ARTICLE IV

In the Fourth Article We Ask: DOES THE SOUL OF CHRIST KNOW IN THE WORD ALL THAT THE WORD KNOWS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. God knows an infinite multitude of things, as Augustine says. But, since the soul of Christ is finite, it cannot know an infinite multitude of things. Therefore, in the Word the soul of Christ cannot know all that God knows.

2. It was said that by its union with the Word the soul of Christ is strengthened, and thus can know an infinite multitude of things.--On the contrary, the activity of the soul of Christ proceeds from it through the mediation not of the Word but of its own power. But its power is not infinite, since its essence is finite. Therefore, neither can its operation extend to the knowledge of an infinite multitude of things, although the Word to whom it is united is infinite.

3. In the union of the human and the divine nature, as Damascene says, "the uncreated remains uncreated, and the created remains created." But the capacity and activity of any created thing is finite. Therefore, from its union with the Word, the soul of Christ did not receive the ability to know an infinite multitude of things.

4. Since the Word is infinite, it is fitting that He not only know an infinite multitude of things but also comprehend the infinite, that is to say, God. Therefore, if from its union with the Word the soul of Christ received knowledge of an infinite multitude of things, with equal reason, from the same union, it should have received comprehension of God. But this is false.

5. The activity by which the soul of Christ knew an infinite multitude of things was either the Creator or a creature. If it was the creator, it proceeded from the soul of Christ, which is a creature. Therefore, the Creator proceeded from a creature, which is impossible. If it is a creature--and every creature is finite--then that activity is finite. So, an infinite multitude of things are not known through it.

6. It was said that, although the activity is finite, it has an ordination to an infinite multitude of things.--On the contrary, that relation by which it is ordained to what is infinite is either the Creator or a creature. And we can proceed in the same way as before.

7. Since everything known is known through some species, if the soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things, it will know them through a finite or an infinite species. But it does not know them through an infinite species, since no created species is infinite. But, if it knows them through a finite species--and such a species does not represent an infinite multitude of things--then it is impossible for the soul of Christ to know an infinite multitude of things.

8. It was said that, although the species by which the soul of Christ knows is created, still, from its union with the Word of God, it becomes a representation for knowing an infinite multitude of things.--On the contrary, union with the Word does not elevate a creature beyond the limits of creaturehood. For what is created can in no way become uncreated. But it is beyond the limits of creaturehood to be a representation of an infinite multitude of things. Therefore, no created species is elevated to this by union [with the Word].

9. Isidore says that the assumed man was made equal to the Word neither in knowledge nor in anything else. Consequently, not in number of things known. Therefore.

10. We can say that two quantities of equal length but unequal width are in some way equal. But, just as a quantity is called large by reason of several dimensions, so knowledge is called great for different reasons, both because of the number of things known and because of the clarity of the cognition. Accordingly, if the knowledge of the soul of Christ is made equal to the knowledge of God in the number of things known, although not in clearness and distinctness of the cognition, it can be said that the knowledge of the soul of Christ is in some way equal to the divine knowledge. But it seems absurd to make a creature equal to the Creator in anything.

11. Along with our nature, Christ took on those defects which did not hinder the purpose for which He assumed it, namely, our redemption. But a lack of knowledge of many things would never have hindered our redemption, as, for example, if Christ would not have known the number of pebbles in the bed of some river. Therefore, we should not say that Christ knew everything.

12. It was said that, although knowledge of such things would not help toward the end of our redemption, ignorance of these things would derogate from Christ's perfection.--On the contrary, ignorance is opposed to the perfection of the soul in the way hunger and thirst are opposed to the perfection of the body. But Christ took on hunger and thirst because they were not obstacles to our redemption. Therefore, with equal reason He should have assumed ignorance of many things.

13. Ambrose says: "Every nature is bounded by its given limits." But nothing of this sort extends to an infinite multitude of things. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not know an infinite multitude of things.

14. Just as knowledge is said to be infinite in extension in as far as one knows an infinite multitude of things, so it is said to be infinite in intensity in as far as one knows with infinite clearness. But Christ's knowledge was not infinite in intensity, since, if it were, it would be equal to God's knowledge in clearness. Therefore, it was not infinite in extension, either. Hence He did not know an infinite number of things, or all that God knows.

To the Contrary:

1'. Commenting on the Apocalypse (5:12), "The Lamb . . . is worthy to receive . . . wisdom," the Gloss says: ". . . knowledge of all things which God knows." Therefore, the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows.

2'. By one infinite, it is possible to know an infinite multitude of things, since God knows an infinite multitude of things by His essence, which is infinite. But the soul of Christ saw the Word, which is infinite, and through the Word it sees other things. Therefore, it can know an infinite multitude of things.

3'. In Colossians (1:19) we read: "Because in him [Christ], it hath well pleased the Father, that all fullness [of divinity] should dwell." But this would not be so unless He knew all that God knows. Therefore, the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows.

4'. Whatever can be communicated to any creature was communicated to the soul of Christ. But the knowledge of all things can be communicated to a creature, for, according to the Philosopher, the possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible things. Therefore, God conferred on the soul of Christ the vision of all things in the Word.

REPLY:

For a clear understanding of this question we must grasp what it means to see something in the Word. Therefore, we must remember that a thing can be seen in something only in the way in which it exists in that thing. However, there are two ways in which a number of things can come to exist in one thing. In one way, they exist there in separation and multiplicity, as for instance, with many forms, each is reflected separately in a mirror, and as many men are in one house. In the other way, they are there according to one simple form, as many effects exist virtually in a cause, as conclusions in a principle, and as bodily members in seed.

Accordingly, whoever sees anything must, as a consequence, also see those things which exist in it in multiplicity and division. For each one of them presents itself to him in the same way as that single thing in which they are contained presents itself. To this extent, one who sees a mirror sees the forms reflected by the mirror. But one who sees some one thing does not have to see all the things which exist in it as united in one form, except when he comprehends the total power of that one thing. Thus, one who sees some principle does not have to see all the conclusions which exist virtually in it, unless he comprehends the principle.

But created things are not in God in multiplicity, but in unity, as Dionysius says. Hence, when we say that a thing is in God, this is more like the manner in which effects are in a cause and conclusions in a principle, than like the manner in which forms are in a mirror. Therefore, one who sees the Word does not have to see everything which the Word sees in Himself, as some have said, using the example of forms which are seen in a mirror when one sees the mirror. For the Word has comprehensive knowledge of Himself, so that, seeing Himself, He knows all the things which are in Him virtually and in unity.

But created intellects, which do not have a comprehensive grasp of the Word, do not necessarily see all that is in the Word when they see the Word. But, even in this, the soul of Christ enjoyed a greater privilege than any [other] created intellect. For in the Word it sees all things, present, past, and future.

The reason for this is that there is a double relation of God to creatures, since He is the principle and end of all things. We have one of these in so far as all things proceed from God into being, and the other in so far as they are ordained to God as to their end. Some, as the irrational creatures, are thus ordained only by assimilation; others, however, are thus ordained both by assimilation and also by attaining the divine essence itself. For it is innate in every creature proceeding from God to strive for the good by its activity. But a creature is assimilated to God in attaining any good whatsoever. But, beyond this, rational creatures by their activity can attain to knowledge and love of God. Consequently, they, beyond other creatures, have a capacity for beatitude.

The Creator, however, surpasses creatures in both of these relations. In the first, because over and above everything which God has made He can still make other different things, new species, new genera, and other worlds. And that which has been made can never exhaust the power of the Maker. And He surpasses creatures in the second relation because, no matter how much a creature shares the good, it can never reach the point where it is equal to God's goodness. Also, no matter how much a rational creature knows and loves God, it can never know and love Him as perfectly as He can be known and loved.

And, just as creatures would be imperfect if they proceeded from God and were not ordained to return to God, so, too, their procession from God would be imperfect unless the return to God were equal to the procession. Therefore, every creature participates in goodness to the extent to which it participates in being. Thus, it is necessary for the most excellent created intellects to know God, so that their knowledge be equal to the procession of creatures from God. But things proceed from God naturally and according to the order of grace. Hence, the created intellects, that is, the angels, who in the natural order are set at the peak of creation, receive knowledge of all natural things in God and from God. But Christ stands above every creature also according to the gifts of grace, since "of his fullness we all have received, and grace for grace" (John 1:16). Therefore, He received in God knowledge of all things which proceed from God at any time, not only according to the order of nature, but also according to the order of grace.

Therefore, the soul of Christ knows all creatures not only according to their natural properties, as the angels also do, but even in so far as they are subject to divine providence and are ordered to the end of human salvation and the gifts of grace. Therefore, He knows all individual things and every single act of all things, even the secret thoughts of men's hearts. This can be said of no other creature. Nevertheless, because this does not reach the point where it includes comprehensive grasp of God's infinity, God still has the power to do many other things than those which the soul of Christ knows.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The common answer to this objection is that God knows some things with the knowledge of vision, namely, present, past, and future things. And granted that the world has a beginning and an end, these are not infinite. We say that God sees only these because vision concerns things which exist in themselves outside the understanding of the one who sees them. However, He knows some things with the knowledge of simple intelligence, namely, those which He can make, but which will never exist. These things are infinite. And we say that God understands these things by means of the representation which His understanding can use to form quiddities of things which do not exist outside of Him. Accordingly, the soul of Christ sees all things, present, past, and future, in the Word; nevertheless, it does not see everything which God can make, and thus it does not follow that it knows an infinite multitude of things.

But that answer does not meet the force of the difficulty. For, if we grant that generation might continue to infinity in the future, as God could so make it, it is evident that there would be an infinite multitude of men, and God would know them all by knowledge of vision. Hence, if the soul of Christ knew everything that God knows with the knowledge of vision, it would follow that it would know an infinite multitude of things, although it would not know everything which God can do. For, besides an infinite multitude of individuals of these finite species, God can make an infinite multitude of different species and an infinite multitude of individuals in each species, as is clear especially in the ratios of numbers.

For, if we take the individuals in one species of ratio, they will be multiplied to infinity. Thus, in the species of doubling there is the ratio of two to one, four to two, six to three, and so on to infinity. And again, besides the ratio of doubling, there is another species, that of triple, and also of quadruple, and quintuple, and so on to infinity. Yet each of these contains potentially an infinite multitude of individuals. Consequently, if generation were to continue to infinity according to these species which are now finite, God could still make more, because He could make new species, and this to infinity. It is clear from this that it does not mean the same thing to say that the soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things and that it knows all that God can make.

Furthermore, in knowing all creatures with the knowledge of vision, God has a comprehensive grasp of them, so He knows whatever is in the potency of creatures. But there is an infinity in the potency of creatures, as is evident in the division of the continuum and in the addition of numbers. Hence, since the soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge of creatures, it knows the infinite number of things which are in creatures potentially.

Besides, if the souls of the damned exist forever, and their thoughts, all of which God knows, will be changing, God now knows an infinite multitude of future things with the knowledge of vision. Hence, if the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows with the knowledge of the vision, we must say that it knows an infinite multitude of things.

Hence, we have to give a different answer, and say that in reality we find something which is simply and in every way infinite, namely, God. And there is something finite in every way, namely, material things. Moreover, there is something which is finite in some sense and infinite in some sense, for any immaterial substance is finite in so far as it has existence limited to its own nature, since no created substance, although immaterial, is its own existence, but participates in existence. Nevertheless, it is infinite by reason of the removal of that limitation by which a form is limited by the very fact of its reception into matter. For everything received exists in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient.

Therefore, in so far as a thing is infinite, it is related to the infinite by its activity. For that which is infinite both because of its existence and its immateriality, namely God, is related to infinity through its operation by reason both of its matter, or quantity, and of its specific or generic nature. Consequently, God can know an infinite multitude of individuals and an infinite multitude of species because He knows all that He can do, and He can make new species to infinity. Besides this, since a thing acts in so far as it is in act, just as God's being is infinite, so also His activity is infinitely efficacious.

But a material thing is not related to an infinite multitude of things either as infinite according to quantity or matter, or as infinite according to species. This is evident in sight, which is a material power and, accordingly, cannot know any species whatever, but a determined species, color. Nor can it know an infinite number of things except successively. For, since it is material, its activity is material, and attains to things which are numerically infinite according to continuous or discrete quantity, and this is material infinity. It does this in the way in which they are infinite, that is to say, materially, numbering part after part. Therefore, it can never arrive at knowledge of an infinite number of individuals. And since our understanding in the present state receives from sense, neither can it know an infinite number of things in this way.

But immaterial substances, which are in some sense infinite and in some sense finite, have limited existence, and because of this their activity has finite efficacy and is ordained to finite natures. But, because they are immaterial, their activity extends to things materially infinite. Hence, as the Commentator says, our understanding appears to be infinite in some respect, in so far as it knows the universal, in which an infinite number of singulars are known. But it is deficient in this, that the universal species which understanding perceives, that of man, for example, is not a perfect representation for knowledge of any individual in its individuality.

However, if that were the case, then our understanding, granted that there were an infinite number of men, would still know these materially infinite things through one finite nature, human nature. For, although in an infinite multitude of men human nature would be infinite quantitatively or materially, it would not be infinite specifically. This is clear from the fact that there can be other species outside of the infinite multitude of men. And the proper object of understanding is the specific nature, not matter. The case would be similar with one who, by means of the nature of animal, would know all species of animals in their specific qualities. For if there were an actually infinite number of species of animals, he would indeed know an infinite species but only a finite nature, since, besides the nature of animal, there is still the nature of stone.

Therefore, since the soul of Christ knows the Word, which is a sufficient representation for knowledge of all individuals in their individuality, and all species in their specific qualities, nothing prevents the soul of Christ from knowing an infinite multitude of things, even though its being is finite. Nevertheless, it cannot have a comprehensive grasp of infinite nature.

2. The soul of Christ is not elevated above the limits of creaturehood by its union with the Word. Therefore, it does not become infinite, does not have infinite power, and its activity is not intrinsically infinite, although it does know an infinite multitude of things. For it knows an infinite multitude of things with a finite power. As a result, it remains infinite only materially.

3. The solution to the third difficulty is clear from the second response.

4. Comprehensive grasp of the infinite can come only through an activity which has infinite efficacy. For God Himself is known comprehensively by an intellect when it has as much efficacy to understand as God has to be understood. Consequently, He can be known comprehensively only by an uncreated intellect. But knowledge of an infinite multitude of things does not demand infinite efficacy in intellectual activity, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.

5-6. The solution to the fifth and sixth difficulties is clear from what has been said.

7. The soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things through an uncreated species in the way we have described, that is, through the divine essence itself. And, since this is infinite, nothing prevents it from containing the intelligibility of an infinite multitude of things.

8. The solution to the eighth difficulty is clear from what has been said.

9. The man assumed [by the Word] was not made equal to the Word in the number of things known, although he knew an infinite multitude of things. For it still does not follow that he knows everything which God can make as is clear from what has been said. And, granting that he knew all that the Word knows, even though the number were equal in both, he is not made equal in the number of things known with reference to the manner of knowing.

10. Essentially, any dimension belongs to measurable quantity. Therefore, one body can be said to be equal to another according to any dimension in which it is equal to the other. But quantity of knowledge, which is considered according to the number of things known, belongs to it accidentally and materially, especially when in the many objects of knowledge there is a single intelligible aspect by which they are known. It would be different if they were known according to different intelligible aspects. But the quantity which comes from efficacy of knowledge belongs essentially to knowledge, since such quantity is considered according to the procession of intellectual activity from the intellectual power. Therefore, the situation is not the same.

11. The Son of God did not assume all the defects which could have existed in Him without interfering with the redemption of men. But it is true that He assumed those whose assumption aided in the redemption of the human race. Nevertheless, any lack of knowledge whatever would have been a defect which hindered the redemption of the human race. For the Redeemer, through whom grace and truth were to be diffused throughout the whole human race, needed the fullness of grace and truth. And any defect of knowledge could have been prejudicial to this.

12. Through His bodily weakness Christ came to heal the weakness of soul which consists in a lack of grace and knowledge. Therefore, although He did assume bodily defects, He should not in any way have assumed any defect of knowledge or grace.

13. The solution to this thirteenth difficulty is clear from what has been said.

14. Extensive quantity, as is clear from what has been said, is accidental to knowledge. But intensive quantity is essential to it, as is also clear from our explanation. Therefore, the situation is not the same.