194

and to bring forward those who are weighty and firm in their thoughts; but as long as the argument is presented to them unconstructed and unproven, who is so foolish and beast-like as to make the teaching of the evangelists and apostles and of those who in succession shone in the churches weaker than this unproven nonsense? 3.2.100 Let us see also the most difficult-to-detect part of the cleverness of the writer, how with an abundance of dialectical experience he cleverly draws the more simple-minded to the opposite view. He has added to the designation of 20made thing20 and 20creature20 also the term of 20offspring20, saying that the substance of the Son admits these names to itself, and as if delivering a public speech in an assembly of drunkards he thinks that to no one will his own malice concerning the dogma become manifest. For by joining 'offspring' with 'creature' and 'made thing', he thinks to steal away the difference in the meaning of the names through the syntax of things that have nothing in common. 3.2.101 These are the clever devices of dialectic. But we who are laymen in speech do not deny that we are this in voice and tongue, which the argument shows about us, but we confess that ears, as the prophet says, have been prepared for us too for intelligent hearing. Therefore we are in no way led into confusion of meanings by the conjunction of names that have nothing in common; but even if the great apostle should name at the same time wood and hay and stubble, gold and silver and precious stones, we both reckon the number of things mentioned in sum, and we will not be ignorant of the specific nature of each of the things named. 3.2.102 So also now, with 20offspring and made thing20 mentioned at the same time, passing from the terms to their meanings, we do not perceive the same thought in each of the names; for 'creature' means one thing and 'offspring' means another, so that even if he mixes the unmixable, the intelligent hearer will hear with discernment and will show that it is among the impossible things for any one nature to admit to itself the designation of 'offspring' and 'creature'. For if one of these were true, the other would of necessity be false, so that if it were a creature, it would not be an offspring, and conversely, if it were called an offspring, it would be alien to the designation of 'creature'. 3.2.103 But Eunomius says that 20the substance of the Son admits to itself the designations of offspring and made thing and creature20. Has he by what follows perhaps secured this headless and rootless argument (since no power was laid down by the first parts for what is being constructed) or does the rest also partake of the same futility, not acquiring its strength from any alliance of reasoning, but having an exposition of the blasphemy that is discursive and unconstructed, as in the telling of dreams? 3.2.104 For he adds these things to what has been said, that it has 20a birth without intermediary, but indivisibly preserves its relation to the one who begot and made and created it20. For if, leaving aside 'without intermediary' and 'indivisibly', we were to consider the meaning of the words on its own, we will find that everywhere the nonsense of the teaching is thrown at the ears of the deceived, being strengthened by no argument. 20The one who begot20, he says, 20and created and made20. 3.2.105 Though these seem to be three, they contain the meaning of two thoughts, since the two terms are equivalent to each other in sense. For 'to make' is the same as 'to create', but begetting is different from what has been said. Since, therefore, the common understanding of men is divided toward different senses from the meaning of the words, what argument has shown us that 'made thing' is the same as 'begetting', so that we might adapt the one 3.2.106 substance to the difference of the words? For as long as the customary meaning of the words prevails and no argument is found that alters the significations of the words to the contrary, not

194

καὶ τοὺς ἐμβριθεῖς τε καὶ βεβηκότας ταῖς διανοίαις προσάγεσθαι· ἕως δ' ἂν ἀκατάσκευος αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ λόγος προφέρηται, τίς οὕτως ἠλίθιος καὶ κτηνώδης, ὡς τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν τε καὶ ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν καθεξῆς ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις διαλαμψάντων ἀσθενεστέραν τὴν διδασκαλίαν τῆς ἀναποδείκτου φλυαρίας ποιήσασθαι; 3.2.100 Ἴδωμεν δὲ καὶ τὸ δυσφωρατότατον τῆς ἀγχινοίας τοῦ λογογράφου, ὅπως τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμπειρίας πρὸς τοὐναντίον εὐμηχάνως τοὺς ἀκεραιοτέρους ἐφέλκεται. προσέρριψε τῇ τοῦ 20ποιήματος20 καὶ 20κτίσματος20 προσ ηγορίᾳ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ 20γεννήματος20, εἰπὼν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μεθυόντων συνεδρίῳ δημηγορῶν οἴεται μηδενὶ κατά φωρον ἑαυτοῦ τὴν περὶ τὸ δόγμα κακουργίαν γενήσεσθαι. τῷ γὰρ συνάψαι τὸ γέννημα τῷ κτίσματί τε καὶ τῷ ποιή ματι ἐκκλέπτειν ἡγεῖται τὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκοινωνήτων συντάξεως. 3.2.101 ταῦτα τὰ σοφὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς μηχανήματα. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οἱ ἰδιῶται τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν, ὅπερ ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα, ὠτία δέ, καθώς φησιν ὁ προφήτης, κατηρ τίσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀκοὴν εὐσύνετον ὁμολογοῦμεν. διόπερ οὐδὲν διὰ τῆς συναφείας τῶν ἀκοινωνήτων ὀνομάτων εἰς τὴν τῶν σημαινομένων σύγχυσιν ὑπαγόμεθα· ἀλλὰ κἂν ὁ μέγας ἀπόστολος κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὀνομάσῃ ξύλα καὶ χόρτον καὶ καλάμην χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ λίθους τιμίους, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν μνημονευθέντων ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου συλ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου τῶν κατωνομασμένων 3.2.102 ἰδιαζόντως οὐκ ἀγνοήσομεν. οὕτω καὶ νῦν 20γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος20 κατὰ ταὐτὸν μνημονευθέντων, ἐκ τῶν φωνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα μεταβάντες οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐνθεωροῦμεν διάνοιαν· ἄλλο γάρ τι τὸ κτίσμα καὶ ἕτερον σημαίνει τὸ γέννημα, ὥστε κἂν ἐκεῖνος μιγνύῃ τὰ ἄμικτα, ὁ συνετὸς ἀκροατὴς διακεκριμένως ἀκού σεται καὶ δείξει τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ τὴν τοῦ κτίσματος προσηγορίαν μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύοιτο τούτων, ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον, ὥστε εἰ κτίσμα εἴη, μὴ εἶναι γέννημα, καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ γέννημα λέγοιτο, ἀλ λοτριοῦσθαι τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ κτίσματος. 3.2.103 Ἀλλά φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος 20εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας20. μή τι διὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων κατησφαλίσατο τὸν ἀκέφαλον τοῦτον καὶ ἄρριζον λόγον (ὡς οὐδεμία διὰ τῶν πρώτων κατε βλήθη πρὸς τὸ κατασκευαζόμενον δύναμις) ἢ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται ματαιότητος, οὐκ ἀπό τινος τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας τὴν ἰσχὺν προσλαβόντα, ἀλλὰ διεξο δικήν τε καὶ ἀκατάσκευον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνείρων διη 3.2.104 γήσεως τὴν τῆς βλασφημίας ἔκθεσιν ἔχοντα; λέγει γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπισυνάψας ταῦτα ὅτι 20ἀμεσίτευτον μὲν ἔχουσαν τὴν γέννησιν, ἀμερίστως δὲ σῴ ζουσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ πεποιη κότα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν20. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀμεσίτευτόν τε καὶ ἀμέριστον καταλιπόντες αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς θεωρή σαιμεν τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων διάνοιαν, εὑρήσομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ τὸ ληρῶδες τῆς διδασκαλίας δι' οὐδενὸς ἰσχυροποιούμενον λόγου ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τῶν ἀπατωμένων προσρίπτεται. 20τὸν γεγεννηκότα20, φησί, 20καὶ κτίσαντα καὶ ποιή 3.2.105 σαντα20. ταῦτα κἂν τρία δοκῇ, δύο νοημάτων περιέχει τὴν σημασίαν, τῷ τὰς δύο φωνὰς ἰσοδυναμεῖν ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν. τὸ γὰρ ποιῆσαι τῷ κτίσαι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ γέννησις. τῆς οὖν κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολήψεως πρὸς διαφόρους ἐννοίας ἐκ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων σημασίας μεριζομένης, τίς ἡμῖν ἐπέδειξε λόγος ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ γεννήσει τὸ ποίημα, ἵνα τὴν μίαν 3.2.106 οὐσίαν τῇ τῶν ῥημάτων διαφορᾷ προσαρμόσωμεν; ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἡ συνήθης κρατῇ σημασία τῶν λέξεων καὶ μηδεὶς εὑρίσκηται λόγος ὁ μετασκευάζων εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὰς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεις, οὐκ