perform their activities without the mediation of a habit. And this seems to pertain to their nobility, since in this they are like God. Therefore, the soul of Christ with much greater reason performs its activity without any habit. Thus, we conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

1'. No passive power can perform its activity unless it is perfected by the form of its corresponding active agent, since a thing operates only in so far as it is in act. But the possible intellect, by which the soul of Christ understood, was a passive power. Therefore, it could not understand unless it was perfected through the form of its corresponding active principle, that is to say, unless it was perfected by something intelligible. But a habit in the understanding seems to be nothing other than the species of intelligible things in the understanding. Therefore, the soul of Christ saw God and understood through the mediation of a habit.

2'. It did not befit the Son of God to assume anything but a perfect intellective power. But the active power is made perfect through the habit of knowledge. Therefore, He assumed habitual knowledge.

REPLY:

For a clear understanding of this question we must know what a habit is, and why we need habits.

At first sight, habit seems to mean something added to a power, by which power receives the perfection needed for its activity. A power, however, needs some addition for two reasons: because of the state of its nature, and because of the nature of the power of itself. Nor is this without reason, since the activity, which proceeds from a power, depends on the nature which is the source of the power.

A power needs something for its activity because of its nature, for example, when the activity is such that it is beyond the capacity and condition of the nature. In this way, to love God with the love of fellowship, as a sharer in His inheritance, is beyond the condition of human nature. Hence, our affective power needs the habit of charity for this activity. A power needs something by reason of the power itself, however, when it is ordained to objects of such a nature that it can in no wise of itself perfectly possess their act. Thus, the power of sight is ordained to knowledge of all colors, but it was not possible for all colors actually to exist in the organ of sight. Therefore, things were ordained differently, namely, that the power of sight could be given the likeness of any color and so proceed to the act of sight.

Still, we must bear in mind that that which is added to a power is sometimes received in it as a habit, and sometimes after the manner of a transient impression.

This latter is the case when that which is received does not remain within the recipient, and does not become a quality of the recipient, but is impressed on it by a kind of contact from some agent, and quickly passes on. Thus, the Philosopher says that, when one suddenly blushes because of shame, the redness is "a transient impression" and not an affective "quality."

But that which is received is retained as a habit when it becomes in a sense connatural to the receiver. For this reason, the Philosopher says that a habit is a quality which is hard to change. Hence it is, also, that activities which proceed from a habit are pleasurable, readily undertaken, and easily performed, since they have, in a sense, become connatural.

Accordingly, what is supplementary in the sense powers is not given as a habit, but as a transient impression. But in the intellective powers of the soul the supplement is given as a habit. For the sensitive part is led by natural instinct rather than taking the lead itself, whereas the intellective part has the direction of its acts. Therefore, it should have a readiness to act, so that it can engage in activity when it pleases.

From what has been said, it is evident that a power is more perfect when it receives something as a habit than if it receives it only as a transient impression. Therefore, we must say that anything supplementary to the soul of Christ is there as a habit.

For both of the reasons we have given we must say that there is some addition to the soul of Christ. By reason of the nature, for vision of the divine essence is above the state of any created nature. Consequently, no creature can reach this unless it is elevated to that blessed vision by some light. In some, for example those enraptured, this light is received as a temporary impression and transiently. But in Christ it was there as a habit, making the soul of Christ beatified from the beginning of its existence.

By reason of the power, however, the intellect of the human soul is in potency to all things. However, it is impossible for any created being to be perfectly the act and likeness of all beings, for, thus, it would possess the nature of being in an infinite manner. Hence, only God can understand all things by Himself and without any addition. But every created intellect understands through some species given it, either acquired by it, as happens with us, or given in creation or infused, as in the angels. And what belongs to angels by reason of the state of their nature, that is to say, to have the species of all things infused in them from their creation, was conferred on the soul of Christ in a much more excellent way by reason of the fullness of grace. But through the mediation of these species it did not know the Word, but only created things.

Therefore, it must be said that in the knowledge with which the soul of Christ saw the Word it needed the habit which is light, not as that through which something would become actually intelligible, as happens in us with the light of the agent intellect, but as that through which the created understanding would be elevated to that which is above it. But, for knowledge of other creatures, it had the habit which is the aggregate of the species ordained to knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The soul of Christ sees the Word without that medium which consists in a likeness of the thing seen, as the species in the eye is a likeness of the visible thing, or a mirror is a likeness of the thing reflected. But it does not see the Word without that medium which is a disposition of the one seeing. Thus, the argument is not valid.

2. When one says that happiness is not habitual, this should be understood of the habit from which an act does not proceed. For one who has something habitually and not actually is like one who is asleep. But, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, the act in which happiness consists must proceed from some habit. Otherwise, the activity would not be pleasurable and perfect.

3. According to Dionysius, the situation is not the same in participations and participants, for, the more simple participations are, the more noble they are, as to exist than to live, and to live than to understand, if by our understanding we separate existence and life in order to compare them. But, among participants, the more composed a thing is (not, of course, with material composition, but by reason of reception of more participations), the more noble it is, because it is like God in so many more things. This kind of assimilation can come only from something received from God. Hence, also, the soul which besides its nature has habits perfecting it is more noble.

4. The words of Maximus should be taken of separable accidents and those belonging to [physical] nature, for, if they had accidents of this sort, they would be subject to change, and not immaterial and subsistent essences. Consequently, he adds: "For if it were this, their essence would certainly not remain within itself." And he concludes: "Therefore, their attributes [habitudines] and powers are essential to them because of their immateriality." And he calls essential that which never leaves the essence.

5. The union in Christ does not terminate in activity but in existence. Therefore, in so far as the soul is united to the Word, speaking of what is immediate, it is not entitled to sight of the Word or any other activity, but to this only, namely, existence in the person of the Word. However, its activities belong to it by reason of its powers and its nature. And, although the whole soul is more perfect than the agent intellect, no other power of the soul is more noble than the agent intellect. Hence, the fact that the agent intellect does not need a habit does not mean that the possible intellect must not need one. For the agent intellect needs no habit for its activity, because it does not receive anything from intelligible things, but gives its own form to them by making them actually intelligible. The possible intellect, however, has just the opposite relation to intelligible things.

6. Natural powers are limited to one thing, so they reach their objects of themselves and do not need anything supplementary in order to act. But rational powers are ordained to many things, and this is an indication of their nobility. Therefore, the case is not the same.