192

the nature is different20. For he who is at war with himself would not signify things distinct in nature by an identity of appellations. But since the principle of the essence is one in the Father and the Son, for this reason he says that that one is most properly so, and this one is also most properly so. And human custom bears witness to the argument, applying "most properly" to nothing for which the name is not true in nature. For example, we call a likeness a man by an improper use of the term, but we properly name by this word the living being shown in nature; and likewise the word of Scripture knows to call an idol and a demon and the belly "god", but the title does not have "properly", and all other things 3.2.85 in the same way. Someone is said to have eaten according to a dream-fantasy, but it is not possible to call the fantasy a proper meal. Therefore, just as in the case of two men existing according to nature, we properly address each of them by the word "man", but if someone were to count a lifeless image along with the man who exists in truth, he might perhaps say "two men"—the one who truly is and the likeness—but he would no longer testify that "properly" applies to both, so, if the nature of the Only-begotten were conceived as something other than the essence of the Father, the writer would not have named each of the essences 20most properly so20. For how could anyone signify things that differ in nature by an identity of names? 3.2.86 But it seems that the truth is made manifest even through those who fight against it, as falsehood is not able to prevail at all over the truth, not even in the voices of its enemies. For this reason the doctrine of piety is proclaimed by the mouth of opponents who do not even know what they are saying; just as the saving passion of the Lord on our behalf was foretold by Caiaphas, who did not know what he was saying. Therefore, if "20most properly so20" is common to the essence of both, I mean of the Father and of the Son, what room is there for saying that 20the essences are different20 from one another? Or how is a difference with respect to the more powerful and greater and more honorable contemplated in them, when the most proper essence admits no 3.2.87 diminution? For that which exists imperfectly, whatever it may be, does not exist properly—not nature, not power, not rank, nor anything else of things considered individually—so that the superiority of the Father in essence, as the heresy wishes, proves the imperfection of the essence of the Only-begotten. If therefore it is imperfect, it is not proper; but if it is 20most proper20, it is also completely perfect; for it is not in the nature of what is deficient to be named perfect. But not even when comparing perfect with perfect is it possible to conceive of any difference arising from excess or deficiency; for the perfection in both is one, as if by a rule, neither being hollowed out by what is lacking nor being uneven 3.2.88 by what is excessive. So then, from what has been said, one can sufficiently see Eunomius's advocacy for our doctrine, or rather, not his zeal for us, but his battle against himself. For by the very arguments with which he establishes our doctrine, he turns his contrivances against himself. But let us again follow what is written, word for word, so that it may become clear to all that, apart from the will to do evil, their argument has no strength for its wickedness. 3.2.89 Let us hear, then, what was said: 20one might reasonably say that the most proper and first and only essence, which subsisted by the energy of the Father, admits to itself the appellations of offspring and product and creature20. Who does not know that what separates the Church from the heresy is the term "creature" said of the Son? Therefore, since the difference in doctrine is admitted by all, what was more reasonable for one who is attempting to show that his own suppositions are truer than ours to do? Plainly, to construct his own argument, by which it was possible, proving that one must think the Lord is created, or, having omitted this, to legislate for his hearers so as to state disputed matters 3.2.90 as if they were agreed upon? I for my part say the former; but perhaps also

192

ἡ φύσις διάφορος20. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διεστῶτα τῇ φύσει τῇ ταὐτότητι τῶν προσηγοριῶν διεσήμαινεν ὁ ἑαυτῷ μαχό μενος. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ εἷς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος, διὰ τοῦτο πάντως κυριωτάτην μὲν ἐκείνην, κυριω τάτην δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶναί φησι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων συνήθεια, μηδενὶ τὸ κυριώτατον ἐφαρμό ζουσα, ᾧ μὴ συναληθεύεται τῇ φύσει τὸ ὄνομα. οἷον ἄν θρωπον ἐκ καταχρήσεως τὸ ὁμοίωμα λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τῇ φωνῇ ταύτῃ κατονομάζομεν τὸ ζῷον τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει δεικνύμενον· καὶ θεὸν ὡσαύτως εἴδωλόν τε καὶ δαιμόνιον καὶ κοιλίαν οἶδεν ὁ τῆς γραφῆς λόγος προσαγορεύειν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ κύριον ἡ κλῆσις ἔχει, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα 3.2.85 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. βεβρωκέναι τις κατὰ τὴν ἐνύπνιον φαντασίαν λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι κυρίαν βρῶσιν τὴν φαντα σίαν εἰπεῖν. ὥσπερ τοίνυν ἐπίσης ἐπὶ δύο τινῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ φύσιν ὑφεστηκότων ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν κυρίως τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσαγορεύομεν, εἰ δὲ τὴν ἄψυχόν τις εἰκόνα πρὸς τὸν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπον συνθεὶς ἀριθμήσειε, δύο μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἴσως ἂν εἴποι τόν τε ἀληθῶς ὄντα καὶ τὸ ὁμοίωμα, οὐκέτι δ' ἂν καὶ τὸ κύριον ἀμφοτέροις προσμαρτυρήσειεν, οὕτως εἴπερ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πα τρὸς οὐσίαν ἡ τοῦ μονογενοῦς φύσις ὑπενοεῖτο, οὐκ ἂν 20κυ ριωτάτην20 ἑκατέραν τῶν οὐσιῶν ὁ λογογράφος ὠνόμασε. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ διαφέροντα τῇ φύσει τῇ ταὐτότητι τῶν ὀνομάτων σημάνειεν; 3.2.86 Ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ διὰ τῶν πολεμούντων αὐτῇ φανεροῦσθαι, μὴ δυναμένου καθάπαξ μηδὲ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν φωναῖς ὑπερισχύειν τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ ψεύ δους. διὰ τοῦτο τῷ στόματι τῶν ἀντικειμένων καὶ μὴ εἰδότων ἃ λέγουσιν ὁ τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀνακηρύσσεται λόγος· καθάπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καϊάφα τὸ σωτήριον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοῦ κυρίου πάθος προηγόρευτο, οὐκ εἰδότος ὃ λέγει. οὐκοῦν εἰ κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων τῆς οὐσίας τὸ 20κυριώτατον20, τοῦ πατρὸς λέγω καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τίνα χώραν ἔχει τὸ 20παρηλ λάχθαι τὰς οὐσίας20 ἀλλήλων λέγειν; ἢ πῶς ἐν αὐταῖς ἡ πρὸς τὸ δυνατώτερόν τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ προτιμότερον ἐν θεωρεῖται διαφορά, τῆς κυριωτάτης οὐσίας οὐδεμίαν παρα 3.2.87 δεχομένης ἐλάττωσιν; τὸ γὰρ ἀτελῶς ὄν, ὅτι περ ἂν ᾖ, κυρίως οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ φύσις, οὐ δύναμις, οὐκ ἀξίωμα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον θεωρουμένων οὐδέν, ὥστε ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπεροχή, καθὼς ἡ αἵρεσις βούλεται, τὸ ἀτελὲς τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ μονογενοῦς διελέγχει. εἰ οὖν ἀτελής, οὐ κυρία· εἰ δὲ 20κυριωτάτη20, καὶ τελεία πάντως· τέλειον γὰρ τὸ ἐλλιπὲς ὀνομάζεσθαι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συγκριτικῶς ἀντιπαρατιθεμένου τελείου πρὸς τέλειον, δια φοράν τινα κατὰ πλεονασμὸν ἢ ἔλλειψιν γινομένην δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοῆσαι· μία γὰρ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κανόνος ἡ τελειότης, οὔτε κοιλαινομένη τῷ λείποντι οὔτε ἀνωμαλοῦσα 3.2.88 τῷ πλεονάζοντι. τὴν μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς δόγ ματος τοῦ Εὐνομίου συνηγορίαν ἱκανῶς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν σπουδήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μάχην. δι' ὧν γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα τοῖς ἰδίοις συνίστησι λόγοις, καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τρέπει τὰ μηχα νήματα. ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν ἀκολουθήσωμεν, ὡς ἂν φανερὸν γένοιτο πᾶσιν ὅτι πλὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι κακουργεῖν οὐδεμίαν ἰσχὺν πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ὁ παρ' αὐτῶν λόγος ἔχει. 3.2.89 Ἀκούσωμεν τοίνυν τῶν εἰρημένων· 20εἰκότως φαίη τις ἂν τὴν κυριωτάτην καὶ πρώτην καὶ μόνην ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας20. τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ χωρίζον ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἡ τοῦ κτίσματός ἐστι φωνὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ λεγομένη; οὐκοῦν ὁμολογουμένης παρὰ πᾶσι τῆς κατὰ τὸ δόγμα διαφορᾶς, τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα δεικνύειν τῶν ἡμετέρων τὰς ἰδίας ὑπο λήψεις ἀληθεστέρας τί πράττειν εὐλογώτερον ἦν, κατα σκευάζειν δηλονότι τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, δι' ὧν οἷόν τε ἦν, ἀπο δεικνύντα κτιστὸν τὸν κύριον εἶναι δεῖν οἴεσθαι, ἢ τοῦτον παρέντα νομοθετεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὡς ὁμολογούμενα τὰ 3.2.90 ἀμφιβαλλόμενα λέγειν; ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκεῖνό φημι· τάχα δὲ καὶ